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KONSTANTIN AVRAMOV: Soviet America: Popular Responses to the 
United States in post-World War II Soviet Union 
 
 
 In this work, I attempt to explore how average Soviet people reacted to the images 
and depictions of America presented to them through official and unofficial channels 
from both sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.  I argue that average Soviet 
citizens’ view of America was primarily informed by, and closely followed that of 
official propaganda.  Deprived of any coherent information about America, Soviet 
citizens fell back on pre-World War II and even pre-Revolutionary views of America as 
an incredibly rich yet socially unjust country dominated by an insatiable pursuit of 
money.  While these views did not remain static they adjusted to social and political 
events--the changes remained on the outer layers and did not touch the foundations of 
ordinary Soviet people’s image of America.  To put it another way, Soviet citizens had 
two levels of beliefs about America.  The first, or the core level, was more static, based 
mostly on official propaganda.  The second, or the outer level, was more flexible and 
allowed for incorporation of unofficial information about America, including the use of 
American consumer and cultural products.  Moreover, I will show that core Soviet 
attitudes about America remained roughly the same at least into the mid-eighties, 
highlighting a high degree of success in the Soviet state’s manipulation of information on 
this issue. 
 I contend that unofficial information about America available to the Soviet people 
in form of radio broadcasts, magazines, movies, and encounters with foreign visitors did 
little to alter their core perceptions of America.  Furthermore, when Soviets came in 
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contact with information about real America through interaction with Western travelers, 
they frequently chose to ignore it if it challenged their core image of the United States.  
Instead, many average Soviets used new information in a way that reinforced their 
already formed beliefs, positive or negative, about America.  While outside information 
and products from the United States served as a proverbial “window to the West,” they 
also served as a mirror through which the Soviets, denied free access to information, 
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 The Cold War has had a lasting impact on Americans' perception of Russians, and 
on Russians' perceptions of Americans.  The threat of nuclear war between the world's 
two military superpowers, which arose out of the disintegration of their alliance in World 
War II, colored two generations' sense of their identity and their future.  
 In the past ten years Cold War scholarship finally began to address the fact that 
this conflict was not just diplomatic or geo-political in nature.  At the time of the Berlin 
Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. also waged 
battles for the hearts and minds (to use a well-worn phrase) of their own citizens as well 
as people outside their borders.  Various forms of soft power, a term I borrow from 
Joseph Nye, stood at the center of this struggle.1  Here, I attempt to explore how average 
Soviet people reacted to the soft power of the images and depictions of America 
presented to them through official and unofficial channels from both sides of the Iron 
Curtain during the Cold War. 
 In this work I will argue that average Soviet citizens’ view of America was 
primarily informed by, and closely followed that of official propaganda.  Deprived of any 
coherent information about America, Soviet citizens fell back on pre-World War II and 
even pre-Revolutionary views of America as an incredibly rich yet socially unjust 
country dominated by an insatiable pursuit of money.  While these views did not remain 
                                                        
1 For more on soft power see Joseph Nye, Soft power : the means to success in world politics (New York : 
Public Affairs, 2004). 
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static they adjusted to social and political events--the changes remained on the outer 
layers and did not touch the foundations of ordinary Soviet people’s image of America.  
To put it another way, Soviet citizens had two levels of beliefs about America.  The first, 
or the core level, was more static, based mostly on official propaganda.  The second, or 
the outer level, was more flexible and allowed for incorporation of unofficial information 
about America, including the use of American consumer and cultural products.  
Moreover, I will show that core Soviet attitudes about the United States remained roughly 
the same at least into the mid-eighties, highlighting a high degree of success in the Soviet 
state’s manipulation of information on this issue. 
 I contend that unofficial information about America available to the Soviet people 
in form of radio broadcasts, magazines, movies, and encounters with foreign visitors did 
little to alter their core perceptions of America.2   It did, however, force Soviet authorities 
to tailor their domestic propaganda message to adjust for outside information.  
Furthermore, when Soviets came in contact with information about real America through 
interaction with Western travelers, they chose to ignore it if it challenged their core image 
of the United States.  Instead, many average Soviets used new information in a way that 
reinforced their already formed beliefs, positive or negative, about America.  While 
outside information and products from the United States served as a proverbial “window 
to the West,” they also served as a mirror through which the Soviets, denied free access 
to information, sought to reflect on their own country and its standing in the wider world.      
                                                        
2 Primarily these unofficial images were those constructed by American authorities to “market” to Soviet 
citizens at the USIA exhibits and via Voice of America and Radio Liberty.  At the same time, American 
movies and books permitted for internal consumption also faced censorship as Soviet authorities used them 
to support their version of America.  Therefore, I use the term “unofficial information” when talking about 
content not physically created by the Soviet government. 
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 America’s status as the most powerful capitalist nation and Soviet Union’s enemy 
in the Cold War made it an appealing symbol for Soviet citizens to use to promote their 
own messages to the government or the larger Soviet society.  Workers and others 
unhappy with economic situation, marginalized groups (such as religious sectarians and 
convicts), youth in search of self-identity, and those wishing to showcase their status in 
society all used the image of America to further their cause.  Having little knowledge 
about the real America, all of them molded America into something that best suited their 
needs, no matter how far removed from reality.  Paulina Bren drew similar conclusions 
about how political leaders and average people in Czechoslovakia in 1960s to 1980s used 
images of the West.3  
 In addition, by the late 1960s Soviet people’s positive images of America as a 
country or their affinity for American cultural and consumer products did not necessarily 
signal their denunciation of the Soviet system.4  This was especially true of the younger 
Soviets.  In other words, Soviet people created an internal hybrid system where socialist 
and nationalist values co-existed together with theirs desire for, and use of, popular 
American cultural and consumer products, areas in which the Soviet system was 
deficient.  In his recent book, William Risch found similar trends in the Ukrainian city of 
Lviv, which “represented a compromise with the capitalist West and Soviet socialism.”5  
  In the past decade, social and cultural histories of the Cold War emerged as some 
of the more popular areas of study in the historical field.  And my attempt to understand 
                                                        
3 Paulina Bren, “Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall … Is the West the Fairest of Them All? Czechoslovak 
Normalization and Its (Dis)Contents,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9:4 (Fall 
2008), 831-854. 
4 For process of normalization of these practices among the younger generation see Alexei Yurchak, 
Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More, 160-185. 
5 William Risch, The Ukrainian West : culture and the fate of empire in Soviet Lviv.  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011).  
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Soviet reactions to the United States is not new.  Alan Ball’s excellent study explored the 
influence of America on the Soviet Union in 1920s and 1990s, concluding that “no other 
country approached America’s influence on Soviet popular culture.”6  Over many years, 
sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh has been one of the leading scholars of Soviet society, 
often touching on frequently conformist nature of Soviet public opinion (in line with my 
findings).  More recently, Denis Kozlov and Karl Loewenstein produced highly 
informative and insightful works where they showed Soviet public’s increased expression 
of their opinions over a variety of topics through their responses to events such as the 
XXth Party Congress as well as the Pasternak and Siniavskii–Daniel´ affairs.7  Donald 
Raleigh’s recent book is an engaging oral history of “Russia’s Cold War generation” 
constructed from interviews with former students of an elite school in the city of 
Saratov.8  Another work by Vladislav Zubok and Eric Shiraev’s concluded that “While 
the government exerted all its strength to compete with the United States, the society was 
largely neutral and even friendly toward Americans.”9  Alexei Yurchak and Juliane Furst 
examined the lives of younger Soviets in late-Stalinist and Brezhnev periods, in part 
touching on their relationships with the West as a way to form identities that differed 
from ones envisioned by the government.10  Thomas Cushman and Sergei Zhuk 
                                                        
6Alan Ball,  Imagining America: influence and images in twentieth-century Russia. (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 113. 
7 Denis Kozlov,  “I Have Not Read, but I Will Say” Soviet Literary Audiences and Changing Ideas of 
Social Membership, 1958–66,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7: 3  (Summer 
2006), pp. 557-597; Karl Loewenstein,  “Re-emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev 
and Responses to the Secret Speech” EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 58, No. 8, (December 2006), pp. 1329 
– 1345. 
8 Donald Raleigh,  Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation.  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
9 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 2.    
10 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Juliane Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and 
the Emergence of Mature Socialism  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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investigated Soviet youth’s relationship with Western music in the late Soviet period, 
arguing that consumption of Western music carried elements of counterculture.11 
 All of these works help us better understand public opinion in post World War II 
Soviet Union.  There are, however, almost no studies that deal specifically with the topic 
of reactions to the United States by average Soviet people in this period.  One exception 
is Rósa Magnúsdóttir’s dissertation on Soviet popular attitudes towards America (1945-
1959) where she argued that “The Soviet State Failed To Control Popular Attitudes 
Toward The United States Of America.”12  Although contrary to Magnúsdóttir’s 
conclusion, I find that the Soviet state did remarkably well in controlling and shaping 
public attitudes about its Cold War rival.   
 The post-World War II period of Soviet history has enjoyed increased scholarly 
attention in the last ten years.  Elena Zubkova’s pioneering book brought forth a number 
of social issues such as crime, poverty, demographics, and the interrelationship between 
the people and the government.13  Looking at post-war social dynamics, Donald Filtzer 
undertook a study of Soviet workers.14  He argued that due to dire economic conditions 
following the war Soviet workers could not assert much agency and counter the 
government’s more repressive measures such as forced labor conscription.  Meanwhile, 
Juliane Furst wrote about the younger generation growing up in post-war years.  She 
found that some among the younger post-war generation managed to establish identities 
                                                        
11 Thomas Cushman, Notes from underground : rock music counterculture in Russia. (Albany : State 
University of New York Press, 1995); Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City : The West, Identity, 
and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
12 Rósa Magnúsdóttir, “Keeping Up Appearances: How The Soviet State Failed To Control Popular 
Attitudes Toward The United States Of America, 1945-1959” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 
2008). 
13 Elena Zubkova,  Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo : politika i povsednevnostʹ, 1945-1953  (Moskva: 
ROSPENN, 2000). 
14 Donald Filtzer,  Soviet workers and late Stalinism : labour and the restoration of the Stalinist system 
after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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separate from the ones dictated to them from the top, largely through consumption of 
Western music, clothes, and dance.15         
 Better relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death led to 
increased contact between the two countries.  Studies by David Caute and Walter Hixson 
devote a great number of pages to covering this war of cultures.  Caute’s work provides 
extensive examples, but little analysis.  On the other hand, Hixson is more inclined to 
suggest that American victory in the battle of cultures eventually led to victory in the 
Cold War, as did Yale Richmond.16  Calling her latest book Moscow prime time : how the 
Soviet Union built the media empire that lost the cultural Cold War Kristin Roth-Ey 
reaches a similar if more limited conclusion.17  Greater interaction with the world outside 
of Soviet borders also forced Soviet people to redefine their views on what it meant to be 
Soviet.18  Moreover, while Stalin’s passing brought a change in leadership and foreign 
policy it also raised questions of de-Stalinization and its effect on generational 
interrelationship.19     
                                                        
15 Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation. 
16 David Caute,  The Dancer Defects: the Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War.  (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the 
Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange & The Cold War: 
Raising The Iron Curtain (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), ix. 
17 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the media empire that lost the 
cultural Cold War  (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2011). 
18 Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation and Timothy Johnson, Being Soviet: identity, rumour, and Everyday Life 
under Stalin 1939-1953, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) provide good background on ideas 
and practices of being a Soviet citizen in the late Stalinist period.  Susan Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: 
Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 
61:2 (Summer, 2002), 211-252 and Kristin Roth-Ey, “Loose Girls’ on the Loose?: Sex, Propaganda and the 
1957 Youth Festival,” in Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood eds., Women in the Khrushchev 
Era  (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75-95, offer evidence of change in social perceptions and 
definitions in the Khrushchev period.  For Soviet tourism abroad see Anne Gorsuch, All this is your World: 
Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).    
19 See Stephen Bittner,  The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s 
Arbat. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).  Also, Jones, Polly. ed. The dilemmas of de-Stalinization : 
negotiating cultural and social change in the Khrushchev era. (New York : Routledge, 2006).  For an 
excellent discussion on definitions of the term “generation” see Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 16-23. 
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 The social history of the Brezhnev period has also received some recent attention, 
with scholars reevaluating the long-standing label of stagnation from economics to 
intellectual climate.20  Christine Evans’s recent work continued historical reassessment of 
the Brezhnev period by showing that social and cultural competition from the West 
forced Soviet television to make its content more appealing to a wider audience.21  David 
Ruffley’s book highlighted growing frustration with Soviet system’s inability to meet 
their aspirations among young Soviet professionals (1960s-1980s).  These “Children of 
Victory,” as he called them largely funneled their complaints through official channels 
such as petitions and letters to authorities.22  Exploring the younger generation of the 
period, Alexei Yurchak showed how the Soviet government unintentionally “normalized” 
the use of Western consumer and cultural products among the Soviet youth through 
mixed messages and portrayal of those who used these products in terms that did not 
correspond to reality.23 
 On the other side, several scholars focused on the response of ordinary Americans 
to the image of the Soviet Union presented to them by the U.S. government during the 
Cold War.  In his work on American patriotic rituals in the Cold War, Richard Fried 
showed that despite intense campaigns by certain segments of the American elite, 
average Americans did not buy into the more exaggerated threats promoted by these 
                                                        
20 See for example, Edwin Bacon and Marc Sandle. eds., Brezhnev Reconsidered. (New York: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2002). 
21 Christine Evans, “Song of the Year and Soviet Mass Culture in the 1970s” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History, 12 : 3 (Summer 2011): 617-645.  Also see Thomas Wolfe. Governing Soviet 
journalism : the press and the socialist person after Stalin. (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2005).  
Other studies showing the need to reexamine the Brezhnev period include collection of essays in Bacon, 
Brezhnev Reconsidered.   
22 David Ruffley., Children of victory : young specialists and the evolution of Soviet society (Westport : 
Praeger, 2003). 
23 Yurchak, 160-185.  For more indepth discussion of Soviet youth and Western music of the period see 
Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City.   
  8 
campaigns.24  Fried also noted the fact that popular consumer culture did more to shape 
American sense of itself than did patriotic campaigns of the Cold War.  David Foglesong 
argued that, for many of the same people Fried discussed, their focus on reforming the 
Soviet Union served as a way to soothe internal negative feelings about America, such as 
the Vietnam War.25  Joanne Sharp’s study of the Cold War Reader’s Digest explored how 
America’s most popular magazine of the time shaped its readers view of America’s Cold 
War enemy.26 
 A number of studies also addressed the topic of American Cold War propaganda 
both domestic and abroad.  Focusing on Western and Eastern exhibitions and trade fares, 
Greg Castillo highlighted the importance of consumerism as a Cold War propaganda 
battleground.27  Laura Belmonte showed the process of “selling the American way,” a 
highly idealistic and sanitized version of the United States, to the world.28  The United 
States Information Agency and American radio broadcasting has received considerable 
attention both in the form of memoirs by former staff members as well as professional 
scholars.29     
                                                        
24 Richard Fried, The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold 
War America (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
25 David Foglesong, The American mission and the Evil Empire : the crusade for a Free Russia since 1881  
(New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Nancy Bernhard, US television news and Cold War 
propaganda, 1947-1960 (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
26 Joanne Sharp, Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
27 Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
28 Laura Belmonte, Selling the American way : U.S. propaganda and the Cold War. (Philadelphia : 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
29 See for example, James Critchlow,  Radio Hole-in-the-Head: Radio Liberty- An Insider’s Story of Cold 
War Broadcasting.  (Washington: American University Press, 1995), Arch Puddington. Broadcasting 
Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.  (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 2003), Gene Sosin, Sparks of Liberty: an insider’s memoir of Radio Liberty.  
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999), Eugene Parta, Discovering the Hidden Listener: an 
Assessment of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR during the Cold War.  (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2007) and Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and The United States Information 
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 Many of these studies touch on the topic of Soviet people’s interaction with the 
West.  They do so, however, in narrow terms, focusing on either a particular period or 
single issue such as music or propaganda.  Therefore, my study aims to combine my 
research with the micro-studies of other scholars in the field into a coherent narrative 
detailing reactions to America by average Soviet people from the end of World War II to 
period right before beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. 
 My use of the words “average” and “regular” in reference to the subjects of my 
study immediately raises the questions:  Who are these average Soviets?  What makes 
them different from the others? 




 Top-level nachalniks [supervisors] 
 Top-level intelligentsia 
 
Sub-elites 
 Middle-level nachalniks 
 Middle-level intellectuals 
 
Large  socio-professional groups 
 Members of the mass professions 
 Students 
 Skilled workers 
 White-collar workers 
 
Labor groups 
 Rank-and-file workers 
 Agricultural workers 
 Unskilled workers 
 Kolkhoz peasantry30    
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989.  (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
30 National Archives (College Park, Maryland), hereafter NA 306/A1-1016/44. 
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Because the MIT study was computational in nature, it required firm delineation of social 
groups that in reality were much more fluid in composition.  Even so, these descriptors 
represent a reasonable approach to parsing Soviet society. 
 So which of these people are average?   
 For purposes of this study, I have focused on responses of those who consumed 
messages about America, not those who produced them.  I selected people who did not 
play an active role in shaping public opinion, such as intellectuals and government 
officials responsible for various aspects of propaganda, to give two prominent 
examples.31  Neither high government officials nor prominent dissidents are central to my 
study; instead, I strive to recover the voices of persons who were remarkable only for 
their ordinariness. 
It is difficult to reconstruct the perspective of the “average Soviet.”  Soviet 
sociology and especially public opinion studies were almost non-existent until the 1960s, 
and even then quite limited.  As a result, there is little scientific sociological information 
on demographics and how they relate to public opinion.  Even the very small number of 
such Soviet studies that do exist must be used cautiously, as with any public opinion 
survey data.32  Thus, uncovering public reactions in the Soviet Union is no easy task, 
especially in relation to sensitive topics such as people’s opinion about the United States, 
Soviet Union’s chief rival in the Cold War.  Formal, published studies of popular opinion 
using statistically reliable polling techniques certainly did not exist before Khrushchev.  
                                                        
31 Attitudes towards America by Soviet intellectuals are discussed in Shlapentokh, Vladimir.  Soviet 
intellectuals and political power : the post-Stalin era. (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1990). 
For analysis of America by Soviet experts in political and social studies see Richard Mills.  As Moscow 
Sees Us: American Politics and Society in the Soviet Mind Set.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990).  
32 See for example, George Bishop, The illusion of public opinion : fact and artifact in American public 
opinion polls.  (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
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However, Soviet authorities were intensely interested in the "popular mood" and gathered 
information about rumors, complaints, etc.33  Various state administrative and security 
agencies, such as the local Ispolkoms (executive committees) and the NKVD (State 
security agency 1934-1954), acted as the main sources of gauging how the Soviet people 
felt about this or that particular topic.  However, the accuracy of such reports was not 
guaranteed, given that local authorities had their own agendas in suppressing information 
that placed them in an unflattering light to higher authorities, or over-exaggerating facts 
in order to force action from the top. 
 Understanding the importance of public opinion, the Soviet government did allow 
some social scientists to conduct public opinion studies starting in the late 1950s.  
Komsomolskaya Pravda, a newspaper intended for a younger audience, even began a 
public opinion section based on readers’ letters.34  The column, however, was closed 
down in late 1960s under a more politically conservative Leonid Brezhnev.  There were 
sociological studies done in the 1970s and 1980s.  Many of these, however, often 
suffered from the Soviet public’s distrust of any type of official questionnaires.35  
Therefore, people often told the researchers what they thought the official line was, 
instead of their real opinion.36 
 That is not to say that Soviet Union lacked quality studies in public opinion.  
Notably, Boris Grushin and his team produced excellent studies in the area.37  From time 
to time, Soviet security organs such as the KGB would produce or commission public 
                                                        
33 See for example Elena Zubkova,  “Mir Mnenii Sovetskogo Cheloveka 1945-1948 Gody: Po Materiialam 
TSK VKP(B)” Otechestvennaia Istoriia; September (1998), Issue 4, p. 99-108. 
34 Boris Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia: ocherki massovogo 
soznavaniia rossiian vremen Khrushcheva, Brezhneva, Gorbacheva i El’tsina v 4-kh knigakh. (Moskva : 
Progress-Traditsiia, 2001), 45-49. 
35 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii, 785. 
36 Gorshkov, M.K. Obshestvenoe Mnenie.  (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), 304. 
37 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii. 
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opinion studies.38  Unfortunately, KGB (now FSB) archives are currently closed to most 
researchers.  Even if we had better access to these archives, it would not have a 
significant impact on the accuracy of Soviet public opinion and reactions to the United 
States.  Judging from several available reports, KGB officials tended to view any 
expression of affinity for the West as harmful and anti-Soviet.  And as I make clear in 
this work, many average people did not share the KGB’s view of such practices.  On the 
positive side, they are useful for their factual information such as examples of people’s 
statements about America and the West. 
 Interviews are an obvious choice as a source.  Time, however, becomes a factor.  
Even if we are to take 1985, the cut-off year of my study, that is still a quarter century 
after the fact.  And as several scholars have shown, memory and remembrance are 
dynamic forces that do not always reflect reality of the time in question.39  Others noted 
the fact that during interviews, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens are 
still reluctant to talk frankly about their past, especially if the interview is conducted by a 
foreign specialist.40  As a result, after careful consideration I decided not to make 
interviews conducted more than five years after the period in question a significant part 
of my source material.41  I do, however, make extensive use of interviews conducted 
                                                        
38 See for example “Analiticheskaia spravka KGB SSSR o kharaktere I prichinakh negativkykh proiavlenii 
sredi uchaisheisia I studen’cheskoi molodezhi” Istoricheskii Arkhiv, No. 1, 1994, 195-207 and Elena 
Bashkirova. “The Foreign Radio Audience in the USSR During the Cold War: An Internal Perspective” in 
Ross Johnson and Parta, Eugene, eds., Cold War broadcasting: impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe : a collection of studies and documents. (New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 
103-120. 
39 For example, James Wertsch suggests that collective memory is always shifting in response to political 
and cultural forces; see Voices of collective remembering. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
and Stephen Bittner showed that many Soviet intellectuals recollections about the Thaw period did not 
necessarily correspond to their views at the time.   
40 Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson and Anna Rotkirch. eds., On living through Soviet Russia. (New York : 
Routledge, 2004), 7-9. 
41 One notable exeption is Donald Raleigh. ed., Russia’s Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk 
about Their lives.  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006) and his follow up his book Baby 
  13 
shortly after interviewees left the Soviet Union, such as the Harvard Project and a several 
studies by the United States Information Agency.  
 A number of foreign visitors visited the Soviet Union in the period of my study, 
especially following cultural and academic exchanges that began in the late 1950s.  
Scores of scholars, students, professionals, officials, journalists and ordinary tourists 
sought to experience the other great super-power of the Cold War first-hand.  And given 
the mystique that surrounded the Soviet Union, many Western observers reflected on 
their experience in form of a book shortly after their return.  We must take into account 
that Westerners saw the Soviet Union through their own prism, one colored by the Cold 
War, and through infinite prisms of their own experiences and personalities.  
Consequently, their observations concerning what Soviet citizens thought must be 
regarded with great caution, and due attention to the authors’ own biases.  Even though 
the KGB collections remained inaccessible to me, a number of other archives proved a 
treasure trove of information.  Because the Soviet government did not have a centralized 
public opinion department I focused on three Russian archives: State Archive of the 
Russian Federation (GARF), Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) 
and Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI).   
 GARF holds a large collection of documents from Soviet agencies that had direct 
contact with American citizens and institutions.  These included records of agencies such 
as Inturist (collection 9612) that was responsible for hosting foreign tourists, as well as 
various agencies that sent specialists (such as scientists and doctors) to seminars in the 
U.S. (collection 8009). GARF also houses substantial materials on Soviet-American 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
Although I do not want to suggest that oral histories are not a valuable historical source; they certainly are, 
just not in trying to ascertain popular opinion in the past. 
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relations, including, for example, letters from regular Soviet citizens related to the 
Khrushchev-Eisenhower meetings (collection 5446). 
 My research at the RGASPI archive focused on two major areas.  The first 
included records of the Soviet Propaganda Department of the Central Committee (1945-
1956) (collections 125, 132).  The second area housed archives of various Soviet 
newspapers such as the ideological Komunist and the rural Sel’skaia zhizn’, many of 
which contained letters to the editor, including a number concerning the United States.  
My RGANI archive research largely dealt with the records of the Soviet Propaganda 
Department of the Central Committee (1958-) that was responsible for directing public 
opinion based on instructions from the central government (collection 5, op. 33), as well 
as various documents from other governmental departments such as the KGB from the 
post-Stalin period (1960s – 1980s) (collection 89). 
 American exhibitions in the Soviet Union constituted another area of interest for 
my project.  Throughout the Cold War, the United States Information Agency, created in 
the mid-1950s to promote U.S. national interests abroad, hosted a number of exhibitions 
in the Soviet Union.  USIA exhibitions covered areas from agriculture to plastics, from 
sports equipment to space exploration.  While these exhibitions promoted a positive 
image of America in the Soviet Union, they also functioned as barometers of Soviet 
public opinion toward the United States.  The USIA archives (National Archives - 
College Park, MD) contain a wealth of information on Soviet public reactions to the U.S.  
USIA staffers collected reactions of Soviet citizens attending these exhibitions, in official 
Comment Books, voluntary questionnaires, and recollections of interactions with Soviet 
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citizens by American exhibition guides.  In many cases, these responses were organized 
and printed in forms of research reports. 
 As we have seen, getting a coherent picture of Soviet responses to the United 
States during the Cold War requires piecing together information from a wide array of 
sources.  This method has its drawbacks such as not being rooted in quantitative methods; 
the sources provide few opportunities to determine what percentage of the Soviet 
population held a particular view.42  At the same time, this source jigsaw puzzle allows us 
to study the issue from many angles, thus painting a much wider and intricate picture. 
 My study consists of three chapters.  The first chapter examines official Soviet 
images of the United States from newspapers, magazine articles, books, films and the 
like, and how they were constructed.  Some high-quality scholarship already exists on 
official Soviet images of America, particularly, works of Frederick Barghoorn, Jonathan 
Becker, Eric Shiraev, Vladislav Zubok, Yale Richmond, and Kevin McKenna.  For the 
most part, however, these works focus on specific events or timeframes and do not deal 
with the broader picture.  In this chapter I survey a broad range of Russian publications, 
but particularly focus on the popular Soviet magazines Ogonek and Krokodil.  More 
importantly, in discussing official Soviet images of America I include new sources from 
the Soviet Department of Propaganda (RGANI and RGASPI), which speak to the goals 
Soviet officials pursued in constructing propaganda regarding America. 
 The second chapter focuses on images that were available to average Soviet 
citizens from sources other than their government.  These included Western radio 
broadcasts, magazines, movies, and American exhibitions put on by the United States 
                                                        
42 Vladimir Shlapentokh provided a good critique of available sources for the study of Soviet public 
opinion in Soviet public opinion and ideology : mythology and pragmatism in interaction.  (New York : 
Praeger, 1986), xvii-xx. 
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Information agency starting with the 1959 Moscow exhibition.  I devote large sections of 
the chapter to discussion of American radio broadcasts, especially the Voice of America 
and American exhibitions.  Radio because it was by far the biggest source of unofficial 
information available to the average Soviet person and exhibitions because they were the 
only chance for Soviets to come face to face with America, or at least America that 
Americans wanted the Soviets to see.  
 The third and final chapter deals with Soviet youth.  In most years of the post 
World War II Soviet period, young people engaged with images and ideas of the West 
more intensely than adults, because the idea of the West had close ties to their search for 





CHAPTER 1: Informing the Masses: Official Propaganda and 





 Before we can discuss public perceptions and reactions to America in the Soviet 
Union we must first understand the sources of information that were available to the 
Soviet public.  For most Soviet citizens, state media in the form of newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television were their main information resource.  Having little 
opportunity to travel abroad, they especially learned about international topics from 
official sources.  Therefore, we must form a clear picture of the official image of the 
United States presented to its citizens by the Soviet government to provide a proper 
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context for discussion of public reaction to those messages.  
 In this chapter, the source base rests first upon popular magazines, especially the 
satirical Krokodil and the weekly Ogonek.  Both magazines had large numbers of readers 
and were designed for non-specialized audiences, making them ideal for study of official 
propaganda meant for broad popular consumption.1  State newspapers such as Pravda 
and Izvestiia presented starkly-drawn images of the United States; several fine scholarly 
studies drawing upon them have already been published.   A number of foreign 
journalists, government officials and tourists writing about their time in the Soviet Union 
provided detailed analysis and observation of official Soviet propaganda.  Most 
foreigners viewed the Soviet Union through a different prism, shaped by their own 
worldview that was quite different from that of an average Soviet citizen.  Consequently, 
they sometimes misunderstood or misrepresented official Soviet representations of the 
United States.  To overcome their bias, I have tried to verify their depictions by 
comparison to other sources.  In addition, unpublished documents from the Russian State 
Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History (RGANI) from the Soviet propaganda department2 offer an inside 
look at the shaping of official propaganda about the United States.  Still more revealing 
are the collections of uncensored and unsolicited letters written by Soviet citizens to 
Soviet leadership regarding America, on occasions such as Nikita Khrushchev’s 1959 
visit to the United States and his meeting with John F. Kennedy, the Bay of Pigs and U2 
incidents, as well as Richard Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in the early 1970s.  There 
                                                        
1 For a view of America as presented by Soviet scholars see Richard Mills.  As Moscow Sees Us: American 
Politics and Society in the Soviet Mind Set.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
2 Its official name was Department of Propaganda and Agitation (Otdel Propagandy i agitatsii).  It was part 
of the Central Committee Secretariat. 
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is little doubt about authenticity of feelings expressed in the letters, considering the fact 
that vast majority of these were unsolicited.  However, the largest percentage of the 
letters came from retirees, and therefore only represent a specific demographic of Soviet 
population.  At the same time, however, the views in retirees’ letters in many ways 
resemble the feelings of other population segments.3  For the most part, I do not discuss 
the topic of Soviet youth, part of Soviet population most effected by ideas and images of 
the West, reserving them for a separate chapter on the subject.  Other collections contain 
people’s letters to various newspapers such as official ideological publication Kommunist 
and popular rural paper Rural Life (Sel’skaia zhizn’) some of which touch on Soviet 
views of America. 
 From the very beginning of the Soviet state official propaganda regarding the 
United States was largely based on the Marxist idea of a two-class world where one class, 
the capitalists, ruled over and exploited the other, the working class.  Both countries 
emerged as leading representatives of their respective economic and social systems after 
World War II, and as Cold War tensions between them grew, so did Soviet propaganda 
about America.  The tone of propaganda became more hostile and attacks on America 
more frequent, yet fundamental ideas stayed the same until at least the mid 1980s.   
The term propaganda often carries a negative connotation, largely due to its 
association with German propaganda efforts in World War I, World War II, and Soviet 
media during the Cold War.  There is no intent on my part here to load the term with any 
of these associations.  Here I follow Edward Bernays, one of the founders of American 
                                                        
3 Rósa Magnúsdóttir discusses this topic in some detail - Magnúsdóttir, 229-232.  She largely relies on 
published letters from one book: Face to Face with America: The Story of N.S. Khrushchov’s Visit to the 
U.S.A. September 15-27, 1959 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publ. House, 1960).  However, they do tend 
to resemble archival holdings in many ways.  
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public relations following World War I, who defined propaganda neutrally as simple 
efforts by one group or the other to sway the public to a specific point of view.4  
Therefore, here I use the term propaganda to signify efforts to influence public opinion 
on the part of the Soviet, or other, governments, without endorsing or condemning such 
efforts.  Furthermore, there is no intention on my part to label official Soviet depictions 
of America as either right or wrong, as much of it is a matter of perspective and such 
discussion is outside the scope of this study.  I do so only when the information presented 
in official Soviet sources was factually incorrect.  
Official propaganda did not remain static over time, and while keeping the core 
messages, it used different topics to drive the point home.  For example, in the post-
World War II Stalin period, official Soviet publications used the fear of war to portray 
America as not only profiting from world conflicts but also employing particularly 
barbaric methods to achieve their goals.  The Khrushchev period saw use of Soviet 
victories in the space race to underscore superiority of the Soviet system.  In the 
Brezhnev years, Soviet propaganda employed a combination of the two in order to 
counter the growing gap in consumer economics.  Tony Shaw schematized cogently, 
specifically in regard to propaganda in Soviet cinema, this periodization: “1946-1953 
(hard-line propaganda); 1953-1978 (the beginning and development of soft propaganda); 
1978-1986 (a return to harder propaganda, but a return that bears hallmarks of softer 
times)”.5    
  The Soviet government had great success in convincing the population to believe 
the official image of the United States.  And for the most part, having little outside 
                                                        
4 Edward Bernays, Propaganda. (New York : H. Liveright, 1928), 21-24. 
5 Tony Shaw, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2010), 40. 
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information about the United States, a majority of the Soviet population saw America 
much in the same way as it was presented in the Soviet media.  Largely this was a 
reflection of the lack of outside information about the United States and on international 
issues in general.  When people’s view of the United States diverged from the official 
line, it not so much signaled their admiration for America, although this played a part, as 
it expressed their disapproval of the situation inside the country, usually relating to the 
Soviet standard of living.  To put it another way, having little outside information about 
America, Soviet people created their own vision of America-- one that served as a 
counterweight to much of what they saw wrong with their own country. In this chapter I 
frequently use phrases such as “most Soviets” or “many Soviets” while citing one or two 
examples.  It is certainly not my intent to pass off singular instances as evidence of larger 
trends, or lump all of Soviet people into one singular whole.  In fact, former Soviet 
sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh stressed extreme diversity in Soviet population’s 
attitudes towards the West.6   However, sociological studies as we understand them today 
largely did not exist in the Soviet Union until the 1960s.  Even then they were subject to 
heavy state censorship.  As a result, there are very few empirical studies of Soviet public 
opinion, with the notable exception of Boris Grushin’s research.  Thus, I am not able to 
provide statistical evidence for the prevalence of a particular view, and instead I need to 
rely upon the frequency with which similar expressions appear in the sources available to 
me. 
                                                        




Constructing the capitalist: official propaganda before World War II  
  
 In the period prior to 1945, we see the emergence of official depictions and 
popular views of America that would last until the final years of the Soviet Union.  For 
example, American unemployment, racism, lack of social benefits and warmongering 
were all featured in official Soviet narrative about America shortly after the 1917 
Revolution.7  Many of these themes had roots going back to decades preceding the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, although the focus here will be on the Soviet period.  
 Through out late 19th and into the 20th centuries many people throughout the 
world saw America as a land of opportunity where old notions about the world crumbled, 
giving way to new modernist horizons, especially in the fields of industry and 
technology.  Among intellectuals in Europe and elsewhere, “by the 1920s”, wrote 
Russian historian Alan Ball, “America had become the modernist nation par excellence.”8 
 In the early years of the Soviet state, America did not occupy as prominent a spot 
in official propaganda nor in the public mind as it would during the Cold War.  Despite 
limited American intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1919, Soviet media did not 
usually single America out for individual denunciation.  Instead, America was frequently 
lumped together with other capitalist countries into a single hostile bloc that threatened 
the Soviet state.9  For the young Soviet country, however, America contained qualities to 
                                                        
7 Kevin McKenna, All the views fit to print : changing images of the U.S. in Pravda political cartoons, 
1917-1991.  (New York : Peter Lang, 2001), 39-44. 
8 Ball, 9. 
9 McKenna, 27. 
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be emulated, despite its capitalist economic system.  Soviet leaders and media frequently 
held up America as an illustration of industrial efficiency exemplified by the scientific 
time management system of Taylorism and the assembly lines at the Ford plants.10   
 Concurrently, while marveling at American technological achievements such as 
the Brooklyn Bridge, some of those Soviets who visited America noted the darker side of 
America progress.  The Soviet poet and propagandist Vladimir Mayakovsky, during his 
brief visit to New York in 1920s, wrote memorably about America’s obsession with 
commercial pursuits and shallowness of its spiritual life. 
 
I HATE NEW YORK ON SUNDAYS: around ten o’clock, wearing only purple cloth, a clerk 
raises his curtain.  Without putting on pants, he sits near a window with a two-pound, hundred-
page edition of the World or The Times.  Then he reads poetic and illustrious section of the 
department store advertisements (that constitute the extent of the American worldview.)  After the 
advertisements, he looks at the robbery and murder section.11 
   
Another leading Soviet poet, Sergei Esenin, reacted similar to his American experience in 
the 1920s:  “Internally, America does not believe in god.  There is no time for such 
nonsense.”12 
 Despite the appearance of such dismissive statements about the United States, the 
rarety of hostile official propaganda, the lack of any direct confrontation between the two 
countries, and American aid to the Soviet Union during a severe famine in the early 
1920s combined to produce a relatively positive image of America in Soviet sources of 
the period.  American relief efforts in the 1920s, “reinforced the pre-existing image of 
“golden America” as a land of magical abundance.  It also led to a broader use of the 
                                                        
10 For a good discussion of Soviet Union and American industrial planning, see Thomas Hughes.  American 
genesis : a century of invention and technological enthusiasm, 1870-1970.  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004) – particularly Chapter 6.  Also see Alan Ball – Chapter 1. 
11 Vladimir Mayakovsky, Sobranie Sochinenii v Shesti Tomah, Tom 3 (Moskva: Pravda, 1973), 224-225.  
12 Sergei Esenin, Sobranie Sochinenii v Peti Tomakh, Tom 4. (Moskva: Gosudarstvenoe izdatel’stvo 
khudozhestvenoi literatury, 1962), 262. 
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term Amerikanizm to refer to a fast-paced, hard-working ethos,” concluded historian 
David Foglesong.13  At the same time, Soviet officials and other visitors to America often 
noted appalling exploitation and racism, themes noted by Russian visitors prior to 1917.14   
 The 1920s saw relatively few official treatments of individual Americans in the 
Soviet media.  When they did appear it was often in a humorous light.  1924 Soviet silent 
film The Extraordinatry Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of Bolsheviks (Neobychainye 
priklyucheniya mistera Vesta v strane bolshevikov) featured a rich American businessman 
(Mr. West) traveling to Moscow.  At first, Mr. West is apprehensive about the Soviet 
Union, his perceptions driven by preconceived notions that the country is full of crime 
and disorder.  Eventually, after a number of comical adventures, Mr. West learns that 
Soviets are good and hospitable people.  Overall, the movie presented Americans as rich 
and spoiled by luxury (Mr. West came with a servant), but not bad people at heart.   
 Considering the still low literacy rates and general preoccupation with post Civil 
War reconstruction, it is unlikely that too many average Soviet people read poetry and 
other books largely targeted at the more educated crowd.  The average Soviets’ view of 
America was shaped by official propaganda (lectures and printed media – largely 
posters), contact with Americans and America goods during famine relief, and growing 
number of American cars and tractors on Soviet streets and fields. 15  As a result, they 
saw America as a wealthy country, a leader in industrial and technological areas, yet 
suffering from exploitation and racism.  According to Alan Ball, many Soviet peasants of 
the period viewed America largely through the “cult” of Ford and attributed fantastic and 
almost magical qualities to American technical progress after seeing American tractors in 
                                                        
13 Foglesong, 65. 
14 Ball, 39. 
15 McKenna, 29-31. Ball, Chapter 2. 
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the fields.16  At the same time, pointed out popular magazine Krokodil, American 




“Americans, being industrious people, use the smoke from a peace-pipe to power 
their military factories…” (taken from a German satire magazine)   Krokodil 1924 
#26 p.14  (Illustration 1) 
    
 The start of the Soviet industrialization effort in the early 1930s brought a number 
of American businessmen, engineers, and other specialists into the country, creating 
positive personal contacts between Soviet and American people.17  Official propaganda, 
however, began to present America in a more negative light in order to show superiority 
of the Soviet system.  Following Marxist ideology that divided the world into two classes, 
the capitalists and proletariat, the exploiters and the exploited, Soviet media continued to 
                                                        
16 Ibid, 58-59. 
17 For a detailed account of American-Soviet business and social relations from the period please see 
Norman Saul, Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921–1941 (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 2006).  Also see, Thomas Hughes,  “How America helped build the Soviet machine.” 
American Heritage 39:8 (December 1988), 56; Ball, Chapter 4;  Kurt Schultz, “Building the "Soviet 
Detroit": The Construction of the Nizhnii-Novgorod Automobile Factory, 1927-1932,” Slavic Review 49:2 
(Summer, 1990), 200-212. 
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portray America as a country of the moneyed elite and unemployed and oppressed 
working class.     
 Specifically, Soviet propaganda focused on the issue of racism, one of the most 
visible features of inequality in American society.  Black and White (Chernoe i Beloe), a 
Soviet animated cartoon from 1933, showed African Americans in a virtual state of 
slavery, beaten and lynched by their white masters (see Illustration 2).  1936 movie 
Circus (Tsyrk) told the story of Marion Dixon, a white American circus performer and a 
mother of an interracial child, who escapes racial discrimination at home and comes to 
perform in Moscow circus.  Once in the Soviet Union she discovers that Soviet people do 
not care about the color of her baby’s skin, highlighting the difference between the two 




American road - Black and White (Chornoe I Beloe) – 1933  (Illustration 2) 
 
 In addition, the Soviet press began to compare capitalist and communist systems 
by contrasting Soviet industrial growth of the 1930s with long unemployment lines of 
America in the midst of the Great Depression.  Again Soviet media showed America as a 
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country of astounding inequality where a few got rich at the expense of the many.  
“Soviet propaganda [of the 1930s] portrayed America as a plutocracy ruled by a handful 
of ruthless, selfish, and wasteful monopolists, who held in poverty the vast majority of 
the population.  It dilated on unemployment and exploitation in the United States,” wrote 
Frederick Barghoorn, American scholar of the Soviet Union.18   Writing about popular 
Soviet satire magazine Krokodil, William Nelson pointed out that pre-World War II 
Krokodil depicted the United States “as a nation of dollar-mad imperialists with a 
moribund economic system and a gangster culture.”19       
 In 1937, Ilia Ilf and Evgeni Petrov, two of the most popular Soviet comedic 
writers, published a book detailing their recent trip through the United States.  Titled 
One-Storied20 America (Odnoetazhnaia Amerika), the book described the United States 
as a country where commercial spirit ruled the land:   
 
Advertisements have penetrated American life to such an extent that, if upon waking up 
one morning Americans were to find all advertisements gone, the majority of them would 
be in the most desperate of plights.  They would not know: 
 What cigarettes to smoke? 
 In what store to buy ready-made clothes? 
 Which drink best quenches thirst – Coca-Cola or ginger ale? 
 Which whisky to drink – White Horse or Johnny Walker? 
 Which gasoline to buy – Shell or Standard Oil? 
 Which god to worship – Baptist or Presbyterian?21 
 
At the same time the writers praised the high American living standards, “Comfort in 
America is not a sign of extravagance.  It is standard and accessible,” they wrote.22 
 As a result, by the start of World War II, average Soviet citizens developed a 
                                                        
18 Frederick Barghoorn,  The Soviet image of the United States: A Study of Distortion.  (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), 21-22.  Barghoorns book contains both his first hand experiences, 
which I will use as a primary source, and scholarly material that will serve as a secondary source.  
19 William Nelson,  Out of the Crocodile’s Mouth: Russian Cartoons About the United States From 
“Krokodil”, Moscow’s Humor Magazine. (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), 12. 
20 Referring to prevalence of one-story houses in American landscape. 
21 Ilya Ilf and Evgeni Petrov, Odnoetazhnaya Amerika (Moskva: Tekxt, 2003), 121. 
22 Ibid., 24. 
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highly polarized picture of the United States.  On the one hand there was America - world 
leader in technology and industry, and America - land of personal wealth and multitude 
of consumer conveniences.  On the other, there was America of financial inequality, 
racism, crime, and the all-pervasive obsession with profit where a few fabulously rich 
men called the shots for the whole country.  This perception would lie at the foundation 
of Soviet propaganda about America, and the Soviet people’s view of the United States, 
until the mid-1980s.   
 Overall, prior to World War II the Soviet media showed America as a capitalist 
country with all of the problems inherent to capitalist economic system according to 
Marxist theory: unemployment, exploitation, racism, overproduction, and lack of social 
services.  These images, however, did not present America as an evil or overly 
militaristic country bent on world domination, as was the case during the Cold War 
period.  At the same time, due to lack of serious geo-political friction between the two 
countries, America did not feature as prominently in the Soviet mass media as it would in 
post-war years.        
 Both Lenin and Stalin admired American economic practicality and industrial 
ingenuity.23  This, coupled with American aid during famines of the early 1920s and 
heavy American involvement in Soviet industrial development of the 1930s, established 
America as a country of inequality and racism but also as a country of generosity and of 
admirable entrepreneurship rooted in practicality of production.  The two countries’ 
wartime alliance, centered on the American Lend-Lease program that supplied the Soviet 
                                                        
23 A. V. Fateev,  Obraz vraga v sovetskoi propagande.  1945-1954 gg.  (Moskva: RAN, 1999).  Available 
at - http://psyfactor.org/lib/fateev5.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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Union with much needed food products and military hardware, further cemented 
America’s status as a friendly, if capitalist, nation in the eyes of most Soviets.   
 
 
Brief Friend-New Enemy: official propaganda after World War II  
 
 
 The period immediately following World War II saw a major change in the way 
the Soviet media portrayed the United States.24  With the start of the Cold War in the late 
1940s,25 Soviet media had an up-hill challenge in trying to persuade Soviet people that its 
recent ally was in fact now its biggest and most dangerous enemy.  It was no surprise 
then that the sudden shift in the Soviet relationship with America caused confusion, as 
Soviet people were not clear on how to interpret the countries’ past and present 
relationships.  For example, in late 1947, during the height of the anti-American 
campaign, Soviet authorities from various regions of the country reported that questions 
about the rapid change in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union featured most 
prominently on the minds of Soviet citizens. “What caused the radical change in 
American policy towards the USSR?” was the most common.26            
 One strategy that Soviet propaganda institutions pursued to address people’s 
concerns was diminishing the American contribution the war effort.  For example, in 
describing the wartime alliance, Soviet textbooks published in the late 1940s made no 
                                                        
24 For a brief overview of Soviet propaganda about the West during World War II see Timothy Johnson.  
Being Soviet – Chapter 2. 
25 The beginnings of the Cold War are beyond the scope of this paper.  I will however mention a few major 
issues at the center of the post war conflict between the Soviet Union and America.  These included: mutual 
misunderstanding of Soviet post-war security concerns and the American Marshall Plan.  See John Gaddis,  
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) and 
Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and The Cold War, 1945-1996 (New York: Mcgraw-Hill College, 1996) 
for  good overviews of the subject.      
26 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, hereafter RGASPI f.17, op.125, d. 515 
l.24, f.17, op.125, d. 517 l.34. 
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mention of the German war against Britain or the U.S. war against Japan in the Pacific.  It 
claimed that the Soviet Union singlehandedly saved itself and its allies.27  Such portrayals 
played on the already existing perceptions among the Soviet leaders and citizens that 
America delayed the opening of the second front in order to weaken the Soviet Union.  
The Soviet people sometimes sarcastically referred to American Spam as the “second 
front”.28 
 Soviet authorities went so far as to suggest that America and its European allies 
were responsible for the outbreak of the war in the first place.  In a 1948 speech before 
the writers of the Soviet propaganda department, Party ideologist Boris Ponomarev laid 
out the official version of pre-war events: 
 
In your propaganda you must make clear, taking the current international situation into 
account, that it was the ruling circles of the US, England, France, and especially 
American monopolies, that were responsible for the start of World War II by arming 
Hitler’s Germany.29 
 
The message that the United States contributed to the rise of Nazi Germany continued 
well into the early fifties.30 
 In 1951, Soviet Propaganda Department instructed regional party officials to 
discuss Allies involvement in World War II in the following way: At the end of World 
War II it has become clear that America and England entered the war not to defeat 
Nazism but to “weaken their imperialist competitors, to dominate their economies and 
markets.”31  In other words, besides letting the Soviet Union do most of the fighting, 
America’s motives for entering the war were far from noble.    
                                                        
27 Richard Hilton,  Military Attache in Moscow. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 51-52. 
28 Barghoorn, 237. 
29 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, hereafter GARF f. 8581 op. 2 d. 203. 
30 Harrison Salisbury,  Moscow Journal.  (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 175-176. 
31 RGASPI f.17, op.132, d.467, l.76. 
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 Furthermore, America hoped to profit from the post-war devastation.  In his study 
of Soviet propaganda, Fredrick Barghoorn, described official Soviet depiction of post-
war American foreign policy in this way:   
 
It [America] abandoned its prewar isolationist foreign policy and switched to a drive for 
world domination.  Its grandiose aspirations have been motivated by a combination of 
factors including a desire to utilize excess production capacity accumulated during World 
War II, lust for super-profits, and hatred and fear of the increased power and prestige of 
the “socialist” camp headed by Russia.32 
 
 The Marshall Plan, American project to aid Western European post-war 
reconstruction, became one of the most popular items for attack in the Soviet media.  
Coupled with announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 of American financial and 
military help to Greece and Turkey in their fight against communist forces, the Marshall 
Plan signaled a new phase in the Cold War.       
 American intentions in offering aid to Greece, Turkey, and Western Europe 
became the chief focus of Soviet propaganda on the subject.  Late 1947 saw a sharp 
increase in anti-American material in the Soviet media, accusing America of taking 
advantage of war-devastated Western Europe.  The Soviets painted American offers of 
aid as efforts to enchain Western Europe and others through so-called “dollar 
diplomacy”.  Soviet depiction of the Truman-Marshall Plan, as they called it, claimed that 
American aid was simply a smoke screen to ensnare war-ravaged countries in debt that 
could be used later to extract economic concessions by unloading overproduced 
American goods on European markets.33  The Marshall Plan is “nothing else but a tool of 
                                                        
32 Barghoorn, 180. 
33 N. I.  Nikolaeva,  “Novyi obraz SShA.  Izmeneniia v sovetskoi politike i propagande v 1947-48 gg.,” 
Nauchnye publikatsii Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta.  Novoia i noveishaia istoriia.  Vyp. 20.  
Here I use an electronic version of the article available at - 
http://www.sgu.ru/faculties/historical/sc.publication/historynewtime/new_history_20/21.php. Accessed 
April 22, 2012.  
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American imperialism for economic and political enslavement of Western Europe,” 
explained ideological magazine Komunist in its December, 1948 issue.34 
 The satirical magazine Krokodil summarized the issue in a 1947 poem titled “The 
Savior of Europe”: 
 
The Marshall Plan helped Europe so much 
that in the end  
such “help” will see the death of Europe35 
 
The theme continued well into the early 1950s.  An American tourist visiting the Soviet 
Union in 1953 noted the following skit in Kharkov (Ukraine) circus: “Two clowns came 
out with a long rubber cow labeled, “U.S.A.” “This is the longest cow in the world,” they 
explained.  “It feeds in Western Europe and gives milk in the United States.””36 
 The message about the ulterior motives behind American aid served a dual role.  
It portrayed the United States as a selfish and a greedy country in its post-war foreign 
policy.  At the same time it attempted to undermine the value of American help to the 
Soviet Union in the form of Lend-Lease program that supplied the Soviet Union with 
many consumer and military goods.  American help during the war was still fresh in the 
minds of the Soviet people; in fact many still used some of the American Lend-Lease 
items.37  Therefore, Soviet propaganda sought to re-characterize Soviet people’s 
associations about Lend-Lease, suggesting that it was an inherently selfish act on part of 
the United States. 
   To answer the question of why the United States took such an aggressive stance 
towards the Soviet Union following World War II, Soviet propaganda described America 
                                                        
34 RGASPI f. 599  op.1  d. 8  l. 103. 
35 Quoted in N. I.  Nikolaeva.  
36 Marshall McDuffie, The Red Carpet: 10,000 Miles Through Russia on a Visa from Khrushchev. (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1955), 315. 
37 Barghoorn, 236. 
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as a country that could survive only on war.  Business monopolies controlled American 
foreign policy and sought any excuse to start a war as way to earn generous profits.  
Tensions with the Soviet Union resulted in increased military spending, thus lining the 
pockets of American business monopolies. 
 The Korean War was frequently used as an example of America’s reliance on war 
as a means for economic gain.  In the early 1950s, the magazine Komunist, in answering 
readers’ letters, stated that the American economy is sustained only through war.  It 
pointed out that after the Great Depression America recovered only because of World 
War II, and now Americans started the Korean War in order to prop up their economy.38  
In 1951, the Soviet Propaganda Department instructed officials to inform people in their 
districts that American corporations profited handsomely from World War II and were 
now hoping to do the same in Korea.39 
 Recent war provided for a smooth propaganda transition.  Soviet propaganda 
quickly eased America into the role previously occupied by Nazi Germany--that of a 
bloodthirsty war machine seeking world domination.  All of the hatred stored in the 
hearts of the Soviet people for the Nazis was now to be directed at the new enemy. 
 Many of the characterizations and images previously reserved for the Nazis were 
now used to describe America.  One 1948 issue of Krokodil featured a cartoon comparing 
Voice of America to Nazi propaganda, while 1951 issue suggested Americans were 
recruiting and arming former Nazis in West Germany (see Illustration 3).40  Newspaper 
articles frequently pointed out similarities between American and Nazi foreign policy.  
Other publications suggested that along with German weapon scientists, Americans also 
                                                        
38 RGASPI f. 599 op. 1  d. 415 l. 43-45. 
39 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 467, l. 78. 
40 N. I. Nikolaeva. 
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imported Nazi ideology.41  A Soviet Propaganda Department draft of a 1949 plan for an 
increase in anti-American propaganda called for use of themes such as: “Monopolies help 
the growth of fascism on American soil” and publication of books such as American 
fascism (original title Pattern for Domestic Fascism) by American communist writer 






Title: In West Germany  (Pic. 1) Aha! That’s where your Nazi organization is! 
Follow me!    (Pic.2) …and they followed willingly.    
Krokodil #13 1951 p.6  (Illustration 3) 
 
Writing about early Soviet Cold War propaganda, historian Kevin McKenna noted:     
 
The suggestive association of Anglo-American designs with images of their former foe 
would soon develop as a permanent feature of the Soviet propaganda campaign to install 
                                                        
41 Ibid.  
42 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132. d. 224. l. 48-52. 
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the United States into the role formerly occupied by Nazi Germany as the threat to 
international peace and, in particular, to Soviet security.43 
 
Richard Stites also pointed to Soviet use of World War II iconography in their anti-
American Cold War propaganda.44 
 In official Soviet depictions, early Cold War America regained all of its pre-war 
flaws of racism, inequality, exploitation, and imperialism, but now it acquired something 
even more sinister.  By highlighting American use of Nazi scientists and close 
cooperation with former Nazi officials, Soviet propaganda suggested that somehow 
America was now infected with the virus of Nazi brutality and inhumanity.  This was an 
easy sell to the Soviet population that still vividly remembered Nazi atrocities during the 
war.  The goal, therefore, was to make America look like the old capitalist bogeyman but 
now with the added viciousness of Nazi Germany. 
 Along with trying to change America’s image from a recent ally to a new enemy, 
Soviet authorities faced an equally difficult task.  Millions of Soviet soldiers witnessed 
first-hand the standard of living enjoyed by people in countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Austria and Germany, even after wartime devastation, as the Soviet 
army marched towards Berlin at the end of World War II.  Stories making it back to the 
Soviet Union did not portray Soviet living standards in a flattering light.   
 Already in August 1945, a few months after the end of the war, a group of Soviet 
teachers wrote a letter to Stalin complaining about low teacher salaries.  In the letter they 
stated: “Our troops and specialists stationed abroad testify to the fact that material 
wellbeing and outward appearance of [their] school teachers is infinitely better than 
                                                        
43 McKenna, 76. 
44 Richard Stites, Soviet Popular Culture. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 111. 
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ours.”45  In another case, a number of Soviet soldiers serving in Europe shortly after the 
war were overheard praising Western capitalist system for its ability to provide better 
material rewards.46  Around the same time, Soviet officials noted that negative feelings 
towards collective farms, as evidenced by rumors that Britain and the U.S. were 
pressuring the Soviet government to abolish them, were stronger among those who have 
been abroad, usually as prisoners in Germany.47  An influx of American Lend-Lease 
goods, many of superior quality to their Soviet counterparts, further raised a suspicion 
among Soviet people that life in the West, at least in material terms, was better than in the 
Soviet Union.  For example, Americans frequently reported Soviet fascination and 
admiration of neat cellophane packaging of Lend-Lease goods such as cigarettes.48 
 Soviet people’s exposure to life outside its borders worried the Soviet leadership, 
especially in the face of the government’s continuing struggle to rebuild the country after 
the war.  Consumer products, such as food and clothes, and living space were extremely 
limited.  The government looked at the standard of living as a secondary issue, instead 
focusing on industrial reconstruction.  As a result, the consumer goods situation improved 
very slowly.  Soviet people, wanting a chance to relax and live a more comfortable life 
after enormous sacrifices during the war were to be disappointed.49   
 The post-war situation on collective farms (kolkhozy50), was even worse than 
during the war.  Following defeat of Germany, peasants refused to sacrifice any longer by 
performing backbreaking labor for next to nothing.  For example, Elena Zubkova noted 
                                                        
45 Elena Zubkova, Sovetskaia zhizn’, 1945-1953. (Moskva : ROSSPEN, 2003), 18.  
46 Ibid, 357. 
47 Ibid, 374. 
48 Barghoorn, 263-264. 
49 Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo, 55-59. 
50 The Soviet Union had two types of farms: kolkhoz (collective farm) and sovkhoz (state farm).  While 
technically different, the two functioned almost identically in real life.  Therefore, when I use the term 
kolkhoz or collective farm, I also include sovkhoz in this category as well.   
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that after all of the state taxes and forced grain requisitioning, sometimes the peasants 
were left with no income at all.51  There were persistent rumors that the government was 
about to dismantle state farms.  A lot of the rumors centered on speculation that the 
United States and Britain were about to force the Soviet government to abolish collective 
agriculture.52  A member of a Ukrainian religious community repatriated from the 
American sector after the war claimed 
 
Ukraine will soon be given to America; that is why the Soviets are in a hurry to take all 
of the Ukrainian bread to [Russia].  America said – take most of the bread, leaving 
enough for two weeks, take all the communists, komsomol members, and all of 
communist activists, but do not touch the average people.  Living in the Ukraine was 
much better under the Germans, there was freedom, and when Americans come, things 
will be even better.53 
 
Another repatriated peasant was heard saying  
 
If I knew it would be like this in Russia I would have never returned.  Americans agreed 
to let us stay with them.  I still remember the words of American officer, who said, 
“When we signed an agreement with the Soviet Union about aid, it specified that at the 
end of the war [the SU] had to disband all of the communal farms (kolkhozy), the 
Communist party, the Komsomol, and that all Soviet citizens had to adopt American 
ways, and if the Soviets broke that agreement then the Soviet Union would be crushed by 
the rest of the world.54 
 
Members of religious communities were not the only ones with such views.  Peasants 
from other regions, those not involved in organized religious sects and who did not have 
first hand experience with Americans, voiced similar sentiments.  For example, collective 
farm workers in the Pskov province said, “Soon America will come to rule our country 
                                                        
51 Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo, 60.  
52 Ibid., 63. 
53 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 517 l. 37.  There is some evidence that this sentiment remained at least into the 
mid-1960s.  For example, Sergei Zhuk quoted from a sermon by a Ukrainian Orthodox priest in 1963: 
“Look at our collective farmers; they are paid only 40 kopeks a day.  Their living conditions are appalling.  
But do not worry; the time is coming when the Germans and Americans will come again and liberate us.” 
Zhuk, 189. 
54 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 517 l. 37. 
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and there will be no more collective farms” and many similar messages.55  There were 
comparable reports from other regions.56 
 A number of industrial workers, unhappy with their post-war situation made 
similar remarks. After hearing about laborers being sent east to lift industrial production 
there, a factory worker was quoted as saying:  “This is serfdom.  I will run away to 
America.”57  Others suggested that the Soviet Union buy food from America and Britain, 
as there was not enough to feed the country.58  Some among the deported nationalities, 
such as Chechens and Ingushi, spread rumors that Western powers put pressure on the 
Soviet government to move them back to their original homelands.59 
 In one interesting case, a government report from Chukotka, a far eastern Soviet 
region, described a situation where Soviet collective farm workers, members of an 
indigenous Inuit tribe, visited American Inuits on nearby island of St. Lawrence.  There, 
the report stated, Soviet Inuit saw that most American Inuit lived much better than their 
Soviet counterparts: the store was full of food, the houses had electricity, all residents had 
their own bed.  And because Soviet authorities failed to provide enough goods, many 
Soviets ended up acquiring them from America.  A few Inuit complained that “The 
American government cared more about Inuit than the Soviet government.”60 
 Despite these examples, we must not assume that majority of the post-war Soviet 
population was deeply unhappy with the Soviet government and wished to relocate to the 
United States.  Most Soviets understood that much of their present day suffering was a 
                                                        
55 Zubkova, Sovetskaya Zhizn’, 50. 
56 Ibid., 53-54. 
57 RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 695 l. 106. 
58 RGASPI f. 17, op. 121, d. 524. l. 7. 
59 Zubkova, Sovetskaia zhizn’, 381. 
60 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 561, l. 8-9. 
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result of a devastating war and that rebuilding the country was not an easy task.  It is 
clear, however, that Soviets who had been outside the Soviet borders and the people who 
heard their accounts used the information they garnered as a way to express disapproval 
with the pace of the post-war recovery, and low standard of living in general.  America, 
heavily mythologized by rumors that passed through numerous people, stood as the 
centerpiece of people’s hope of a better life after so much had been put on hold in the 
name of wartime sacrifices.   
 Increasingly hostile rhetoric between the Soviet Union and its recent allies, the 
U.S. and the U.K., along with the sudden opening of the Soviet Union to foreign 
influences during and immediately following the war, triggered a fast response from the 
Kremlin.  Officially, the goals of the new campaign were to raise domestic patriotism and 
put a stop to the practice of “bowing [nizkopoklonstvo] before the West.”  In other words, 
at least on paper, Stalin and others at the top accused a number of people of over 
admiring the West and not giving enough credit to domestic achievements.  The bulk of 
criticism was aimed at writers, musicians, journalists, and others who shaped public 
perceptions of issues in the Soviet Union.   
 Most importantly, this campaign was not a simple act of criticism but signaled the 
course that the Soviet mass media was to follow.  In April 1947, the Soviet Propaganda 
Department issued a detailed plan to promote Soviet patriotism.  Among other things, the 
plan called for press, film, art, and other media specialists to raise awareness of the 
differences between Soviet and bourgeois social systems.  Furthermore, it stressed the 
need to highlight achievements of Russian and Soviet scientists, specifically stressing that 
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many Russian/Soviet scientific discoveries had been downplayed and later stolen by 
foreigners.61   
 Several months later, the Soviet leadership discussed publication of Russian 
scientists (Liudi Russkoi Nauki), a book detailing Russian/Soviet scientific 
accomplishments.  The book, eventually published in 1948, claimed that a Russian 
named Polzunov and not James Watt invented the first steam engine, and Popov not 
Guglielmo Marconi developed the radiotelegraph system.62  The revisionist campaign 
was not limited to the field of science.  All of Soviet society had to participate, from 
music to engineering.  At the tail end of the campaign in the early 1950s, one Soviet 
journal even claimed that American baseball was simply a distorted version of a 
traditional Russian game of lapta.63    
  In 1947, Konstantin Simonov, a leading war-time writer, met Stalin to discuss the 
issue and wrote about it in his journal later that day.  Simonov noted Stalin saying the 
following about Soviet intelligentsia including writers, scientists, doctors, and academics: 
 
[they] have an underdeveloped sense of Soviet patriotism.  They have an ungrounded 
admiration for foreign culture.  They see themselves as minors, as incomplete, used to the 
position of eternal students.  This tradition is outdated and comes from Peter I.  Peter had 
good ideas, but soon too many foreigners came into the country.  This was a period of 
bowing down to the foreigners.64    
  
The signal from the top was clear.  Soviets needed to feel more pride in their 
achievements and stop looking to the West in veneration, and those in the Soviet media 
had to promote the new direction. 
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 The early phase of the patriotism campaign, launched in 1946, asserted itself on 
the pages of the Soviet press in form of attacks on several literary journals and 
performance theaters, accusing some staff members of “bowing before modern bourgeois 
culture of the West.”65  The main focus of criticism, however, fell on academics in fields 
of philosophy, genetics, microbiology and many others66 mentioned by Stalin in his 
conversation with Simonov.  Press articles accused members of Soviet intelligentsia of 
downplaying Soviet achievements while giving too much praise to foreign 
accomplishments.  The press labeled such people “cosmopolitans;” therefore the whole 
campaign was widely known as “anti-cosmopolitan.”     
 One case in particular served as a blueprint for the rest of the campaign.  In June, 
1947, Soviet press broke the story of two Soviet microbiologists who recklessly provided 
Americans with results of their most valuable experiments while attending a conference 
in the U.S.  Specifically, Soviet authorities charged Professors Kliueva and Roskin with 
giving American spies a cure for cancer due to their lack of vigilance.67  A letter from the 
Central Committee to lower Party organizations described professors’ crime in this way:         
 
They could not withstand American spy importunities and gave Americans a scientific 
discovery that is the property of the Soviet government and the Soviet people.  
Disregarding vital interests of the state and the people, and forgetting their debt before 
the motherland that attentively supported their work, Kliueva and Roskin deprived Soviet 




65 RGASPI f.17 op. 122 d. 269 l. 183. 
66 A. V. Fateev - http://psyfactor.org/lib/fateev2.htm.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
67 For more on Kliueva and Roskin see: Nikolai Krementsov.  The Cure: A Story of Cancer and Politics 
from the Annals of the Cold War. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) 
68 RGASPI f. 17 op. 122 d. 269 l. 183.  
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Furthermore, the letter revealed that Kliueva and Roskin’s crimes were uncovered during 
the so-called Court of Honor (sud chesti), where their peers and other members of the 
Health Ministry, numbering in the thousands, questioned them regarding the matter.69  
 A year later the movie Court of Honor (Sud Chesti) presented the Soviet 
moviegoers with an almost identical scenario.  The movie told a story of a group of 
Soviet scientists who just discovered a new pain medication.  One of the scientists, a vain 
man susceptible to flattery, is overcome with praise while presenting the discovery at an 
American conference and provides Americans with some of the experiment designs.  
Eventually, an American science professor travels to the Soviet Union in order to study 
the laboratory producing the pain medicine.  Unknown to Soviet scientists, one of the 
people in professor’s retinue is a spy who wants to steal Soviet production secrets.  Only 
hyper-vigilance on the part of a number of young Soviet scientists thwarts American spy 
efforts.  In the end, the Ministry holds a Court of Honor where the guilty parties are 
exposed and reprimanded for their lack of awareness. 
 Kliueva and Roskin case, as well as the movie, touched on a number of 
propaganda themes.  First, it brought back the issue of vigilance that was popular during 
the 1930s where Soviet citizens were instructed by the state to watch for foreign spies 
and saboteurs who infiltrated that Soviet Union and intended to harm the country by any 
means.  In the same vein, Courts of Honor resembled the “self-criticism campaign” of the 
late 1920s-early 1930s, when Soviet organizations were supposed to engage in self-
criticism during meetings.  One critical difference, however, was the fact that the general 
foreign saboteur/spy of the earlier period now acquired a more specific identity – a 




 In fact, the late 1940s saw a number of high profile cases in the Soviet press 
denouncing Americans in the Soviet Union as spies.  One that received particular 
attention from the Soviet press focused on Truth about American Diplomats, a book by 
Annabella Bucar, a former employee of the American embassy in Moscow, and a self-
proclaimed American spy.  In the book, Bucar, an American citizen, who attributed her 
desire to come clean to her falling in love with a Soviet opera singer, described the 
American embassy as a nest of spies and the American attitude towards the Soviet Union 
as determined by a small anti-Soviet clique at the State Department who took their order 
from moneyed interests in the United States.  In addition, she related information that 
Americans would try to recruit old men and women who came to the embassy for help in 
contacting their relatives in America.  Furthermore, wrote Bucar, American spies actively 
pursued Soviet individuals who bowed before Western culture.70 
 A British military attaché living in Moscow in the late 1940s recounted an 
incident where he was accused of taking photographs of a factory in central Moscow.  
After some interrogation where he insisted they search him to see that he did not have a 
camera (they did not search him), he was let go.  A few days later a Soviet newspaper 
published a letter to the editor by four factory workers who saw the incident and 
vehemently protested British spying.71 
 The point was unambiguous.  A vast majority of foreigners, particularly 
Americans and their close allies in the Soviet Union, were spies attempting to gather 
information that later could be used against the Soviet Union.  Soviet citizens who 
showed interest in foreign, especially American, culture were most vulnerable.  
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Therefore, Soviets had to avoid any contact with foreigners and keep a close eye on those 
who did.  In reviewing the Bucar book, Pravda concluded: 
 
The facts outlined in the book once again remind us about the necessity to raise our 
vigilance in every way possible, and remember about the intrigues of agents from anti-
democratic imperialist camp.72 
 
 Did the Soviet leadership actually believe these stories?  There is some indication 
pointing to the fact that the Soviet patriotism campaign exaggerated the evidence in order 
to make the problem appear more serious that it actually was in real life.  Kliueva and 
Roskin, for example, two microbiologists accused of passing scientific discoveries to 
Americans, received promotions and a new lab not too long after their case ended up on 
the front pages of Soviet newspapers.73  It is highly unlikely that they would have been 
rewarded had they actually done the things they were accused of in the Soviet press.  
Most likely, authorities drummed up the Kliueva-Roskin affair and many other incidents 
that characterized the patriotism campaign, so as to prepare the psychological 
groundwork for the Cold War with the United States.  Furthermore, some scholars 
suggested that Soviet bureaucracy used anti-American/Russian patriotism campaign in 
order to solidify its hold over Soviet people disoriented by the war, as well as for 
purposes of promoting personal ambitions.74  
 In addition to the noisy press campaign, late 1940s saw the passage of several 
anti-foreigner laws.  Two main laws, the State Secrets Act (June, 1947) and Marriage to 
Foreigners Act (February, 1947), precluded any substantive contact with foreigners that 
had not been officially authorized.  The State Secrets Act imposed harsh penalties on 
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anyone caught passing information to foreigners, while the Marriage to Foreigners Act 
effectively forbade Soviets from marrying non-citizens.  Influenced by high level of 
fraternization, including marriage, between Soviets soldiers stationed in Europe and local 
population, especially Germany,75 the Acts fit well with the overall anti-foreigner 
campaign amid rising Cold War tension. 
 Soviet children were also targets for the anti-foreigner propaganda.  The 1949 
children’s cartoon A Foreign Voice (Chuzhoi golos) showed a Soviet bird coming home 
from a tour abroad.  Now, performing in front of Soviet birds it was dressed in foreign 
clothes and sang jazz instead of its usual Soviet repertoire.  Soviet birds were outraged 
and drove the Westernized bird off stage (see Illustration 4).76  The cartoon’s references 
to American style clothes and jazz suggested that anything American was simply too 
alien for a Soviet person and had to be rejected. Children were not only target but also 
tools in Cold War propaganda battle.  As Margaret Peacock showed in her work, Soviet 
propaganda used embellished images of Soviet childhood being threatened by American 
warmongers, as well as contrasting happy Soviet childhood with bleakness, violence, and 
despair that characterized growing up in America.77     
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A Foreign Voice (Chuzhoi Golos) – 1949 (Illustration 4)  
 
Good American – Bad American: dual nature of America in official 
propaganda 
 
 Marxist ideology divided the world into two classes, the exploiters and the 
exploited.  Soviet post-war anti-American propaganda reflected this divide in its 
depiction of America.  According to Soviet media, Americans belonged either to the 
exclusive ultra-wealthy elite that owned all of the capital and means of productions, or to 
the vast majority that was poor, overworked and had little to show for it.78  Therefore, 
Americans were either bad or good with little grey area in the middle. 
 Roughly, the bad camp (frequently referred to as reactionary) consisted of three 
basic parts: First, a small number of bankers who controlled disproportionate amount of 
wealth, were collectively referred to as simply “Wall Street.”  In Soviet narrative, Wall 
Street partnered with a handful of rich industrialists (“monopolists”), often in the military 
industries, in order to exploit the working class in America and abroad, and through 
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perpetual wars further increase their wealth.  The third part of the unholy trinity included 
various governmental and independent institutions that aided the ruling class in 
exploiting and suppressing American workers.  These included things such as the military 
(collectively known as “Pentagon”), federal and state law enforcement agencies (CIA, 
FBI, and police in general), non-governmental organizations (KKK, Salvation Army, 
YMCA), Congress, and the press. 
  The 1949 anti-American propaganda plan circulated by the Propaganda 
Department suggested, among others, the following topics for publication and discussion 
in the media:  
 
Capitalist monopolies in America – the force behind politics of aggression. 
American ruling circles against global cooperation.               
American reactionaries in the role of “saviors” of capitalism from communism. 
Large monopolies’ total control of American economy and politics. 
American progressive forces in fight for peace and international cooperation. 
Who do American union leaders really serve?79 
 
 Moreover, the Soviet media showed the office of American president as simply an 
instrument of the wealthy elites who pick and choose who is to occupy the White House 
(see Illustration  5).    
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Title: Two servants of the same master.  
Wall Street (large man on the right).  Republicans, Democrats (two men in front of 
the White House) - “I wonder which one of us he will pick to stay at his house!” 
Krokodil #25 1952 p. 7  (Illustration  5) 
 
The issue was addressed in a 1949 play about Harry Truman titled The Mad 
Haberdasher.  Harrison Salisbury described it in this way:   
 
The play is set in a small Missouri town.  The central character is an unsuccessful 
haberdasher who in appearance resembles Hitler.  A gang of Missouri Democratic 
politicians, members of the Pendergast gang, decide to put the haberdasher in the White 
House.80 
 
In another example, echoing official rhetoric, a Soviet tourist guide explained the 
difference between the Kremlin and the White House to a group of Indonesian students 
visiting Moscow in 1953: 
 
Question:  Is the Kremlin the same as the American White House? 
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Answer: No.  The Kremlin serves the interests of the people, peace, friendship of peoples 
and is a symbol for all of progressive humanity.  At the same time, the White House is a 
residence for Wall Street appointees.81 
 
 
 The American press was also depicted as a slave to moneyed interests.  The 
subject came up in a 1947 play titled The Russian Question.  The play, written by 
Konstantin Simonov (a famous Soviet author and journalist), won a Stalin prize and 
played extensively in many Soviet theaters, and was eventually made into a movie.  The 
play focused on the life of an American reporter who got to know the Russian people 
while working on the Eastern front during World War II, ultimately writing a positive 
book about Russia in 1942.  When he returns, his boss offers him a huge sum of money to 
write a book claiming that Russia wants to conquer Europe and then America.  The boss 
wants the book because only this kind of subject matter will make him money.  
Following his consciousness, Smith (the reporter) ends up writing a positive book and 
because of this ends up without money and family (his wife leaves him because he is 
broke.)  In the end, Smith declares that even though he is ruined he will still fight for 
America of Lincoln and Roosevelt and not for America of William Randolph Hearst.82 
 In search of profit, Soviet propaganda stressed, American ruling circles would go 
to any length, commit any crime.  The theme gained particular traction during another 
escalation of Cold War tensions.  Apparently in response to renewed questions about 
Katyn massacre,83  Soviet media launched another ferocious anti-American campaign in 
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the early 1950s.  The thrust of the campaign focused on American involvement in the 
Korean War.  Soviet newspapers, radio stations, and propaganda lectures accused 
American reactionary forces of starting the war so that the defense industry could profit 
from it.  Furthermore, it charged American forces with using bacteriological and 





(Pic 1) 1950.  An American soldier was here.  Krokodil #5 1951 p. 7   (Pic 2)  School 
(sign in the background). “Ok children.  During the last lesson we went over 
American history and now let’s learn about American customs.” Krokodil #13 1951 
p. 5  (Illustration 6) 
  
 The scale of the campaign took even the seasoned American diplomats by 
surprise.  In a 1952 telegram to the Department of State, American ambassador George 
Kennan wrote:  
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The quantitative figures on space and time given to the subjects are impressive enough. 
We estimate that on an average well over half entire foreign news sections of major 
papers have been devoted to these subjects, not to mention domestic radio programs and 
other outlets… I must say that I have never seen anything to equal in viciousness, 
shamelessness, mendacity and intensity what is now being done in this country to arouse 
hatred, revulsion and indignation with regard to Americans in general and our armed 
forces in particular.84 
 
Even the state-controlled Soviet religious organizations joined in the anti-American 
campaign.  An English priest visiting the Soviet Union around that time cited the 
following statements made by Soviet religious authorities at a peace conference: 
 
Archbishop Flavian of Moscow: ‘At the present time, the American invaders, trampling 
upon all that is holy in the soul of man, are committing horrible deeds by using against 
the peaceful population of Korea chemical weapons, poisoning peaceful people with 
lethal gases and infecting by bacteriological means the population with plague, cholera, 
typhus and other diseases.’ …Ali Zade, President of the Moslem Council for 
Transcaucasia: ‘Bloodthirsty American imperialism, American bankers and industrialists, 
losing all conscience and semblance of human beings, have embarked on the path of 
shameless violation of the laws of God and man.’”85 
 
 An American tourist recalled the following news article about American atrocities 
in Korea.  The story, he wrote, accused the U.S. Army in Korea of: 
 
burning alive, tearing out their [Korean civilians] hearts, and gassing them.  The 
Americans hung up prisoners by their feet, broke arms and legs of prisoners with wooden 
cudgels, stabbed them with bayonets, cut away pieces of their flesh, forced nails under 
their fingernails, tortured them with electrical current, poured hot water into their 
stomachs, put prisoners in cells flooded with water, and shut them in cages with sharp 
nails.86  
  
 In not so subtle ways, campaign suggested that reactionary forces, or bad 
Americans, had little in common with the human race.  Wall Street, the military-
industrial complex, politicians, and other instruments of American authority were simply 
a faceless machine that used money as fuel and ground up ordinary people in the process. 
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 The dehumanization of the bad Americans contrasted with intense humanization 
of the so-called progressive forces, or good Americans.  Usually, the Soviet media 
portrayed the “progressive” faction of American society as the vast majority of American 
people who were exploited by the ruling class yet fighting to achieve equality and 
fairness in socio-economic relations.  Average American workers, farmers, doctors, 
engineers, and so forth lived in poverty and oppression and waged an unequal fight with 
the ruling institution that stopped at nothing to extinguish the people’s will.  In parallel 
with the Soviet narrative on American racism, the progressive movement frequently 
featured black Americans who fought not only for worker rights but also for civil rights 
for American minorities.87  
 Soviet press and radio broadcasts often featured stories of Americans struggling 
to overcome racism, poverty, violence, and lack of social benefits.  It painted a picture of 
America in a struggle for human rights on the part of the American public against 
inhuman reactionary forces.  Clearly, this was a classic Marxist duel between the 
exploiters and the exploited that superseded national borders.  Leaders of the American 
progressive movement, as defined by the Soviet media, saw past petty personal agendas 
and sought world peace and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.   
 Soviet propaganda identified specific American intellectuals, politicians, and civil 
rights leaders as being at the forefront of the progressive struggle.  Criticism of the 
United States and a call for improved relations with the Soviet Union were the common 
threads.  Henry Wallace, vice-president under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a 1948 
presidential candidate and an advocate for better relations with the Soviet Union, became 
a symbol of the American progressive movement.  Soviet newspapers also suggested that 
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a majority of the American people agreed with and supported Wallace.88  In contrast to 
reactionary and warmongering Harry Truman, Wallace was portrayed as carrying on the 
progressive torch of Roosevelt, who was a true friend of the Soviet Union and an enemy 
of American reactionary forces.  
 For the Soviets, the figure of Roosevelt served a convenient purpose.  Under 
Roosevelt, the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed a relationship of friendship 
and mutual aid.  That was how the Soviet media had presented it and that was how the 
Soviet people remembered it.  In Soviet minds, Roosevelt was the president of industrial 
cooperation of the 1930s, the wartime alliance, and Lend-Lease.  Relations between the 
two countries soured quickly following Roosevelt’s death, therefore it was easy for the 
Soviets to blame the post-war split on the change in the White House.  Soviet people 
were bombarded with the simple message that Roosevelt was good and Truman is bad.  
“The death of President Roosevelt must have been a stroke of luck for the Soviet 
propagandists.  It enabled them to suggest that with this great progressive figure 
removed, American capitalist politics moved naturally to the right,” observed historian 
Frederick Barghoorn.89 
 On the literary front, Soviet propaganda singled out a number of works by 
American authors critical of various aspects of American life.  These included well-
known American writers such as Mark Twain, John Steinbeck, and Theodor Dreiser.90  
Soviet media presented these and a number of other less known authors as evidence that 
American progressive intelligentsia saw the true America.  America that oppressed and 
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exploited its people, not the country of prosperity and equality as presented in American 
propaganda.  
 The Good American-Bad American construct fit nicely with the Soviet 
leadership’s characterization of the post-World War II world.  Following Andrei 
Zhdanov’s91 1947 speech at Cominform meeting, Soviet propaganda writers were 
instructed to portray the post-war world as divided into two camps.  The first camp, led 
by the United States, sought to enslave other countries of the world through war and 
exploit their resources for the benefit of a handful of rich Americans.  On the other side, 
the second camp, led by the Soviet Union, stood against American imperialism, and for 
freedom, human rights, and world peace.92   
 Soviet propaganda attempted to drive the point home by a staging a number of so-
called peace offensives in the late 1940s and early 1950s (see Illustration 7).  Through 
these the Soviets presented the Soviet Union as a country that fought hard for peace, only 
to be rebuffed by American leadership.  Soviet media compared American and Soviet 
military expenditures where, according to their figures, America spent far more on the 
military than the Soviet Union.93  The nuclear issue faced a similar treatment where 
Soviets were shown as using the power of the atom for peaceful energy, while Americans 





91 Andrei Zhdanov was one of Stalin’s closest allies.  In the late 1940s he was responsible for setting the 
cultural policy of the Soviet Union as well as organizing Cominform, organization to coordinate communist 
parties of Eastern Europe. 
92 GARF f. 8581 op. 2 d. 203. 
93 Barghoorn, 148. 
94 Ibid., 166-167. 





For Peace Pact (sign in dove’s beak).  “God save us!!!”  Krokodil 1951 #26 Cover  
(Illustration 7) 
 
 In other examples of the differences between the two regimes, a Krokodil cartoon 
from the period showed Soviets discussing strategic plan of fighting drought, while 
Americans made plans for strategic military bases.95  “America sends weapons.  The 
USSR sends tractors,” read a headline of a 1950 Ogonek magazine article about Soviet 
aid to Italy.96  Furthermore, a large proportion of Soviet movies produced at the time 
contrasted “capitalist-imperialist American with the peace-loving, socialist-
                                                        
95 W. Nelson, 25. 
96 Ogonek, #21 May, 1950. p. 12. 
  55 
internationalist Soviet Union.”97  “In other words, capitalism generates war and Soviet 
socialism generates peace,” wrote Frederick Barghoorn in describing Soviet propaganda 
of the early Cold War period.98 
 The threat of a new conflict with America appears to have been one of the 
primary reasons for Soviet propaganda’s focus on the issue.  An American visiting the 
Soviet Union in the late 1940s put it this way: 
 
There’s no question that the common people of the U.S.S.R. are sincere in their desire for 
peace – as are the common people of every nation in the world.  But in the Soviet Union 
this normal hatred of war has been pumped up by the unrelenting propaganda campaign 
into something close to fanaticism.  Peace is an obsession with the Russians.  I believe 
the Kremlin leaders may be counting on their ability to switch this obsessive desire for 
peace into a feeling of righteous rage in any future emergency, by charging that some 
nation has broken the peace every Russian holds dear.  The groundwork has already been 
laid by the concurrent propaganda drive depicting American leaders as warmongers and 
criminals.99   
 
 
Pseudo-Country: American society and culture 
 
 Social and economic problems such as racism and unemployment were some of 
the major focus points for the early Cold War Soviet propaganda about the United States.  
Faced with a low post-war living standard, an end to the wartime Lend-Lease program, 
the slow pace of reconstruction, the greater availability of information about the West, 
and quickly rising Cold War tensions, Soviet authorities tried hard to dispel the myth of 
America as the land of milk and honey.  Again they turned to the familiar Marxist line 
that cast the capitalist world into a small group of exploiters who grew wealthy by 
keeping the rest of the population in poverty.  Consequently, Soviet propaganda 
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attempted to present America as a country with an extravagantly wealthy elite while the 
rest of the population lived in destitution, lacked opportunity and any kind of social 
safety net.  African-Americans, claimed the Soviet media, still lived in slave-like 
conditions and faced discrimination and intimidation at every turn, as did anyone who 
dared to oppose the oppressive capitalist system.  None of these themes were particularly 
novel; they appeared in Soviet media on and off for decades.  However, the frequency 
with which these subjects appeared in the Soviet propaganda was new.       
 In trying to shape public opinion about America, Soviet officials could hardly 
deny that America was a wealthy and industrious country.  America provided the Soviet 
Union with billions of dollars’ worth of food and equipment during the war, and many 
ordinary people still remembered the large role America played in 1920s famine relief, 
and Soviet industrial revival of the early 1930s.  Thus, the thrust of the attack had to 
concentrate on areas of American life that were less familiar to Soviet audiences, with the 
American domestic situation being an obvious target. 
 American unemployment and other economic problems were some of the most 
common subjects of Soviet anti-American campaign.100  American prosperity was only 
available to a select few while the rest lived in hardship, and chronically high 
unemployment was the best evidence.  Soviet propagandists were offered the following 
headlines when discussing the subject of American economy:      
 
Fear of new economic crisis 
Myth of a high living standard among all classes in America 
American monopolies attack American workers’ living standard  
Reality and fables about American “prosperity” 
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Impoverishment of the American small farmer101 
 
 Soviet children studying English used textbooks containing the following reading 
exercise: “John Smith is an American.  John’s elder brother is an engineer.  He is not 
married because he cannot afford to keep a family.  He is out of work now.”102  Soviet 
newspapers published stories about American farmers not being able to sell their product 
due to “the impoverishment of the working class and the ruining of the toiling peasants 
are narrowing down the internal market.”103   
 A Krokodil cartoon from the late 1940s mocked the notion of equality between 
the haves and have-nots in America by showing two unemployed men sitting on a bench.  
Turning to the other man, the first man says: “In the United States, everybody is equal.  
Rockefeller has the right to sleep on a park bench, just like us unemployed.  If he doesn’t 
choose to exercise that right, why that’s his business.”104  The magazine Krokodil sighted 
the following notice from a college bulletin board in the U.S.: “I am willing to move to 
any town, state, country, or even planet to find a permanent job.”105  Another magazine 
Ogonek featured an article describing lavish American dog shows where some dogs wore 
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“American heaven for dogs” - Ogonek #8 February, 1950.  p. 16 (Illustration 8) 
  
 In his 1947 study, Whitman Bassow summarized the Soviet press’s treatment of 
the American economy as follows: 
 
The United States was beset by severe economic problems which apparently could not be 
solved. Everyone feared a new depression. Prices were high and workers wanted higher 
wages to keep pace with the rising cost of living. They were forced to strike in order to 
get their demands and this resulted in additional economic dislocation. In the face of 
these problems, the President of the United States could do nothing but plead with Big 
Business to lower prices. Of course, these pleas went unheeded.107 
 
 Racism took up a large percentage of Soviet propaganda about the United States 
since the early days of the Soviet state.108  Even in the days of more cordial relations 
between the two states in the 1930’s, “Unemployment and racial discrimination 
remained, however, the chief and all-pervasive themes of Soviet attack on American 
capitalist society,” wrote Barghoorn.109  The issue’s visibility and its unambiguously 
immoral character made it an easy target for those wishing to criticize America.  It 
provided a clear and easily identifiable group of Americans exploited by the corrupt and 
unjust capitalist system.  American ruling circles oppressed African-Americans not only 
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because they represented the working class but also because of their skin color, thus 
providing twice the ammunition for Soviet attacks on capitalism and the United States.  
Since racism frequently made it onto the pages of American newspapers, Soviets could 
easily use these stories to provide credibility to their claims that America was a country 
of tyranny, cruelty, and most importantly inequality.         
 Soviet movies of the period featuring Americans often focused on the issue of 
race.  A group of American servicemen attack a fellow black soldier in a bar simply 
because of his skin in Meeting on the Elbe (Vstrecha na Elbe, 1949), a movie about 
Soviet and American post-war relations in Germany.  Silvery Dust (Serebristaia pyl’, 
1953), showed African-Americans as intelligent people fighting for civil rights yet still 
forced to work as servants for wealthy white families and under constant threat from 
reactionary whites, particularly the police.  Furthermore, in the movie, in order to test a 
lethal substance on human subjects, white scientists forced blacks to become test subjects 
by using corrupt justice system. 
 Soviets used all forms of media to instill the image of America as a country where 
blacks were second-class citizens, if not still slaves.  The Soviet children’s cartoon 
Masha’s Concert (Mashen’kin kontsert, 1948) told a story of a little Soviet girl Masha 
who receives a black doll named Tom for her birthday.  “Why is Tom so sad?” the little 
girl asks her mother.  “Oh. I remember that you told me how poorly the Negros live in 
America,” says the girl not waiting for an answer.110  A Krokodil cartoon from the late 
1940s showed two American black men playing chess. “I don’t want to play black, Sam.  
Black always loses around here,” says one to the other.111  Some Soviet newspapers 
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published stories alleging that up to five million African Americans still lived in virtual 
slavery in the American South.112 
            To further paint America as a country where money prevailed over more human 
concerns, Soviets picked the subject of social benefits.  Thus, in contrast to the Soviet 
Union that featured free healthcare and full employment, America was portrayed as a 
country where one had to pay for these services or risk death.  One Krokodil cartoon 
showed an American doctor inspecting the contents of a man’s jackets instead of the man 
himself.  “I’m very much worried by your condition.  I’m afraid that you aren’t going to 
be able to pay me for this visit,” says the doctor.113  The American healthcare industry not 
only failed to provide free service, noted the Soviet press, but in some cases desire to 
make a dollar actually hurt patients.  Ogonek magazine printed a story alleging that 
American pharmaceutical companies produced drugs that were often useless and 
sometimes harmful.114   
 Lacking unemployment benefits, American workers had to do whatever it took to 
survive.   A 1950 expose in a Soviet magazine claimed that American blood banks 
profited from desperate unemployed who were forced to sell their blood in order to feed 
their families.115  Another article, citing an American newspaper, told a story of one 
William Moden who for forty-four years worked for General Mills Corporation.  Once he 
got older the corporation promptly threw him out, and when he brought up the question 
of a pension he received a framed picture of the company’s board of directors instead.116        
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 Besides attacking American weaknesses such as racism and lack of socialized 
healthcare, Soviet propaganda also tried to chip away at things that Americans pointed to 
as their strengths.  Besides above-mentioned stories of American wealth as only 
benefiting a handful of people, Soviets attacked other cornerstones of American society 
promoted by Americans in the Soviet Union via newly operational Voice of America and 
printed media such as magazine Amerika.  These included freedoms of speech and press, 
democratic political process, independent judiciary and others.  Soviets pointed to 
American anti-communist hearings in Congress and the Taft-Hartley bill (authorizing 
government monitoring of labor unions), among others, as evidence that free speech and 
civil rights were suppressed in America.  A 1950 issue of Ogonek magazine reprinted a 
story by an American author titled “Alice’s Adventures in American ’democracy’.”  The 
story suggested that most people in American prisons were there because of their demand 
for free speech or equality, and that American judicial system simply made up false 
charges to lock them up.117  The American press was also frequently accused of being on 
the payroll of wealthy Americans who used it to twist the truth, as detailed in the 
previously mentioned story The Russian Question. 
 American culture and society received much attention from the Soviet post-war 
media.  From the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the popular magazine Ogonek, for 
example, featured a column “Foreign Customs” (Zarubezhnye Nravy).  The column 
detailed various episodes from American life, which according to the magazine, 
confirmed Soviet statements about America, greed, corruption, and violence.  In another 
example, in 1949 leading Soviet newspapers were instructed to publish regular materials 
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exposing the “degeneracy of bourgeois [American] culture.”118  Like the rest of anti-
American propaganda of the early Cold War, official Soviet information sources divided 
American culture and society into good and bad, progressive and reactionary.  The profit 
motive dominated a majority of American life.  The result, therefore, was one of shallow 
entertainment aimed at the lowest human instincts: sex and violence, both representative 
of American society in general.  
 So why focus on American culture?  Frederick Barghoorn speculated that the 
intended goal was “the desire to reduce discontent among the Soviet people, particularly 
among intellectuals, by persuading them that Soviet culture and life are superior to the 
decadent, bourgeois West.”119  There is, however, no evidence that Soviet intellectuals of 
the period had any deep admiration for American culture.  If anything the opposite was 
true.120  A certain segment of Soviet youth, which I will discuss in a separate chapter, did 
in fact idolize American culture.  This group, however, was rather small and hardly 
warranted an all-out propaganda campaign.  A more likely explanation is that the Soviet 
government, facing widespread destruction from the war and unable to compete with 
America on the issue of living standards, especially consumer goods, sought to regain 
some psychological control over the population by providing Soviet citizens with an 
alternative source of pride – we might not have fancy cars but we have culture and 
progressive, humane society.  “The Soviet view of American civilization is compounded 
of a profound admiration for our [American] achievements in technology and a profound 
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contempt for our backwardness in humane and cultural pursuits, ” wrote William Nelson, 
a scholar of post-war Soviet propaganda.121 
 According to official Soviet information sources, everything in the United States 
revolved around the pursuit of the dollar, which in turn warped everything around it.  
American culture was not immune.  A late 1940s Krokodil cartoon showed a money safe 
parading around a theater stage with actors and all of the supporting staff bowing.  “Mr. 
Safe, Chief Director and Artistic Inspiration of the American Theater,” read the 
caption.122  In describing Broadway of the late 1940s, Soviet critics wrote that it in no 
way resembled the idea of theater by Soviet or European standards.  American theaters 
were a revolving door of quickly staged plays that focused on the worst sides of life: 
crime, prostitution, sex, hopelessness, etc.123      
 The American music scene, claimed the Soviet media, exploited amateur and 
young composers by requiring them to pay money to studios in the hope that they would 
produce their songs.  Furthermore, musical events were often sponsored and littered with 
advertisements.124  In talking about one New York opera performance, Soviet critics 
noted that “The music, even from the reports of sympathetic critics, was filled with 
various terrifying effects, resembling a sinister requiem service.  Yet this ‘delirious’ 
(bredovoi – a word frequently used to describe Western culture) production had been 
hailed by American critics as ‘an opera for Americans’.”125 
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 Despite the popularity of American movies in the Soviet Union, such as the 
Tarzan series,126 Soviet propaganda attacked American cinema as “among the worst 
expressions of Western/American imperialism” because it “glorified, under various 
sauces, obscurantism, violence, murder, and war.”127  A 1947 article by the famous 
Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein referred to American movies as “Dealers in Spiritual 
Poison.”128   
 American literature did not fare much better.  Apart from several progressive 
authors, the Soviet press labeled American prose as “cheap and stupid.”  In domestic 
press articles, Soviet writers coming back from visiting the United States, noted the 
“spiritual simplicity” of American literature.129  This was no surprise, noted the Soviet 
press, since education was only available to the rich, while a majority of Americans 
lacked access to a quality education.  One Pravda article claimed that up to ten million 
Americans are “virtually illiterate.”130 
 Overall, the picture of American culture readers got from the Soviet media was 
one of cheapness, shallowness, depravity, and absurdity.  A Soviet article “Bubble Gum 
Culture” argued that “American ‘culture’ has a long time ago become a synonym for 
“degeneracy and decay” and turned into a parody of itself.  In other words, it was a 
pseudoculture.  The article provided examples: American comics were pseudoliterature, 
American jazz was pseudomusic, American psychics were an example of pseudoscience, 
and finally baby stroller races were a pseudosport.131  Foreshadowing Nikita 
                                                        
126 See more about this in the section on American movies in the Soviet Union. 
127 Sergei Kapterev, “Illusionary Spoils: Soviet Attitudes toward American Cinema 
during the Early Cold War.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10:4 (Fall 2009): 788. 
128 Barghoorn, 227. 
129 McKenna, 35. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ogonek, #5 January, 1950. p. 31. 
  65 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of abstract art in the 1960s, 1948 Krokodil issue made fun of 
formalist art pointing out its incomprehensibility.132  Moreover, having no culture 
themselves, Americans had no respect for the culture of others.  Harrison Salisbury 
noticed the following article in 1951: “Under a headline ‘Savages in Yasnaya Polyana,’ 
the Literary Gazette charges that ten American embassy staff members have desecrated 
the grave of Lev Tolstoi by boisterous, drunken behavior...”133 
 Of course not all of American culture was degenerate and lowbrow.  Cultural 
figures critical of the United States were labeled as progressive and given publicity in the 
Soviet Union.  Ernest Hemingway, John Steinbeck, William Faulkner, and other less 
notable writers saw some of their works published in the Soviet Union.  Soviet 
propaganda paid particular attention to African Americans because their stories could 
easily be tied to the racist narrative.  In 1952, Ogonek introduced its readers to Charles 
White, an African-American painter who focused on the subject of black America.  The 
story detailed his frequent struggles against racism even as his works hung in many 
leading American museums.  “From a very early age I learned what it means to be a 
Negro in America,” he was quoted as saying, referring to frequent instances of racism in 
his life.134      
 Perhaps the most notable was the African-American singer and actor Paul 
Robeson.  His activism in the fight for minority and worker rights, as well as his 
sympathetic attitude towards the Soviet Union, ensured frequent invitations to perform in 
the country.  In 1952 he was awarded an International Stalin Peace Prize for 
strengthening peace among peoples, one of the highest Soviet honors for foreigners.  
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Investigation of Robeson’s Communist connections by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities in 1949 and the confiscation of his passport by the State Department 
in 1950 provided Soviet media with lots of material to accuse Americans of suppressing 
progressive culture. 
 The media told the Soviet people that much like American culture, American 
society as a whole was under the influence of the forces of greed and depravity inherent 
in capitalist social structure.  Atrocities perpetrated by American soldiers in Korea were 
not isolated incidents but sprung from the very fiber of American life.  Stories about 
America in the Soviet press often insinuated that extreme violence was part of everyday 
American life.  In the section titled “Foreign Life and Manners”, a Soviet magazine 
conveyed a story of David Unruh who killed thirteen of his neighbors in Camden, New 
Jersey, in 1949.  The article sarcastically noted that a reporter looking for a profitable 
story was the first person on the scene asking the killer about his wellbeing and the exact 
number of victims.  The article quoted Time magazine as saying that Unruh’s only 
mistake was that in his personal conflict he used methods reserved for resolution of group 
conflicts.135  A satirical piece in a Soviet magazine named “American school” featured 
the following conversation - “Your son was shooting with a slingshot during class, Mrs. 
Baxter,” complained the teacher. “Oh!  The rascal again lost his Colt that I gave him for 
his birthday,” the mother replied.136  One Soviet magazine even described baseball as a 
“beastly battle, a bloody fight involving mayhem and murder.”137 
 In the Soviet narrative, violence and inhumanity, collectively labeled as 
gangsterism, spread to all layers of American society from the office of the President, the 
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halls of the American Congress, and the corporate boardrooms to the American Main 
Street. Gangsterism in American society, wrote one Soviet author in the late 1940s, was 
“a rather natural phenomenon” that existed throughout “all of the United States history.”  
“Gangsterism,” he stressed, was “the last stage of capitalist society’s moral decay.”138           
 Extensive use of factual stories, supposedly taken from the American media, was 
the hallmark of early Cold War Soviet propaganda and continued with varying intensity 
until the final days of the Soviet Union.  In order to give their image of America 
credibility, Soviet propagandists made it appear as if they came from America and they 
simply relayed information to the Soviet people.  A typical Soviet story about America 
usually opened with or included lines “The American press, or American newspaper X 
reports”, or “This fact/story comes from American newspaper X.” 
 In reality, even if a news item came from an American source it was often altered 
in a way as to make America look in the worst possible light.  Sensational and 
extraordinary stories were presented to the Soviet people as being typical of American 
life.  And Soviet people’s lack of access to outside information allowed authorities to use 
rather crude tactics in order to make its Cold War adversary fit the image assigned to it 
by the Soviet media.  In the earlier mentioned story of Howard Unruh who killed thirteen 
people in Camden in 1949, the Ogonek article stated that psychiatric examination found 
him to be a completely normal man, suggesting such behavior was normal in America.  
In fact, Howard Unruh never stood trial after being diagnosed as a paranoid 
schizophrenic.  In other cases, David Caute noted that when describing American theater 
plays Soviet critics often altered the play’s actual content.139  There were also reports of 
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Soviet magazines publishing pictures of Americans waiting to see a movie and passing 
them of as evidence of unemployment lines.140 
 
Silvery Dust  
 Made in the last year of Stalin’s life, the 1953 movie Silvery Dust (Serebristaia 
pyl’) encapsulates all of the key stereotypes in Soviet anti-American propaganda in the 
early Cold War period.   
 From the very beginning, the movie reiterates the idea of the profit-mad American 
military-industrial complex by showing the military working in close cooperation with 
chemical monopolies in order to profit from development of a chemical weapon (silvery 
dust) regardless of human consequences - one milliliter of the dust is enough to kill 
anything living within a one hectare radius.  Furthermore, the generals in charge of the 
research project conspire to sell the silvery dust to the highest bidder, therefore 
defrauding the chemical company that funded the project.  The silvery dust research lab 
is located in a small town of Fortskill.  To the Soviet audience, Fortskill, located 
somewhere in the South, was supposed to represent an average American town.  
Highlighting the issue of racism, the movie shows Fortskill blacks being treated as 
second-class citizens.  They work as servants for the whites and are verbally and 
physically abused.  KKK lynchings are a common occurrence.  But the younger 
generation of African-Americans strives towards education and equality.  In the movie, 
together with the progressive whites, young black Americans hold a demonstration for 
worker and civil rights in the middle of town. At one point, during the rally one 
demonstrator says “the world must hear what real, honest Americans are saying”, echoing 
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Soviet claims that a majority of average Americans sympathize with the goals of 
communism and oppose oppressive American social structures. 
 Promoting the idea of America as the successor of Nazi Germany, the film shows 
silver dust research lab using Nazi scientists, who dream of revenge against the Soviet 
Union.  “An American army uniform weighs a little heavy on the shoulders of an average 
man,” says a former American officer, explaining the reason for his quitting the army and 
confirming Soviet claims of American warmongering.     
 The degeneracy and dishonesty of American government institutions feature 
prominently in the movie.  People in charge of developing the silver dust use the corrupt 
justice system, crooked cops, and gangsters in order to perform experiments on black 
subjects. Police and other instruments of government authority are just tools for the 
reactionary capitalist forces to further their agenda and keep the progressive population 
down.  Religion is ridiculed when an American priest (his denomination was not 
specified) is shown as caring little about the plight of African Americans, instead 
engaging in various psychic and extrasensory séances. 
 In the end, viewers were supposed to have formed an impression that the United 
States was ruled by a few moneygrubbing individuals who would do anything and sell 
anyone for a dollar, including starting a war.  American culture consisted of spending 
time in a bar, attending a lynching, or participating in psychic readings.  The elite 
exploited and victimized workers and African-Americans through the use of police and 
the legal system that were under their influence.  But there was hope.  The progressive 
elements of American society-- workers, black Americans, and others yearning for 
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equality, peace and justice--were organizing, and sooner or later would overthrow the 
oppressive capitalist regime. 
 To use an analogy of a piano, Soviet leaders pushed certain keys of anti-American 
propaganda to suit a particular occasion.  At times of economic crisis they focused on 
wealth inequality so as to tell the Soviet people that while things were hard at home, they 
are even worse abroad; at times of war such as the one in Korea, they highlighted 
American militarism and savagery.141  Sheet music changed depending on domestic and 
international events, but the piano remained the same.  Except for a few minor 
adjustments and level of intensity, the image of America presented to the Soviet people 
closely resembled that of pre-war America.        
 
 
Why do they want to bomb us?: public reaction to official propaganda 
 
 Soviet post-war propaganda painted America as a country of war, greed, moral 
and spiritual degeneration, racism, crime, and economic decline.  The campaign’s 
intensity, and its sharp focus on the negative aspects of America, left little doubt in the 
mind of Soviet citizens concerning what the government wanted them to think about the 
United States.  So how did the Soviet people react to all of the negative information about 
America in the Soviet media?  Did they fall in line and begin to hate their country’s 
recent ally as the government wanted, or did they reject the official line and retain some 
of the goodwill for the country that supported the Soviet Union with billions of dollars of 
food and equipment?   
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 American famine relief in the 1920s, technological cooperation between the two 
countries during the Soviet industrialization drive of the early 1930s when thousands of 
American specialists came to the Soviet Union to help build its industry, as well as the 
Lend-Lease Program during the war, proved to be the biggest obstacles to the spread of 
official view on America in the Soviet Union.  Soviets who worked with Americans in 
the 1930, or met them during the war, as well as those directly affected by the American 
wartime aid, still held positive images of the American people years after the fact.    
 Living in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, American journalist Harrison 
Salisbury wrote about an exchange with a Soviet architect in Leningrad (St. Petersburg): 
 
What I asked, did the people of Leningrad think about Americans?  Did they still 
remember the days of the war? 
 My friend smiled, sadly.  “Of course we remember,” he said.  
“American Spam… we still make jokes about it but we were glad to eat it at the time.  
American butter…American sugar…We haven’t forgotten that America helped us.  We 
Leningraders never forget a friend.142 
 
Similarly, an American visiting the Soviet Union in 1962 remembered a conversation 
with a Siberian couple, who expressed their goodwill for the American people despite the 
recent cooling of relations after the Soviets shot down an American U2 spy plane.    
 
As a very young man the husband worked with American engineers during the first Five-
Year Plan and said he could never forget those years of common enthusiastic endeavor or 
the friendly, easygoing relationship between the Americans and the Russians.143  
 
Another American traveling on the Trans-Siberian railroad in 1966 met an old Soviet 
man who fought alongside Americans at the end of the war. 
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For him, there was no Cold War, no bitter rivalry between America and the Soviet Union; 
there were only those old days when Americans and Russians were together against the 
dreaded Nazi juggernaut.144 
 
 Interestingly, Soviet citizens expressed the same sentiments to their own leaders. 
Writing to Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 before his trip to the United States, a Soviet 
engineer from Stalingrad (Volgograd), described his liberation by American troops from 
a German POW camp in 1945. 
 
29 April 1945, American soldiers liberated the German concentration camp Dachau, 
among 30 thousand political prisoners of various nationalities were several hundred 
Soviet people – members of the underground resistance.  I remember the first moments of 
this event.  Three tall American soldiers, still hot from battle, looked in horror at the 
crowd of starving and sick people who ran to the barbed wire. 
Everybody was crying.  The soldiers had large tears in their eyes.  And then who can 
forget the heartwarming care of the medical battalion that arrived to treat the typhoid 
fever.  
Maybe these people will listen to you in America.  Tell them thank you from the Soviet 
people.  Tell them that the people they saved returned to their homeland and are happy.145 
 
Many of these accounts took place years after Stalin’s death.  However, the fact that 
some Soviets still remembered their encounters with Americans with fondness decades 
later serves as evidence that these feelings were more intense and more common in the 
period immediately following the war. 
 A friendly attitude on the part of Soviet people towards Americans did not 
necessarily signal a failure of Soviet propaganda.  An overwhelming majority of positive 
comments about America coming from Soviet citizens focused on Americans as people.  
This was very much in line with the theme of Soviet propaganda that most average 
Americans were good and decent people stuck under an exploitative government run by a 
few wealthy individuals.  These attitudes, however, blunted the more vicious attacks on 
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America by the Soviet media, ones portraying America as a country full of indifference 
and inhumanity. 
 Comrade-like feelings towards Americans persisted even during the height of the 
anti-American campaign of the early Cold War period.  “In no case when the Russians 
discovered that I was an American did it evoke any antagonism, resentment, or rudeness.  
On the contrary, the usual reaction was one of amazement, surprise, and pleasure,” noted 
an America journalist living in the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.146  Others made 
similar observations.147  
 On the whole, post-war anti-American propaganda did not break any new ground 
in popular attitudes towards America.  Besides changing the image of America from 
friend to foe, there was little variation in the way that the Soviet information sources 
characterized America and the American people.  However, the focus on the United 
States as the primary foe was new.   America had replaced Nazi Germany as enemy 
number one, but the image of America remained largely the same as it was before the 
war: Good America and Bad America; America of Lend-Lease and racist America; 
America of technological progress and widespread unemployment.  Soviet popular 
attitudes continued to reflect this view.  After talking to a number of Soviet officers in 
Germany in the late 1940s, American journalist Werner Knop characterized their attitude 
towards America this way: 
 
as they saw it, there was on the one hand, the America of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wallace, 
the America of oppressed Negroes, enslaved workers and shackled intellectuals fighting 
for democracy.  On the other hand, there was the semi-fascist America of Marshall and 
Wall Street…even when they castigated it, you saw how, to them America was out of this 
world--a mixture of monster and fairy prince.  Something greedy, cruel, decadent, and 
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voluptuous, but also something so rich and efficient, so inventive, glittering and 
daedalian.148 
      
 In large part, the availability of outside information and Soviet reality dictated the 
extent to which Soviet people believed the official image of America.  As we will see 
later in the chapter, lacking outside information on the subject, most Soviets subscribed 
to the official view of American society.  A Harvard project participant from the Ukraine 
described his view of America while living in the Soviet Union in the following manner: 
 
Due to lack of comparison, I even believed the Soviet radio, that only capitalists live in 
good conditions, and that the ordinary working people must sleep under bridges, live in 
slums and endure the constant threat of unemployment.149 
 
 On the other hand, faced with post-war food and consumer good shortages at 
home, hearing stories from Soviets returning from the West, and still using many 
American Lend-Lease items, many Soviet people saw America as a land of plenty.  
Alongside instances of Soviets praising American and Western living standards 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, a number of people suggested that the Soviet Union 
should turn to America in addressing post-war food shortages:  “Why doesn’t the Soviet 
Union purchase bread and other foodstuffs from America?” was a common question 
during lectures and meetings on post-war economic situation.150 “Here a kilogram of 
meat costs 6 dollars, but in America you can get a hundred killograms of pork for 6 
dollars,” complained one Soviet citizen.151  “Workers in America live better than our 
teachers,” commented one Soviet teacher in the late 1940s.  Clearly, despite attacks on 
the American standard of living as only available to a few, the image of America as a 
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wealthy country stayed with the Soviet people, growing in times of economic hardship in 
the country, and serving as a source of criticism of their own government’s reconstruction 
efforts. 
 In contrast, Soviet propaganda about American warmongering was notably 
successful. This was largely due to post-war conditions, both domestic and international, 
rather than the content of the message itself.  Having faced frequent military conflict 
since the start of World War I in 1914, and the “us against the capitalist world” message 
enshrined in Stalin’s “socialism in one country” speech in 1924, Soviet people quickly 
accepted the possibility of war with their recent ally.  “War with America is unavoidable 
and will start not later than the coming spring;”  “Currently Vyshinskii [the Soviet 
foreign minister] is waging diplomatic war in New York, soon we will be in a real war, 
therefore, mama, don’t wait for me,” read some of the letters from Soviet military 
officers shortly after the end of World War II.152  Soviets from other segments of society 
voiced similar concerns.153  
 At times, the Soviet focus on American militarism had the opposite of the 
intended effect.  Faced with constant headlines about American military spending and 
atomic bombs, some Soviets were left feeling that Soviet Union would lose the upcoming 
war.  “It’s pointless for them to make us to go through all this training, we will not win 
the future war with America,” wrote a Soviet major in a letter back home.154  “America 
and England will choke us with atomic bombs,” lamented others.155  There were official 
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complaints that during lectures that speakers talked about America in such a way that 
many listeners came away with an impression that America was all-powerful.156 
 Certain segments of the Soviet population, particularly ones that had been 
persecuted by the Soviet government, looked forward to the upcoming war.  They hoped 
that America would prevail in the conflict and free them from Soviet control.  A 1946 
official report from Zakarpatskaia region (oblast’) of the Ukraine mentioned that some 
members of the Uniate church were praying for invasion by Anglo-American forces.157  
Devastation and slow recovery in the countryside, especially in Ukraine where resistance 
to collectivized agriculture was the strongest, sparked hopes and rumors that Americans 
would invade the Soviet Union and abolish collective agriculture.158       
 The vast majority of the Soviet people simply could not believe that after 
everything their country went through during the war that the Soviet government was in 
any way responsible for rising international tensions and risking another war.  American 
observers living in the country at the time reported a uniformity of opinion on the subject. 
“The Russians generally feel, why should the Americans dislike us?  Why aren’t the 
Americans friendly?” wrote Harrison Salisbury.159  “Whenever I tried to explain to 
ordinary Russian citizens that American war fears are prompted by Soviet actions abroad, 
they expressed astonishment,” noticed Marshall McDuffie.  Furthermore he observed 
that: 
 
The Soviet people, incessantly indoctrinated over the years, seem to believe their 
government is incapable of starting a war; from the discussions I had, if they were told 
the United States was aggressor in any future struggle, most of them would accept the 
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statement without question.  Time after time Russians said to me, “The Soviet Union has 
never attacked any other nation.160 
 
 Many Soviets took up the official line that change in the White House was 
responsible for the shift in the American stance towards the Soviet Union. “What would 
the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union be if Roosevelt was still alive?  
What party does Roosevelt’s son belong to?  Will Henry Wallace be elected President?” 
and similar questions dominated discussions of international issues among the Soviet 
people at the time.161  “The simple Russian thought that Roosevelt had been killed, and 
that if he had lived America would have still been Russia's friend,” asserted one 
participant in the Harvard Project (a survey of Soviet defectors in the early years of the 
Cold War).162  In addition, this line of reasoning closely followed the official Soviet 
depiction of American politics, including foreign policy, as highjacked by America’s 
financial interests who chose the man in the White House.        
 The image of America as the new Nazi Germany also stuck with some Soviet 
people. “Is it possible that Truman will turn into a second Hitler?”163  “Will reactionary 
forces in the U.S. be able to get the American people behind them, much like the Nazis 
were able to?” asked some.164   Meanwhile, others compared Americans to fascists when 
voicing their concern over a possible nuclear war.165   
 On social issues in America, most Soviets’ opinions seem to have been influenced 
by Soviet propaganda.  In large part, Soviet people in the early Cold War era believed 
that racism was entrenched and widespread in American society.  In fact, the Soviets’ 
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propensity to mention the issue constantly in their conversations with Americans turned 
into a joke among those who had been to the Soviet Union – “An American finds a flaw 
with the Moscow subway.  And the Russian immediately replies “But what about Negro 
discrimination in America?”166  The joke also highlighted Soviet sensitivity to any 
outside criticism. 
 Marshall McDuffie, visiting the Soviet Union in 1953, remarked on the Soviet 
view of American society as shallow, focused on the lowest of human instincts, non-
progressive, and lacking any kind of opportunity and safety nets for the average people.  
In touring the country he noted the following encounters with Soviet people whose 
comments he judged to be genuine:     
 
One public school superintendent had asked me if teachers were still punished in 
America for teaching Darwinism… Some Soviet officials commented that: “failure to 
provide free education for all students who want it, your failure to provide free medicine, 
show that your government and your rulers do not really care for the welfare of your 
people… One person claimed that: “I have seen advertisements in The New York Times 
asking for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old girls to work as secretaries.  I don’t think they 
wanted them for such purposes.”167 
 
 
Frederick Barghoorn drew upon his own experiences with up Soviet people in the 1940s, 
reporting   
 
Soviet girls, for example, sometimes criticize their American sisters for marrying not for 
love but for money.  In view of their own conduct, this criticism is hardly consistent, 
however sincere.  It stems in part from the ideological indoctrination which holds 
Western people, including American, to be “commercial,” “dry” and “soulless.” 
 An extremely intelligent American Army officer who was stationed during the 
war at Poltava told me that Soviet people often remarked that of course America had a far 
superior material culture to that of the U.S.S.R. but that Soviet people were spiritually 
superior.  This opinion was sometimes accompanied by condemnation of American 
culture as commercial.168 
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 Educational level and access to information played a significant role in whether 
Soviet persons believed official information about America.  At times, the crudeness of 
anti-American propaganda raised questions among those who had more information 
about a given subject or simply took the time to reflect.  For example, in 1951 a person 
complained to the propaganda department that a collection of poems about America by a 
famous Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky had serious flaws because almost all positive 
comments about America were removed, thus distorting the poems’ meanings.169  
Around the same time another Soviet citizen wrote a letter stating that recent newspaper 
articles did a disservice to the Soviet press and people because they blatantly lowered 
statistics for American hydroelectric capacity while raising Soviet ones.170  “How can it 
be, that America, that is dumping grain into the sea, will not avoid an [economic] crisis, 
while the Soviet Union, that has bread shortages, will avoid it?” asked Soviet students in 
Latvia in response to articles in the Soviet press that America, not wanting lower grain 
prices, was dumping grain into the sea due to overproduction.171  Obviously the low 
quality of Soviet propaganda raised doubts about its truthfulness among listeners who 
possessed contradictory information or chose to think about issues in depth. 
 On the other hand, those without outside information or any desire to subject 
official information to more intense scrutiny were more likely to believe official sources.  
Harold Laycock, a British journalist visiting the Soviet Union in 1950, reported 
 
While I was at work she [the Soviet maid] confided in my wife.  These American planes 
strewing Colorado beetles all over Eastern Europe to destroy the Communist potato crop 
had disturbed her deeply...She, and millions of others in the Soviet Union, believed 
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without thought of doubt this and thousands of similar bizarre fantasies in their daily 
papers.172       
  
For most Soviet people, their knowledge about America came from official sources 
where information was often scattered and incomplete.  As a result, some people lacked 
basic understanding of the issues involved in anti-American propaganda.  For instance, 
Soviet people wrote newspapers asking questions such as “Who are American negroes?  
Are they part of the American nation?”173  Others asked for newspapers to explain the 
meaning of “Pentagon,” which they had seen mentioned so many times in the press.174    
 So was there anything about America that the Soviet people liked or respected?  
As noted earlier, Soviet propaganda did not vilify the American people; for the most part 
they were depicted as victims of the American capitalist system.  This, coupled with 
American aid to the Soviet people during famines in the early 1920s, and Lend-Lease 
during World War II, led Soviet people to develop positive feelings towards Americans 
as people.  Several Americans living in the Soviet Union at the time reported that Soviets 
often admired American lack of pretense, their politeness, and had a generally friendly 
attitude towards the American people.175       
 Since the early days of the Soviet state the media complimented Americans for 
their work ethic and efficiency.  Technological cooperation during the 1930s further 
solidified the image of Americans as industrious, technologically advanced and hard 
working, a perception that remained in the years of the early Cold War and beyond.176  
An American visiting the Soviet Union in the early 1950s recalled his conversation with a 
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Soviet official who had been to the U.S.: “Since he seemed to attack everything 
American, I finally asked what he liked best about my country, if anything, and he 
promptly answered, ‘American practicality.’”177  “Soviet admiration for American 
technology was nothing new, but the flood of American products which reached the 
U.S.S.R. during the war confirmed and intensified it,” wrote Frederick Barghoorn.178 
 As we have seen, in large part, most people’s image of America closely followed 
one presented by the Soviet media, with little deviation from the image of the pre-war 
United States.  Those who had supplemental sources of information, such as experts in 
certain fields, met some of the more outrageous claims regarding America with 
skepticism.  Most others, however, went along with the official line.  Since propaganda 
did not challenge some of the more positive and well-entrenched views of American 
people as generally good, it was easy to believe that worsening relations between the two 
countries were caused by a few immoral and greedy people in American government and 
business interests.        
 
Let’s race! : presenting America in the Khrushchev period 
 
 
 Stalin died on 5 March, 1953.  His death, however, did not have a drastic impact 
on Soviet propaganda about America.  Soviet foreign policy towards the United States 
assumed a softer tone, yet the basic characteristics of America in the Soviet media 
remained largely the same.  Gone were the crude depictions of America as the center of 
violence and vice.  Soviet journals no longer printed poorly edited tales of daily mass 
murder and appalling poverty on American streets.  What replaced them, however, were 
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the same stories, but now with less visible hostility towards the subject matter.  The 
authors of the new Soviet propaganda wanted to appear as more objective in their 
treatment of its Cold War rival.  In spite of the change in tone, however, Soviet 
propaganda still showed America as a country of wealth inequality and racism, a country 
where domestic and foreign policies, as well as culture, were slaves to selfish interests of 
the affluent elite who stopped at nothing to make money.             
 Three years after Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the clear 
leader of the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev’s policy towards America, at least on paper, 
called for “peaceful coexistence”179 between the two countries.  “Whether you like your 
neighbor or not, nothing can be done about it, you have to find some way of getting on 
with him, for you both live on one and the same planet,” he wrote in his 1959 article in 
Foreign Affairs magazine.180  The new relationship, he added, was not simply about 
tolerance and shelving of old conflicts only for them to reemerge at some later date.  
Peaceful coexistence, he noted “can and should develop into peaceful competition for the 
purpose of satisfying man’s needs in the best possible way.”181  In other words, 
Khrushchev suggested that each country’s peaceful achievements speak for themselves. 
 In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first manmade object into space.  
The small metal satellite named Sputnik182 signaled a new age in human history and made 
strong impressions around the world regarding Soviet technological capabilities.  
Moreover, Soviet leadership in the space-race provided a new platform for Soviet 
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propaganda to showcase Communism’s superiority over capitalism, particularly America, 
a country often portrayed by the Soviets themselves as a technological leader.    
 Propaganda frequently used the issue of Soviet space achievements to stress the 
point that Soviet Union was the country of the future.  “October [referring to the October 
1917 communist revolution] opened the road to space;” “Glory to the conquerors of 
the universe!” “Sons of October - Pioneers of the Universe!” proclaimed official Soviet 
posters of the time (see Illustration 9).183  Soviet feats in space frequently appeared on 
covers of Soviet magazines such as the popular satirical magazine Krokodil.184   A lot of 
Soviet futurist literature portrayed the future of capitalism on Earth as the real fantasy, 
where Soviets (people of the future) could not understand why the capitalists would live 
in such backward conditions when they met them on other planets. “Science-fiction 
became fiction only when the subject was capitalism,” quipped Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr 
Genis.185     
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Glory to the Soviet people – Pioneers of space (Poster 1) 
Socialism is our launching pad (Poster 2)  (Illustration 9) 
 
 At the same time the Soviets gladly gloated over American space failures. After a 
visit to Disneyland, Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and a prominent Soviet 
journalist, informed the Soviet reader that “There is only one American rocket that 
works.  The children like it very much; it takes them to the moon for only twenty 
cents.”186  Face to Face with America (Litsom k Littsu s Amerikoi), an official Soviet 
account of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959, contained lots of talk about 
Soviet scientific achievements – a rocket to the moon and the first atomic icebreaker.  
The book contrasted these with American failures such as two unsuccessful rocket 
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launches in one day during Khrushchev’s visit and slow progress in building an 
American icebreaker.187  The book added that: 
 
At the same time as the rockets on Cape Canaveral were blowing up and Americans 
launched satellites the size of oranges, something new happened, something so important 
that it even eclipsed the satellite era.  A rocket launched by Soviet people reached the 
second cosmic speed – 11.2 km per second.  A magic number, like “Open Sesame” – a 
number that opens the gates of the universe…behind which lies an era of interplanetary 
travel.188             
 
Visiting the Moscow circus in 1957, an American couple recalled seeing the following 
skit: “When the lights went up, a lonely clown was wandering around the arena patting a 
balloon into the air until it burst.  The master of ceremonies shouted, ‘Who are you and 
what are you doing?  Can’t you see you have no place in this show?’ The clown said, 
‘But I am an American and I’m trying to launch my sputnik.’”189 
 In addition, the Soviets used the issue of space exploration in order to reinforce 
some of the old Soviet propaganda themes about the United States.  Soviet posters and 
other media painted Americans as trying to use the new cosmos frontier for military 
purposes while the Soviet Union was committed to using space for peace and progress.190  
The theme expanded into anything space related.  For example, a popular 1957 science-
fiction book Kallisto told the story of an alien spaceship that landed in the Soviet Union.  
After meeting with the aliens Soviets find out that they come from a planet that built 
communism many years ago.  As the aliens share their advanced knowledge of things 
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such as medicines and new engines to help Earth, leaders of unnamed capitalist countries 
fear that Soviets might try to use alien technology for military purposes and 
unsuccessfully attempt to destroy the alien spaceship.191 
 Khrushchev threw another wrinkle into Soviet treatment of the United States 
when in 1957 he announced that the Soviet Union was going to "catch up with and 
overtake America in per capita production of meat, milk, and butter.”  While the idea was 
not new,192 now it came from the very top of the Soviet leadership, therefore becoming 
official policy.  The whole country was now engaged in beating the U.S., not only in 
agricultural output but in all spheres of life.193  Historian Greg Castillo argued that the 
campaign was a part of a larger effort by Khrushchev to stimulate Soviet consumer 
industry.194 
 As we have seen, Soviet leaders and people always saw America as a wealthy, if 
unequal, country.  After Khrushchev’s announcement, however, America became the 
official standard.  According to Zdenek Mlynar, (Secretary of the Czech communist 
party, 1968-1970) Khrushchev made the mistake in comparing the Soviet Union to the 
U.S.  Stalin never did this, he wrote, insisting instead that the Soviet Union was unique 
and could not be compared to any other country.  Therefore, by making "catching up with 
and overtaking America” the goal, Khrushchev “undermined the Soviet people’s faith in 
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their political and social system, thus creating a framework of constant comparison 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.”195   
 There are several problems with this statement.  First, in terms of material wealth, 
America had been the “measuring stick” for the Soviet people since at least the 1920s.196  
We saw examples of this in the previous section, when many Soviets had high opinion of 
Western, and especially American, living standards.  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
Khrushchev’s speech was responsible for Soviet people losing their faith in the system, 
although it might have intensified the level of comparison.  Khrushchev simply told them 
what they had already known for many years. 
 Furthermore, Soviet authorities sought to blunt any aggrandizement of America 
by providing a number of reasons why the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States 
in material terms. For example, magazine Komunist pointed out that U.S. had not had a 
war on its soil for a hundred years, netted huge profits from World War I and World War 
II, and benefited from decline of other capitalist countries following World War II.  The 
U.S. was ahead of the Soviet Union in productivity but only because the workers were 
forced to work at fast speeds and for long hours.  Furthermore, the Soviet Union provided 
many social services to its citizens while the U.S. did not, stressed the magazine.197  In an 
interview with foreign reporters in 1962, Khrushchev himself pointed out that the Soviet 
Union had to spend a lot more resources to achieve comparable living standards because 
of the colder climate.198   
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 The Soviet Union just experienced one of the most devastating wars in its history; 
therefore, most of these reasons seemed valid and relatively new.  Therefore, as we will 
see later in this chapter, many Soviets believed the official line that outside forces, and 
not the system itself, kept them from achieving American level of material wealth. 
 In addition, Soviet media tried to appeal to a sense of patriotism in the Soviet 
people by suggesting that despite not being as wealthy as Americans, Soviet citizens still 
preferred their way of life, one that did not revolve around pursuit of wealth and profit.  
An English professor touring the Soviet Union in 1960 described several such incidents:  
 
Tipping stories had their part to play in this campaign.  One Russian mother wrote to 
Izvestiya about the disgraceful behaviour of an American professor in a Russian post-
office.  First he tried to tip one of the assistants and received a rebuff ‘full of dignity’.  
Then the writer’s twelve-year-old son helped the American by carrying his parcels, and 
was offered a hundred-ruble note ‘to buy ice-cream’ – enough incidentally to keep even a 
Soviet Billy Bunter going for several days.  But the little boy was equal to the situation 
and coldly explained that it was his duty as a Pioneer199 to help his seniors without 
thought of gain.  His mother felt proud to see her son ‘make the Boston professor 
blush.’200     
 
Soviet movies of the period sought to convey a similar message.  “It was very important 
to show that Soviet life, modest though it may be compared with material life in the 
West, was still preferable,” wrote film historian Tony Shaw.201 
Besides the new angle of space exploration and friendly economic competition, 
official Soviet image of the United States changed little.  A survey of late 1950s – early 
1960s issues of the satirical magazine Krokodil underlines continuity in Soviet 
propaganda about America.   As before, the most common portrait of America continued 
to be one of a country highjacked by a few wealthy elites who used war mongering in 
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order to enrich themselves.  The image used by Krokodil to designate this category of 
Americans gives us a good idea of how the Soviet people were supposed to view them.  
Almost always, the Krokodil American was grossly overweight, in the effort to suggest 
the unhealthy excesses of American life, a dollar sign being another permanent feature in 
Krokodil’s depiction of rich Americans.  The dollar represented American obsession and 
worship of wealth and money, and was closely linked to American militarism, with dollar 
symbol frequently appearing on drawings of missiles and nuclear bombs.   
On the other hand, the Soviet Union was depicted as a country that worked day 
and night on the side of peace, but was ready to defend itself against American 
aggression if necessary.  The Soviet Union was the side that was constantly asking for 
peace via a ban on nuclear weapons, but its peaceful intentions were always thwarted by 
American business interests.  “Reaction of a businessman” a cartoon typical of the theme, 
showed an American businessman ripping out his hair in a fury, and screaming “Again 
they demand a ban on nuclear weapons.  How can I not blow up.”202  Another cartoon put 
it this way: “What’s wrong, Johnny?” asked a worried wife.  “I dreamt that the 
disarmament race has begun,” replied her obese and horrified husband, in a caricature 
that featured an American couple sleeping in a luxurious bed with a sizable dollar sign on 
the headboard and pictures of weapons proudly hanging on the wall behind them.203 
 In many of its stories and cartoons, Krokodil implied that America had other, 
more urgent, problems to worry about besides the arms buildup.  The magazine focused 
on the old subject of unemployment, frequently mentioning it as a dark force crippling 
American society – suggesting a contrast with the Soviet Union that, at least officially, 
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had no unemployment.204  Unequal treatment of African-Americans, underlined by 
cartoons where blacks were acceptable as objects of entertainment, yet were 
discriminated against in other social situations, was another staple theme on the pages of 
Krokodil.205  The official ideological magazine Komunist claimed that many African 
Americans faced forced sterilizations, although now these were being done in secret.206  
Similarly, Soviet propaganda showed American children as having few opportunities at 
getting an education, in contrast to Soviet kids who enjoyed all the fruits of socialist 
society.207   
 American society and culture were once again shown as under the influence of 
money, making them shallow and depraved.  A1961 Ogonek article featured a story by 
Soviet journalists who recently visited San Francisco.  In the article, they mentioned the 
overall friendliness of the people but focused on one incident:  An old man on a ferry 
complained that Soviet press never publishes crime stories, and proudly stated that 
tomorrow’s San Francisco paper will feature a story about a father who killed his 
children.  After some discussion with other passengers, the writers claimed that most 
Americans agreed with them and few were interested in these kinds of stories.  The 
article noted that this proved the fact that these horror stories did not arise from reader 
demand, but were instead being pushed by the newspaper owners.208  Once again, we see 
Soviet media highlighting American obsession with violence, but at the same time 
pointing out that most good Americans were under the influence of bad newspaper 
owners. 
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 In rehashing another old theme, a 1959 Ogonek cartoon underscored the 
American obsession with money and profit by showing a long line of Americans waiting 
to invest in land on the moon, for cash or credit, claiming the cartoon was based on real 
newspaper articles.209  In another magazine story, Soviets visiting an American television 
studio noted that famous actors, writers, and many others were forced to make 
commercials to support themselves, instead of working to produce real culture.210  
American art, being a product of rotting bourgeois society, “necessarily reflects 
philosophy of doom, hopelessness, pessimism, tragedy” concluded USIA survey of 
Soviet propaganda regarding American culture for 1957-1958.211   
 Furthermore, despite Khrushchev’s statements to the contrary,212 Soviets 
continued to distort information about the United States.  A Propaganda Department 
report from 1959 complained about a TV program where a group of Soviets, who 
recently visited America to soften up relations before Khrushchev’s visit, shared their 
experiences with a Soviet audience.  Specifically, the official report stated that one of the 
writers said too many positive things about the U.S. during the televised program.  
Officials underlined parts deemed most offensive: 
 
- He called America a “great nation” 
- Talked about how much freedom they [the Soviet delegation] had to visit 
anywhere and talk to anybody 
- He said Americans are very independent and proud to the point where you can’t 
tell the difference between the poor and the rich 
- He called Americans genuine  
- He talked about how he saw little Negro children dance rock-and-roll (a dance, he 
said, that is looked down upon in the Soviet Union) and how beautiful it was. 
- He mentioned clear segregation between blacks and whites 
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- He said how he was in awe of skyscrapers.  They made him feel proud for 
humanity’s achievements 
 
In the end, the Propaganda Department decided to take measures to ensure that such 
things never got on the air again and reprimanded the writer.213  We see that officials 
were most troubled by segments that directly contradicted fundament parts of Soviet anti-
American propaganda such as the disparity between the rich and the poor and racism. 
 Not all features of the propaganda campaign remained the same under 
Khrushchev.  Soviet media now could describe positive aspects of America, without also 
referring to the negative.  In one example, a magazine story featured a Soviet delegation 
visiting American laboratories where scientists did research on the polio vaccine.  The 
article contained almost no negative references to America and kept the focus on the 
disease.214  A 1961 New Year’s Ogonek issue even included a cartoon suggesting that all 
Cold War adversaries should shake hands and make up, without being overly grotesque 
in its depiction of Uncle Sam (see Illustration 10).215 
 
 
Ogonek, 1961 #1 p. 3 (Illustration 10) 
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 Of course, at least some of the improvement in the image of America in Soviet 
propaganda was a result of warming relations between the two countries, with 1961 being 
a particularly good year.  American observers of Soviet media in 1961 found 
“considerable restraint” in Soviet treatment of its Cold War opponent.216  Evidence from 
Soviet archives confirms American observations.  A 1961 note from the main Soviet 
news agency (Sovinformburo) to the Central Committee suggested that they were ordered 
to delay further publication of a brochure detailing American spy and sabotage operation 
in the Soviet Union “due to efforts to normalize U.S.-Soviet relations.”217        
 Periodic thaws in U.S.-Soviet relations did affect the way Soviet media portrayed 
America to Soviet citizens.  These, however, did not alter the core image of America 
presented by Soviet propaganda.  On the pages of Soviet newspapers and on the screens 
of Soviet televisions, America still remained the same place it had been before and after 
World War II. To illustrate the point more vividly, instead of a conclusion I provide a 
section from a book written by a British lawyer who came to the Soviet Union in 1960 to 
witness the Gary Powers218 trial:   
 
To take my mind off the storm I picked up a Russian magazine and looked at the pictures.  
In the middle page spread there was a feature about life in the United States.  The pictures 
made it clear what the publishers were trying to convey – an idea of the depravity of life 
in the leading democratic country in the world.  There were pictures of New York 
bookshops displaying stacks of books.  They related to sex and sex crimes, to famous 
crimes and to “the anatomy of murder”.  There was a ghastly picture of a bout of all-in 
wrestling.  The expressions on the faces of the packed audience were contorted with 
sadist delight.  There was a reproduction of a horoscope feature in a leading newspaper 
and of well-known film stars displaying busts and behinds.  There were reproductions of 
cinema hoardings giving the titles and horrific backcloths of such productions as “War of 
the Planets”, “She Beast of Venus”, “The Gangster’s Moll”.  Several pictures showed 
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Beatniks lying about in the unbelievable squalor of their flats.  New York street scenes 
showed obvious prostitutes ogling men who passed, pitiful-looking urchins in the 
Bowery, unbelievably large limousines with fat, cigar-smoking tycoons.  There were also 
pictures of a poor wretch near a beauty parlor for dogs.219    
 
 
If America is so good, why didn’t it launch the Sputnik?: public reaction 
to America in the Khrushchev period 
 
 
 The Khrushchev period saw a number of small changes in the official treatment of 
the United States.  The biggest was the announcement that the Soviet Union was now in a 
friendly competition with America, with the Soviet Sputnik launch providing hope that 
communism was finally ready to prove its superiority as a system.  Khrushchev’s 
announcement of “catching up and overtaking America” cast America as the official 
basis for the comparison of standards of living.  Furthermore, Soviet propaganda 
decreased the level of hostility with which it talked about America.  For the most part, 
everything else in the Soviet portrayal of America remained the same. “To many Soviets 
citizens, America is a land of baffling contradictions, where great luxury and poverty 
exist side by side,” concluded a 1962 United States Information Agency (USIA) report.220  
 In large part, Soviet people echoed official propaganda themes.  Partly as a result 
of an inferiority complex due to the well-known and often exaggerated American 
standard of living, people welcomed Soviet space achievements with enthusiasm and 
pride, often using them to underscore Soviet superiority in the Cold War conflict and as a 
counterweight to any perceived American advantage.  The American-backed intervention 
in Cuba in 1961, the U2 incident, the Cuban Missile crisis, as well as Soviet media’s non-
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stop portrayal of the Soviet Union as a country of peace, cemented the perception that 
America was ruled by a handful of money-hungry, wealthy men who would stop at 
nothing, even starting a nuclear war, to achieve their goals.  At the same time, the Soviet 
Union stood as the champion of peace, highlighted by Khrushchev’s visit to the United 
States in 1959 where he emphasized peaceful coexistence.   
 Khrushchev’s policies exposed the Soviet people to a lot more information about 
its Cold War rival.  The 1957 Youth Festival in Moscow, Khrushchev’s 1959 visit to the 
United States, the American exhibition in Moscow the same year, and the start of a 
cultural exchange between the two countries, all provided the Soviet people with a first-
hand look at America.  Even though a lot of this information had to go through the 
censorship lens of Soviet and American propaganda, it was still as close as most Soviet 
people got to real America in their lifetime.  The 1957 Youth Festival and American 
exhibitions in the Soviet Union provided face-to-face contact and had an impact on 
Soviet public’s view of Americans as real people who had much the same aspirations as 
their Soviet counterparts.221  However, deprived of an opportunity to experience or see 
American life for themselves, and lacking unbiased context, most Soviets saw America222 
in much the same way as they did in post-war Stalin period, be it with less hostility. 
 The most evident change in Soviet popular attitudes stemmed from the Soviet 
Union’s success in the space race, as reflected in Soviet propaganda.  The Soviet Union 
had bested the most powerful capitalist nation in area of global importance. 223   People 
writing to Khrushchev on various issues frequently referred to Soviet space victories as a 
                                                        
221 For discussion of the 1957 Youth Festival, see Magnúsdóttir, 201-217.  For discussion of American 
exhibitions see my chapter on the subject. 
222  See my chapters on American exhibitions and unofficial information. 
223 Khrushchev himself labeled America as the leader of the capitalist world in an interview with foreign 
reporters; see Nikita Khrushchev., Stroitel’stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 103. 
  96 
source of pride and strength.224   “It [Sputnik] proves Soviet superiority over the U.S.,” 
noted one village driver.225   
 For some, Sputnik was enough proof of the accuracy of Soviet statements about 
America. As an American visitor remembered,       
 
“There are two Americas,” he [a Soviet Army captain] explained.  “A fine life for the 
capitalists, but misery and starvation for the workers.  How sad to see so many 
unemployed, so many starving!  If you had looked on the other side of Fifth Avenue you 
would have seen them.”  After Caryl [an English TV producer] explained that American 
workers were not treated that badly the captain said he did not believe her. 
“If America is so good, why did it not launch the sputnik?” he replied.226 
 
The army captain summarized the general feeling of many Soviets that their 
achievements in space proved the supremacy of the Soviet system, just as the Soviet 
media had claimed for years.  Since these statements seemed to have been proven right, 
there was little need in doubting other official statements about America, especially in the 
absence of information to the contrary.        
 The theme of peaceful coexistence caught on with the Soviet public very quickly 
because it tapped into already existing phenomena in Soviet society.  Having experienced 
World War I, civil war, and the recent devastation of World War II in the past fifty years, 
Soviet people were desperate for a return to normal life.  In letters to Khrushchev many 
people sited their personal experiences during World War II.  In describing the horrors of 
war, Soviet people expressed their desire to channel international disagreements into the 
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peaceful competition of building schools and hospitals instead of a nuclear arms race.227  
“Your main freedom is freedom of business.  We prefer – freedom from exploitation by 
other people. The superiority of each system should be determined through peaceful 
competition,” wrote a retired schoolteacher among many others.228 
 In keeping with official propaganda, Soviet people in general voiced the 
sentiment that if the Soviet Union was simply given a chance to prove its system without 
being interrupted by war than Khrushchev’s predictions would come true.  Bolstered by 
Soviet achievements in space, many Soviet people had optimism in the future. One 
foreign tourist reported this conversation with a Soviet man while visiting the Soviet 
Union in 1959: 
 
The main thing to remember is that five years ago things were far worse, and if you come 
again in five years from now you’ll hardly recognize it.  We really will beat America in 
butter, meat and milk, like they say.  Then everything else.  This country is growing, 
steadily and absolutely surely, despite any setbacks and mistake.  We’re moving, and 
we’re moving with history.229 
 
 While having more optimism in their country’s future, many people, in 
stereotypical Russian fashion, took it with a grain of salt, especially when Khrushchev’s 
economic policies did not live up to expectations.  Several Soviet jokes from the period 
help convey some of the underlying feelings: 
 
What would happen if Stalin rose from the dead? 
— Khrushchev would surpass America.230 
  
A Russian was asked: “Would it be possible to build communism in the United States?” 
The answer: “Of course but it would be such a pity.”231 
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US President Dwight Eisenhower suggests to Nikita Khrushchev that they see who will 
catch and overtake whom in a 100-meter race. The fit Eisenhower covers the distance 
easily, while paunchy Nikita barely manages to puff to the finish line a few minutes later. 
The Soviet newspaper Pravda reports on the event: "US President Eisenhower and our 
dear Nikita Sergeevich participated in an athletic contest; Nikita Sergeevich captured 
second place, while the US president finished second to last."232  
 
 For many Soviets, the bright future, at least in term of consumer goods and 
comforts, closely resembled their image of America.  As we have seen, for decades, a 
majority of Soviets acknowledged America as the gold standard when it came to 
questions of material wealth and technological progress.  Denied most outside 
information about the United States, Soviet people turned America into a consumer and 
technological fairytale that scarcely resembled real America.233  And Khrushchev’s 
“surpass and overtake America” policy further cemented that assumption.  As a result, 
“from the production of pigs to hydrogen bombs not the western European countries but 
the United States of America are the provocative standard of comparison,” noted Laurens 
Van Der Post, a British journalist visiting the Soviet Union in 1963.234  Several other 
foreigners made similar observations.235        
 Apart from Soviet optimism about their ability to compete with America there 
was little change in Soviet popular opinion about the United States.  A majority still saw 
the Soviet Union as a country of peace and America as a country of war.  Much like in 
the late Stalin period, these feelings were based on the assumption that since the Soviet 
Union just went through a terribly destructive war there was no way that the country 
could want another one.  Letter after letter addressed to Khrushchev before his 1959 trip 
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to the United States stated support for Soviet peace initiatives, with people telling 
personal war stories and expressing shock and anger at what they saw as American 
warmongering.236  “I was five when the war started.  My father died in Stalingrad.  I 
don’t want any children to be orphans.  Americans need to stop playing with fire,” wrote 
a thirty-five-year-old Soviet woman.237  
 As before, Soviet people blamed the so-called American ruling circles and not the 
American people.  Taking the lead from domestic media, many assumed that a majority 
of Americans were forced to go along with policies that they disagreed with.    
“Eisenhower’s actions do not coincide with the peaceful intentions of the American 
people,” wrote a retiree from Kiev.238  “The day is not too far away, when the people of 
America will take the government into their hands and planet earth will have peace,” 
stated another.239  “Your Pentagon is no friend of ours, but the American people and the 
Russian people will never fight one another because in the end it will be the people who 
decide things,” a high ranking Soviet military officer told an American journalist.240 
 The division of America into bad government and good people appears to have 
accounted for Soviet people not taking out their anger over tensions between two 
countries on American tourists.  Even at the height of the U2 incident in 1960 where an 
U.S. spyplane was shot down over Soviet territory, American and other foreigners in the 
Soviet Union reported friendly attitudes towards American visitors on the part of the 
Soviet people, who mostly regretted “that our relations, which had been moving toward 
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genuine friendship, were getting worse again.”241  In letters to the Soviet government 
over the U2 episode, a majority of people blamed the bad Americans (government, 
military-industrial complex, Wall Street…etc).242 
 Most Soviets continued to believe that while prosperous, America was beset by a 
host of social problems and lacked refined culture. Racism and unemployment once again 
occupied top spots on the list of American social ills.  In a collective letter to 
Khrushchev, a seventh grade class expressed their sorrow at the plight of minorities in the 
U.S.:   
 
We have been following your trip to New York City.  We have various nationalities in 
our class and we live like one big happy family.  And if we had negros and Indians 
[Native Americans] studying here, we would treat them the same and not like [they get 
treated] in the USA.  Where they are despised and humiliated.”243 
 
After reading some Soviet propaganda about Native Americans, a sixty-eight year old 
retiree from Tashkent suggested they be relocated to the Soviet Union where they would 
be safe.  She wrote: 
 
 Dear comrade Khrushchev.  Can we not save the once great people that are slowly dying 
out because of U.S. policies?  These people are called “Redskins” [krasnokozhie.]  There 
are only a few of them left. Can we not find some land for them here?244 
 
Quite often Soviets used these perceived problems in order to counter criticism of the 
Soviet Union.  For example, a Soviet factory worker, in reference to Nixon’s 1959 visit to 
the Soviet Union, wrote:   
 
We know that it [America] is not as nice as it was portrayed by Mr. Nixon.  We know 
that millions of young people don’t have jobs.  Many people live in poverty and blacks 
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are treated poorly.  So why do they talk about freedom when they don’t have it 
themselves.245 
 
 In the minds of many average Soviets, American culture continued to be largely 
associated with the lowest of human instincts.  ”We are not sextortured in this country as 
in America, you know.  We can have a perfectly natural association as friends with the 
opposite sex,” commented one Soviet writer in a conversation with a British tourist.246  
American abstract painting featured at the 1959 American exhibition in Moscow, 
received a cold reception from Soviet visitors.247  “Maybe they have created a more 
comfortable life than ours.  But there are many things we can’t understand about them… 
Their abstract painting.  It is meaningless,” noted a Soviet elementary school teacher, 
talking about her visit to 1959 American Exhibition.248  By 1960s, however, expanding 
cultural exchange started in 1958 between the two countries began to have an effect.  A 
1967 Soviet sociological study found that 41% of respondents ranked American cultural 
achievements at a high level, above Czechoslovakia and India, and on par with Spain.249     
 Not all believed everything they saw and heard about America from domestic 
information sources.  As in the late Stalin period, any doubt as to the accuracy of 
domestic media usually resulted from personal experiences, access to outside 
information, or critical thinking on the part of the Soviet citizens, much of it tied to their 
professional position and educational level.  “In general, Americans are great people.  
They have much in common with the Soviet Union.  They are extremely friendly and 
hospitable.  Underneath the stern business exterior lies a warm, emotional and even 
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sentimental person,” wrote a Soviet engineer who studied and lived in the U.S. for over 
seven years, and worked with Americans in the 1920s and 1930s, in a letter to 
Khrushchev.250  Some still remembered American Lend-Lease help to the Soviet Union 
during the war and expressed their gratitude to the American people and government.251   
 Those who had access to more complete information about America and their 
own country formed a better picture of the real situation. “I read about America, and 
knew how things were in our country [meaning good in America and bad in the Soviet 
Union],” recalled former first Secretary of Belorussian Central Committee years later.252  
A number of those who analyzed publicly available information developed similar 
suspicions.  “How can U.S. give aid to other countries if they have a 693 billion dollar 
foreign and domestic debt?” asked a reader of Komunist magazine, questioning 
magazine’s premise that America was too poor to help others.253  
 Frequently, official and unofficial information about America merged with Soviet 
people’s frustration over domestic living conditions.  In this case, people tended to 
question official information and see unofficial sources as closer to the truth.  “If 
Americans making $80 a month are considered to be on the verge of poverty, then what 
can we say about Soviet people making 27 rubles a month,” asked one Komunist reader.  
In time of economic downturns, some Soviet workers openly cited things they heard in 
Western radio broadcasts as means of comparing American and Soviet workers, largely 
in favor of the former.254  In writing about a major Soviet worker uprising over economic 
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conditions in the city of Novocherkask in 1962, Erik Kulavig noted that information 
about working conditions in the West (often America), obtained from Western 
broadcasts, played a large “consciousness-raising role” among striking Soviet workers.255  
Clearly, the workers cared little about the accuracy of this information as they had few 
means of verifying it.  They simply used imaginary America as a way of criticizing 
domestic economic conditions. 
 Much like the striking workers in Novocherkask used incomplete information 
from Western sources to build up America and criticize the Soviet Union, others used bits 
and pieces of information from official sources about America to support their own 
version of America, one that often mirrored the one presented by Soviet propaganda.  
Traveling through the Soviet Union in 1962, an American electrical engineer had the 
following exchanges with Tanya, his Soviet traincar neighbor:  
 
”Why did you attack Japan?” she inquired in an accusing voice. 
 “Because they attacked us at Pearl Harbor,” I replied truthfully. 
 “Where is Pearl Harbor?” 
 “In Hawaii.  The Japanese treacherously sank seven of our largest warships.” 
 Her only reaction was a puzzled look.  The story of Pearl Harbor was just a blank 
in her education!256 
 
Tanya became very excited about an article in Pravda concerning the death of Marilyn 
Monroe.  It had been given two columns. 
 “You Capitalists killed her to make money!” she accused me.257 
  
 An American doctoral student on a trip to the Soviet Union in 1956 recorded a 
similar story when sharing a train compartment with a Soviet man.  For hours the man 
kept repeating official propaganda about the U.S. – oppression of African -Americans, 
poverty…etc, and “imposing on peace-loving people soldiers who rape women in the 
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streets and chew gum258… What amazed me was his complete sincerity, his total lack of 
bitterness or rancor, his dedication to the system, and his abysmal ignorance of America 
and the ‘American way of life,’ for lack of a better phrase,” noted the author.259   “In 
short, the great majority of Russians knew nothing about the problems of the Western 
world, whether past or present,” wrote Markoosha Fisher visiting the Soviet Union in 
1962.260 
 When faced with alternate material, many Soviets simply refused to believe 
information that challenged their set beliefs about America.  Among other examples,261 
an American tourist remembered one such incident when traveling in the Soviet Union in 
1962:   
 
Then Seva [the Inturist guide] said to me, “The chauffeur wants to know if it is true that 
the unemployed in America are starving.” 
 “No,” I answered, “they are paid $32 a week if you are out of work.” 
 “He doesn’t believe you,” Seva answered.  “He says it is Capitalist propaganda.  
Nobody gets paid for not working.”262 
  
 Vladimir Kozlov’s study uncovered another interesting use of American images 
in the Soviet Union.  In describing the Soviet criminal world of the Khrushchev period, 
Kozlov showed that America became a symbol of resistance to the Soviet state among 
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Soviet criminals.  “A certain notion of the far away “Amerika,” a land hostile to the 
Soviet bosses, and its remarkable President Truman, who would one day begin a war 
against the Soviet Union and then liberate the prisoners, generally occupied an important 
position in criminal mythology at the beginning of the 1950s,” he wrote.263  In other 
words, Soviet criminals used America in much the same way as religious minorities did 
immediately following the war, and to a lesser extent as striking workers in 
Novocherkask.264  Soviet criminals and religious minorities, both persecuted by the 
Soviet state, saw America as the other world power and naturally ascribed it a savior 
status, the only one capable of bringing down their mighty oppressor – the Soviet 
government.  Novocherkask workers and others unhappy with their economic conditions 
did not want America to destroy the Soviet system, but they did employ the myth of 
American wealth to criticize Soviet standard of living.           
 It is also worth mentioning that most Soviets, while admiring American living 
standards, did not attribute those achievements to the American system of government.  
Instead they chose to believe domestic propaganda line that American wealth was based 
on exploitation of the working class at home and abroad.265  “Apparently the thought 
seldom if ever occurs to the average Soviet that there is any connection between 
American living conditions – which vitally interest them – and America’s political and 
social institutions – which do not,” stated a USIA report.266 
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 In the end, public reaction and the official view of America in the Khrushchev era 
closely resembled that of the post-war Stalin period.  In the above-mentioned letters 
many admitted that they received their information from official sources, primarily 
newspapers and radio.  Moreover, Boris Grushin’s pioneering sociological studies of the 
period revealed that overwhelming majority of respondents, men and women from 
different segments of Soviet society, not only agreed with, but also frequently used 
official propaganda language in their answers to questions on issues of international war 
and peace.267  We must not discount the effect of World War II on Soviet people’s desire 
to go along with official peace rhetoric, yet as analysis of the Grushin data revealed, the 
effectiveness of official propaganda played a significant role in shaping their views 
regarding these issues.268   
 In addition, Shiraev and Zubok stressed that more than one-third of Soviet 
population of the period, including bureaucrats, employees of service industries, and the 
bulk of peasantry and blue-collar workers:  
 
believed the United States was an enemy that wanted to deprive them of their hard-won 
gains.  Therefore, these individuals continued to respond favorably to the themes – 
promoted unflaggingly by the propaganda-that endorsed xenophobic isolationism and the 
Soviet way of life and thinking.269   
 
As we have seen, a majority of the others, while not as hostile in their view of 
America,270 still held views similar to those found in the Soviet media.  The Soviet state 
did remarkably well, save for a few minor instances, in controlling and channeling 
popular opinion about America in this period.  
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 The Brezhnev period (1964-1982) and the brief transitional phase before Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985 saw little in the way of change in official Soviet 
portrayal of the United States.  In its tone, it resembled the late Stalin period more than 
when Khrushchev was in the leadership position, yet it borrowed much from the latter as 
well.  There was a warming of relations in the early 1970s, the so-called détente, where 
America and the Soviet Union agreed to slow down the arms race (SALT I) and 
established closer economic ties, with Pepsi winning the right to be the exclusive 
American cola drink in the Soviet Union in exchange for distributing Stolichnaia vodka 
in the United States.271  Overall, however, “the tone of the coverage might have altered 
during periods of particularly bad or good relations, but the foundation remained the 
same,” noted Jonathan Becker in describing Soviet mass media’s coverage of the United 
States in the Brezhnev period.272  
 One notable feature of this period was Soviet society’s greater shift towards 
materialism, with people focusing on improving their own living standards.  While the 
phenomenon was more widespread among the younger generation,273 it had an effect on 
other segments of Soviet society.274  As a result, America became an even greater symbol 
                                                        
271 J.C. Louis and Harvey Yazijian.,The Cola Wars  (New York: Everest House, 1980), 205. 
272 Jonathan Becker, Soviet and Russian press coverage of the United States: press, politics, and identity in 
transition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan in association with St. Anthony’s College, 2002), 25. 
273 I will discuss this in more detail in my chapter on Soviet youth. 
274 James Millar, “Quality of life: subjective measures of relative satisfaction” in Politics, work, and daily 
life in the USSR: A survey of former Soviet citizens, ed. James R. Millar (New York: Cambridge University 
  108 
of material wealth among the Soviet population.  “Denouncing Americans for 
consumerism and vanity, the Soviets during this period themselves demonstrated a 
growing interest in material comfort and prestige,” stressed Vladimir Shlapentokh.275  
Hedrick Smith, a New York Times reporter living in Russia in the 1970s, noted a similar 
trend.276   Furthermore, because of increased frustration with stifling bureaucracy and the 
lack of consumer goods in the country, the hopes for a better future present in the 
Khrushchev period declined and led to a situation where by the late 1960s “for most 
representatives of Russia’s new middle class, America became the antipode of the 
inefficient, bureaucratic, and backward Soviet Union,” wrote Shiraev and Zubok.277 
 Faced with growing cynicism toward clichéd propaganda language found in mass 
media,278 the government increasingly turned to what Vladimir Shlapentokh called 
“covert propaganda,” political and foreign affairs lectures being the most common 
examples.  He identified the main functions of covert propaganda as  
 
1. Transmission of messages that cannot be conveyed through mass media;  
2. The organization of counterpropaganda, especially against foreign radio and 
rumors, without directly implicating the authorities; and  
3. The adaptation of propaganda to the specific features of each recipient group, 
in order to maximize the effect.279   
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Post-Stalin Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 76-79. 
275 Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Changeable Soviet Image of America,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 497 (May, 1988), 157. 
276 Hedrick Smith,  The Russians.  (New York: Times Books, 1976), 53-55. 
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278 “Piano in the bushes” (roial’ v kustakh) became a popular phrase associated with predictable structure of 
official propaganda in the Brezhnev period where obviously scripted features of official programs, mostly 
official news, were presented as random.  The phrase came from a 1966 comedy sketch where a reporter 
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279 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet public opinion and ideology, 99. 
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 In other words, realizing that the population was getting desensitized to 
information from the regular propaganda channels, the Soviet government sought to 
transmit its message through other means.  Soviet authorities used this pent-up demand 
for other sources of information by increasing the number of informal lectures regarding 
domestic, but mostly international issues.  During these seminars, official lecturers 
frequently distanced themselves from official propaganda by using different terms and 
providing information not available from regular mass media sources.280  As a result, the 
Soviet state was able to turn millions of those who attend lectures into voluntary activists 
in the “horizontal propaganda” of rumors and suggestions.281   We must keep this fact in 
mind when discussing Soviet propaganda of the period.282  
 “Writing about the West was governed by one overriding criterion: it had to show 
the superiority of Soviet socialism over American capitalism,” stated Jonathan Becker in 
describing Soviet media of the period.283  Accomplishments in the area of space 
exploration continued to take center stage in Soviet claims of supremacy.  While no 
longer highlighting American space failures, Soviet media continued to emphasize Soviet 
leadership in the field.  In describing Soviet space missions, magazine articles frequently 
cited these as victories for domestic science and technology, thus implying the victory of 
communism over capitalism.284  Steadily falling behind the U.S. in consumer and 
agricultural production, this was a safe and reliable area to showcase Soviet dominance 
                                                        
280 Ibid., 106. 
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282 Vladimir Shlapentokh gives a good overview of covert propaganda in his book Soviet public opinion 
and ideology, 99-107.  However, it is only a cursory glance at the issue that deserves a separate study. 
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over the West, raising national pride and shifting attention away from less successful 
areas of the Soviet system.    
 Increased American military involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s 
provided Soviet propaganda with excellent material for reemphasizing old notions of the 
U.S. government as militaristic and inhumane, as well as ensuring people’s support for 
Soviet help to North Vietnam.  At the height of the conflict, Soviet media regularly 
published stories focusing on war atrocities perpetrated by American soldiers and the 
heroic liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people.285  A 1972 animated cartoon Ave 
Maria condemned American involvement in Vietnam by showing Americans bombing 
Vietnamese cities and brutally killing Vietnamese children (see Illustration 11).  Part of 
the poem recited in the background to music and lyrics of Ave Maria stated:          
 
In black Boeings, like thieves in the night,  
our husbands fly above foreign countries.  
Turning them into a blood colored desert.   





285 Vietnam consistently took the number one spot for number of political cartoons in Pravda from 1965 to 
1971 (data for period after 1971 does not include Vietnam related issues but it certainly continued to be one 
of the leading subjects in Soviet publications into the mid-1970s) – McKenna, 115.  For some typical 
examples see Ogonek, #6 February, 1968. p. 16-17, #7 February, 1968. p. 4-5, #30 July, 1968. p. 3. 
286 Available at - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lMhOtp62xc. 
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American soldier in Vietnam – Ave Maria (1972) – (Illustration 11) 
 
 
 Some Soviet Vietnam propaganda was coordinated at the highest levels of the 
government with input from a number of government agencies, signaling its importance.  
In 1967, four American sailors Craig Anderson, John Barella, Richard Bailey and 
Michael Lindner, left the U.S. carrier Intrepid while it was docked in Japan.  They asked 
for help from Japanese peace organizations and were eventually flown to the Soviet 
Union.  Once in there they were interviewed by the KGB.  Following the interviews, head 
of the KGB Yuri Andropov and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko sent a note to 
the Soviet Central Committee.  In it they recommended that Soviet authorities should, 
among other things: 
 
- Publish an interview with sailors in newspaper Pravda 
- Organize Moscow radio and TV programs with sailors and broadcast it on 
Intervision287 
- Publish personal statements by sailors in the Soviet press 
 
The International Department of the Central Committee agreed with most suggestions 
from the note and even approved thousand dollar allowances for the sailors’ Western 
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European tour where they were to denounce American involvement in Vietnam.288   
 At the same time, Soviet propaganda continued to show American society as rife 
with inequality, racism, and overall chaos, while American culture as shallow and 
depraved, in a tone reminiscent of the late Stalin period. 289  American crime became a 
particular focal point in Soviet efforts to show that while wealthy, American society was 
disorganized and lawless (see Illustration 12), therefore Soviet people had no reason to be 
envious. “Gangsters Sue” a 1968 Ogonek article, informed Soviet readers about a 
California resident who was suing Life magazine because they published a story claiming 
he was an Italian mob boss.  In the end, Ogonek sarcastically noted that perhaps in the 
future American crime syndicates will demand that shares of their organizations be traded 
along others on the New York stock exchange.290  In another Ogonek story, a caption for 
a photograph showing a middle-aged woman shooting a gun read: 
 
Elderly housewives learning how to shoot.  An unusual sight anywhere in the world 
except America.  They are used to it there.  Americans are learning self-defense, not 
being able to rely on police to protect them from criminals whose numbers grow every 




288 RGANI f. 89 op. 46 d. 9. 
289 “Dial M for Masochism: Miller, Motherwell and Manson” read the title for a typical late 1970s article 
about American culture; see Jay Martin, Winter Dreams: An American in Moscow (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1979), 67. 
290 Ogonek, #20 May, 1968, 25. 
291 Ogonek, #33 August, 1968, 21. 
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Crime (large man in the middle).  American policeman: “I finally got you under 
control!” 




Stories of racism and unemployment, two unwavering pillars of Soviet propaganda about 
America since the founding of the Soviet state, became more graphic and extravagant.  
Soviet press ran stories of athletes being kicked off the American team for publically 
protesting racism in the U.S. at 1968 Olympics in Mexico.  “Alabama in Olympic 
Village” read the caption under a photo of the incident.292  A 1979 animated cartoon 
Shooting Range (Tir), set to a jazz soundtrack, offered a unique twist on American 
unemployment where the main character, unemployed and desperate for money, is forced 
to work as a human target at a shooting range for the rich.293   
 The hierarchy of priorities became clear, however, when covert propaganda, 
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293 Available at - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cEDCeJuBPg.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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mentioned earlier in the section, sacrificed the official view on racism in America in 
order to show American society as being disorganized and dangerous.  David Shipler, a 
New York Times correspondent living in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, remembered 
one incident where:   
 
A friend of mine once sneaked a tape recorder into a closed lecture at Moscow State 
University, where a Soviet journalist just back from a visit to the United States described 
the following scene: 
 “Not knowing all the customs and habits of American life, we started to walk up 
a Washington street, and from around the corner three Negroes advanced upon us.  I 
carried a hammer, which I had bought earlier, and it had a chrome-plated handle.  The 
working tools in America are excellent, and if it’s a hammer, the handle will never break 
or fall off, and it gleams.  So the only thing that I had in my hands was that hammer, and 
in confusion and apprehension I thrust it into my pocket and then drew it out again.  And 
it turned out that that was the most appropriate gesture I could make because the Negroes 
evidently saw that something flashed, black and long, and just as they were coming to us, 
they swerved around us, and we went in opposite directions.  Should it have been 
otherwise,” the journalist concluded.  “I’m not quite sure that I would be delivering this 
lecture.”  So the stereotypes are confirmed: material excellence, dangerous streets, hostile 
blacks, terrifying disorder – a profound ambivalence about America.294 
 
In another example, a 1968 propaganda department report summarized official Soviet 
view of American society by pointing out that for Americans lack of freedom signifies 
absence of “anarchy, gangsterism, violence, compulsion to practice religion, mysticism, 
irrationalism…etc.”295  
 As I noted earlier, increased preoccupation with living standards among Soviet 
people forced official propaganda to devote more time to the subject.  Soviet officials 
were particularly sensitive to American claims of capitalist system’s superiority in 
economic matters.  The Soviet Information department briefed the Central Committee 
that a 1966 five-volume study “New directions in Soviet economy” published by the U.S. 
Congress falsified figures on completion of Soviet seven year economic plan and asserted 
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that Soviet economy is significantly lagging behind the U.S.  In response, the Information 
department suggested that Pravda put out an article critical of the American study and 
several others including leading economic magazine Voprosy ekonomiki publish figures 
countering American conclusions.  The Central Committee approved the proposal.296   
 Almost a decade later, in preparation for extensive Western propaganda focusing 
on American living standards in connection with the American bi-centennial in 1976, 
Soviet authorities suggested that Soviet media emphasize the fact that credit for 
American achievements belonged to American people, not capitalism.297  The fact that 
these issues consistently made it to the highest level of the Soviet government and 
responses appeared in leading Soviet publications testified to the level of importance 
Soviet authorities attached to the issue.    
 Furthermore, in order to discredit the myth of American material prosperity, the 
Soviet press continued to stress the old notion of American wealth inequality.  One 
magazine article did this by attacking the idea of an average American.  Addressing a 
fictional “average American” the author wrote:   
 
I am very well aware that you really don’t exist.  You are an invention of American 
statistics that created you from an average of numbers and determined your brand of 
cigarettes, the kind of car you prefer to drive and everything else that does not really 
represent the average American citizen.  Because your image, created by statistical 
willpower, mixes the incomes of а millionaire and an unemployed Negro, tastes of a four-
star general from the Pentagon and a young draftee, and habits of a newspaper boss and a 
farmer.298       
 
 This division of America into the rich and poor, the good and the bad, continued 
in Soviet patronage of certain American cultural figures.  American writers critical of the 
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United States continued to be the only ones officially available to the Soviet public.299  
Soviet films intensified distinctions between “good” (ordinary people) and “bad” 
(military, politicians, Wall Street) in their portrayal of America.300  The American singer, 
Dean Reed, little known in the United States, was a star in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe because of his Marxist views and opposition to many American policies, foreign 
and domestic.301  Consequently, for many Soviets, American objects of their love or hate 
were often insignificant, or long forgotten in the West.302 
 Other period-specific issues also affected Soviet propaganda regarding the United 
States.  American support of the Soviet dissident movement in American media and 
Western radio broadcasts, particularly the issue of Soviet people not being able to freely 
leave the country, prompted high level response from the Soviet government.  In 1981, 
Pravda published a letter to the American President (Reagan) from a Soviet worker.303  It 
opened up with: “Mr. President I don’t need you defending my rights in my house.  My 
government of workers and peasants protects my rights.  And protects them well.”304   
 Heightened tensions between the two superpowers in the early 1980s, reflected in 
the content of Soviet films with a return of the American spy theme, prominent in anti-
American campaign in the late Stalin period.  The best example, TASS305 Is Authorized 
to Declare (TASS Upolnomochen Zaiavit’), a wildly popular 1984 Soviet TV series, 
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featured KGB agents outwitting CIA spies while fighting for peace across the globe and 
eventually uncovering an American spy network in Moscow.     
 During the Brezhnev period, Khrushchev’s call for peaceful coexistence and 
friendly competition disappeared, replaced with a more negative picture of America.  
Economic and Soviet dissident issues took center stage in official discourse about the 
United States, and Soviet media once again suggested that head to head conflict between 
the two countries was possible.  At the same time, while varying in degree of hostility 
depending on the current state of relations between the two countries, the official Soviet 
image of the United States remained fundamentally the same. 
 
 
Better safe than rich?: public reaction to America in the Brezhnev period 
 
  
 Growing desire for better living standards was the greatest change in public’s 
view of the United States.  For Soviet people, America had always been a symbol of 
material prosperity.  Khrushchev’s statements, and the inability to verify their perceptions 
with outside information further cemented and inflated American status as the land of 
consumer paradise.  In the 1950s and 1960s, most Soviets still believed official 
statements that recent wars prevented the Soviet system from achieving its full potential.  
As a result, until the 1970s, “the party could always find workers who were willing to 
make a sacrifice not only for the evident material advantages but also because of their 
patriotic commitments,” wrote sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh.306  By the 1970s, as 
memories of the war faded and people realized that Soviet missions to Venus would not 
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put furniture into their apartments and quality food on their tables, they began to suspect 
that in the West “living standards were infinitely higher and that the gap between the 
Soviet Union and wealthy countries was widening.”307   
 Naturally, as Soviet people focused more and more on their living standards, the 
legend of American prosperity grew.  By the late Soviet period, Western consumer 
goods, especially ones from America, became some of the most desirable items in the 
Soviet Union “making them symbols of well-being and prestige for a majority of the 
population.”308  Andrea Lee, an American Ph.D. student living in Moscow in the late 
1970s wrote of her and other Americans’ experiences “we who live – and in my case, 
work  - among Russians find at every step the universal, awestruck belief in the barbarous 
wealth of Americans.”309  She also noted that when challenged, Soviets defended 
mythological America at all cost, “Is it really better there [in America]?”  When we 
began an equivocating answer, she waved us away.  America had to exist as a promised 
land of big cars and cheap jeans; it was an attitude we had found before,” recalled Lee of 
her conversation with a woman at a Moscow farmers’ market.310  
 The perception of America as the wealthiest consumer country, however, did not 
translate into more positive image of America in other areas.  Most Soviets had no reason 
to doubt domestic propaganda that America was plagued by severe wealth inequality, 
lack of a social safety net, racism, violence, and crime.  Soviet propaganda worked hard 
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to show that while less affluent, Soviet society offered order and security, in contrast to 
the chaos of American system and most Soviets had little problem believing it.  David 
Shipler noticed that  
 
In all aspects the United States looks chaotic to many Russians.  Politically, because of its 
pluralism, it seems disorderly, directionless, frighteningly disharmonious.  Economically, 
because of its diversity and decentralization, life seems insecure, uncertain, dangerously 
unpredictable.  Socially, the country seems riven by street crime and racial conflict.  It 
makes a terrifying spectacle.” 311   
 
 
 A study of former Soviet citizens who left the country between 1978 and 1981 
revealed that a majority still thought that America could learn from the Soviet Union in 
areas of healthcare and education.312  An analysis of Soviet people’s conversations with 
American exhibition guides from the period revealed similar trends.313  “When I asked a 
young woman what she thought the main differences were between American and Soviet 
societies, she said, “Here I feel secure.  I know I will never starve.  In the U.S. I could 
have a lucky day and an unlucky day,” recalled David Shipler.314  It is possible that at 
least in part these feelings developed out of realization that Soviets were never going to 
achieve Western living standards and thus had to amplify other areas of their life where 
they felt superior to the West in conversations with foreigners, whether they truly 
believed it or not.     
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 As I noted earlier in the chapter, covert Soviet propaganda at times sacrificed the 
long held official view of African-Americans as victims of oppressive American system 
in order to show American society as beleaguered by black crime.  Perhaps influenced by 
frequent pictures of black Americans being at the center of disorder (protests, riots, 
crime…etc) and negative perceptions of blacks in the Soviet Union, often in association 
with interracial dating, many Soviets privately agreed with racial discrimination in 
America while denouncing it in public.315        
 The Vietnam War was one issue that appears to have struck a real chord with the 
Soviet people.  Bombarded with stories of American brutality and the suffering of 
Vietnamese people, Soviets were genuine in their anger at the Vietnam conflict.  Many 
expressed their outrage in letters to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in connection with 
Richard Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1972.  Echoing a general theme, a person 
from Krasnodar wrote: “You will sit at the table with a fascist while his bombs are killing 
women and children.  There is no difference between Nixon and Hitler.”316  A British 
man traveling around the Soviet Union in 1966 noted, “They would become quite white 
with passion when discussing the horrors of this ghastly [Vietman] war, and spat out the 
names of Johnson, McNamara and Dean Rusk with the utmost contempt.”317  
 At least part of the animosity appears to have come from wounded national pride 
when the Soviet press reported that Americans bombed a number of Soviet ships in a 
North Vietnamese harbor.  One Moscow veteran from World War II wrote  
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The Soviet Union talks about peace too much and Americans just take advantage of that 
and do what they want.  They invade Vietnam and attack our ships! And all we do is talk.  
We need to stand up to them.  And now we humiliate ourselves by inviting Nixon.”318 
 
 Skepticism and disagreement with official propaganda about America continued 
to revolve around issues such as economics.  By the 1970s, gap in the standard of living 
between the West and the Soviet Union had become an area of primary concern for many 
in the country.  Therefore it was no surprise that most comments from the public 
concentrated on specifically this issue when discussing the United States.   
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the Soviet Union was forced to purchase 
grain from America due to a poor harvest and inefficient agricultural system, Soviet 
people frequently asked why their country was so far behind America in agricultural 
productivity, a fact admitted by official Soviets publications.319  Often, concerns were 
tied to unofficial information from Western sources such as radio or traveling exhibitions.  
Writing to main propaganda magazine Agitator in 1979, one reader complained:     
 
I recently visited the “Agriculture: USA” exhibit where I found out that American 
farmers who constitute 1% of the population provide all of America’s agricultural needs, 
as well as selling a 100 million tons of agricultural products to other countries – such as 
the Soviet Union for gold.320  
 
A Soviet joke, an altered version of one from the Khrushchev period, made light of the 
issue: 
 
Is it possible to build communism in America?”  
Answer: “It's possible, but who will we buy grain from?321  
      
                                                        
318 GARF f. 5446 op. 106 d. 1339. 
319 In answering a question from one of the readers in 1976, the Soviet magazine Country Life (Sel’skaia 
zhizn’) had to admit that the U.S. produced more agricultural goods with far fewer people.  It quickly 
added, however, that this was due to higher level of automation on American farms, American farmers 
being deeply in debt as a result.  See RGASPI f. 599 op. 1 d. 634 l. 77-82.  
320 RGANI f. 5 op. 76 d. 214 l. 139. 
321 Available at http://www.johndclare.net/Russ12_Jokes.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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In many letters, people expressed similar concerns, often referring to Soviet grain 
purchases from America.322  In letters to newspapers, others asked analogous questions 
about areas where reality did not completely correspond to official media statements: 
 
If the West has such high unemployment and we are projecting worker shortage, than 
why don’t we hire some workers from the West?323     
   
Success of countries such as the Soviet Union and Cuba clearly show advantages of 
socialism over capitalism.  So why don’t more workers support the American Communist 
Party?324 
 
In other words, some people asked the question: If we have the best system in the world 
as our media keeps telling us, then why are we purchasing grain from our Cold War 
nemesis?  If their system is so bad then why don’t more Americans oppose it? 
 Of course we must keep in mind that in order to raise such questions, Soviet 
citizens had to have access to outside information, view it as at least partially truthful, 
and have the ability to put it into the context of the Soviet situation.325  Therefore, 
education seems to have been one of the primary factors in whether an individual 
questioned official propaganda, in this case about the United States.326  However, we 
should not view this skepticism of official propaganda as an indication of Soviets’ 
preference for American system.  In fact, as Vladimir Shlapentokh pointed out, the Soviet 
intelligentsia of 1970s, the most educated segment of Soviet society, while convinced of 
                                                        
322 RGANI f. 5 op. 84 d. 118 l. 85, f. 5 op. 84 d. 119 l. 11. 
323 RGANI f. 5 op. 76 d. 213 l. 40. 
324 RGANI f. 5 op. 76 d. 214 l. 105. 
325 Soviet sociological studies from the period revealed that a majority of people surveyed tended to agree 
with their government’s foreign policy because they had little way of verifying this information and it had 
no immediate impact on their day to day lives; see Shlapentokh, Soviet public opinion and ideology, 129.  
326 As I mention in my chapter on unofficial information, education was also one of the leading factors in 
determining ones listenership of Western radio broadcasts.  Jonathan Becker, quoting Ellen Mickiewicz, 
stated that those with greater level of education “were more likely to disagree with official 
communications; see Becker, 28.  Boris Grushin also found education to be the number one criteria in one’s 
interpretation of mass media information; see B. A. Grushin, ed., Massovaia Informatsiia v sovertskom 
promyshlennom gorode: opyt kompleksnogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia  (Moskva: Politizdat, 1980), 
263. 
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American superiority in economic and technological matters, still saw American culture 
and its way of life as significantly inferior.327         
 The public image of America among a majority of the Soviet population in the 
Brezhnev period continued to be marked by a generally low level of knowledge about the 
subject.  Most Soviet people had little detailed information about the United States and 
therefore formed their opinions based on little superficial details they picked up from 
domestic mass media.  Often the little available information was distorted in word of 
mouth exchanges.  An American graduate student related the following conversation with 
a Soviet shipyard worker in Leningrad in late 1970s:   
  
“The U.S.A. took control of Alaska under your President Lincoln, who was a very sly 
man,” he [a Soviet worker] told us.  “Lincoln foresaw that in America’s future, that land 
would be very useful against Russia.” 
 “I don’t think that’s true,” said Tom [author’s husband].  “Lincoln had no designs 
against Russia.  Besides, we didn’t just take over Alaska.  We bought it fair and square.” 
 “Even that’s not right!”  said Petya with a triumphant laugh.  “Someone at the 
factory told me that in the treaty, America agreed to pay Russia for Alaska na viek.  Now, 
na viek means two things in Russian: ‘forever’ and ‘for a hundred years.’  Russia sold 
that land only for a century, but Lincoln took it for good.  That unfair seizure is at the 
bottom of all the trouble between our two nations.”328 
 
People’s letters to Soviet newspapers often asked for definitions of such words as: KKK 
and phrases such as “American imperialism is the world policeman.”329  Boris Grushin’s 
sociological studies in the city of Taganrog in the 1970s found that many people often 
misinterpreted information from the media, especially when it came to international 
issues.  For example, a number of respondents in the Grushin study thought that 
Bundesver was “something tied to America”.330  Therefore, it appears that the average 
Soviet person simply compartmentalized these issues into the categories of good and bad.  
                                                        
327 Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Changeable Soviet Image of America”, 157-171.    
328 Lee, 207. 
329 RGASPI f. 599 op. 1 d. 472 l. 4, 8, 37. 
330 Grushin, Massovaia Informatsiia v sovertskom promyshlennom gorode, 246. 
  124 
In this case, the constant association of America and West Germany as bad and enemies 
of the Soviet state in the Soviet media, triggered confusion between the two.   
 Rural areas suffered from particularly poor understanding of complex issues, “An 
examination of television habits of viewers with less than fourth grade education (which 
described 40 percent of the rural population) revealed that 93 percent could not 
understand programmes on social/political topics,” wrote Becker.331  In a letter to 
Country Life (Sel’skaia zhizn’), a leading rural publication, one reader mentioned that a 
majority of the people in the countryside got all of their outside information from this one 
magazine.332  
 Some people continued to believe conspiracy theories that America deliberately 
smuggled harmful weeds and insects in order to damage Soviet agriculture.333  Soviet 
playwright Viktor Slavkin made light of this phenomenon when one of the characters in 
his play tells others that he heard a rumor about American plans to disrupt the 1980 
Olympic games by bringing in a hundred moles who then would be released at the main 
stadium in Moscow right before the opening where they would have dug up the whole 
field and ruined the aesthetics of the ceremonies.334  Clearly, the average Soviet citizen’s 
image of America was not marked by sophistication and was largely composed of half-
truths from official media and often grossly distorted rumors. 
 As we have seen, the Brezhnev period did not offer any dramatic changes in the 
image of America.  Gone was the talk of peaceful co-existence and affable competition of 
the Khrushchev years, yet the fundamentals remained.  The same was true for the Soviet 
                                                        
331 Becker, 26. 
332 RGASPI f. 591 op. 1 d. 47 l. 32-33. 
333 Colin Thubron, Among the Russians. (London: Heinemann, 1983), 185. 
334 Slavkin, 137. 
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people whose opinion regarding America continued to closely mirror that of official 
propaganda.335  For most, America was still the country of immense wealth and 
technological marvels, especially in the area of consumer products.  At the same time, it 
was a country of wealth inequality, high unemployment and crime, whose leadership 
threatened world peace in the name of profit.  In the late 1960s, 99% of respondents in a 
sociological study identified the U.S. as a country that favored war over peace.336  On the 
other hand, increased preoccupation with living standards among the Soviet population 
and the government’s failure to deliver on that front pushed many Soviet people to use 
the image of America to criticize their own government’s shortcomings.  To put it 
another way, Soviet people’s views and opinions regarding America were closely tied to 




 As we have seen, the official Soviet image of the United States, largely formed in 
the early years of the Soviet Union, kept its basic message well into the 1980s.  For 
decades, as if by inertia, Soviet image of America followed the classic Marxist blueprint 
of a capitalist country where the privileged few extracted wealth from the oppressed 
masses.  Racism and unemployment, solidified their position as official Soviet 
characteristics of the U.S. in the 1930s during the Great Depression, and remained as key 
staples to the end.  Following World War II, the Soviet state faced increased availability 
of information from the West via returning veterans, newly founded Western radio 
                                                        
335 “[S]urveys in the USSR show that the majority of people perceive life in the United States much as it is 
presented in the official mass media,” wrote Vladimir Shlapentokh about the period; see Shlapentokh, 
Soviet public opinion and ideology, 120. There is more evidence in the Grushin surveys; see Grushin. 
Chetyre zhizni Rossii, 794-812. 
336 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii, 802. 
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stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union and traveling American exhibitions, among 
others.  Eventually, authorities had to account for this unofficial information, particularly 
in the sphere of living standards.  More importantly, however, Soviet people saw 
firsthand that material life in the Soviet Union was behind that of the West.  Until the 
end, Soviet propaganda sought to deflect these concerns by pointing out the recent war, 
Soviet leadership in space exploration, and the negatives of life in the West/America such 
as absence of social benefits, crime, and lack of cultural life.          
 For the Soviet people official channels were their primary source of information 
about America.  Small amounts of outside information and the largely insurmountable 
difficulties of traveling to the United States for the average Soviet person forced them to 
rely on official propaganda.  Of course, it was no secret to the Soviets that domestic 
media and other forms of propaganda sought to present America in the worst possible 
light; therefore their image of America did not adopt the more hostile characteristics 
assigned to the U.S. by those sources.  However, few seem to have challenged the basic 
premises of official messages.  Old, and often exaggerated, perceptions of America as a 
wealthy and business-oriented country, were used by the Soviets to criticize their own 
government’s failure to provide them with better living standards.  These do not, 
however, appear to have been signs of wholesale rejection of the Soviet system in favor 












 The Soviet government tightly controlled the majority of information about 
America available to Soviet citizens.  This included most mass media devices such as 
radio, print, and television.  Considering the fact that America was Soviet Union’s chief 
adversary in the Cold War, the official version of the United States (as we saw in the 
official information chapter) was far from positive.  It portrayed America as a country 
highjacked by the money-obsessed Wall Street executives and the military-industrial 
cartel.  American workers, on the other hand, faced high-unemployment, lack of social 
safety nets, and racial discrimination.   
 While official information constituted most of what the Soviets saw or heard 
about America, it was not the whole story.  There were a number of unofficial1 sources of 
information about America available in the Soviet Union.  The American government 
sponsored the largest and most consistent of these in the form of American 
radiobroadcasts such as Voice of America and Radio Liberty and the magazine Amerika, 
published by the State Department.  Other sources included magazines and music 
smuggled into the Soviet Union through the black market or brought in by foreign 
visitors.  American movies, shown both legally and illegally, attracted hundreds of 
                                                        
1 Here by unofficial I mean information that was not produced or controlled by the Soviet government.  
American movies were a bit of a grey area since many were chosen by the Soviet government for their 
ideological content and thus could be considered as a type of official information.  I discuss this issue 
further in the section about American movies in the Soviet Union. 
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millions of Soviet viewers.  American visitors to the Soviet Union, including tourists, 
diplomats, scholars and students, and Soviets traveling to the United States, although 
small in number, also accounted for some unofficial information about America.   
 In this chapter I look at all of the above2 sources of unofficial information about 
America and their impact on Soviet citizens.  Furthermore, I address the issue of Soviet 
authorities’ reaction and response to unofficial information.  Below, I argue that while 
millions of Soviets listened to American radio, saw American movies, and read American 
magazines, their views did not significantly diverge from the official portrayal of 
America in Soviet mass media as a result.  For the most part, these sources reinforced 
already established notions about America among the Soviet population.  However, the 
availability of these sources did put pressure on Soviet authorities to account for this 
outside information in official media.            
 Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) had their 
origins in the early Cold War strategies drafted by people such as George Kennan and 
Alan Dulles, many of whom saw propaganda as one of the more important features in the 
struggle with the Soviet Union.3  “Initially, these radio stations sought to occupy the 
Soviets with broadcasts into Eastern Europe so as to divert their attention and resources 
and prevent them from making inroads in Western Europe.  Some planners believed that 
fomenting trouble in Moscow’s backyard was one means of diverting Stalin from 
westward expansion,” recalled a former RL employee.4 
                                                        
2 American exhibitions in the Soviet Union were an extremely important source of unofficial information 
not included here.  I devote a separate chapter to this issue. 
3 Puddington, 10-13. 
4 Ibid., 15. 
  129 
 In the post-World War II struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union actual 
military conflict would mean the annihilation of both sides by nuclear weapons.  
Therefore, conflicting sides found more subtle means of trying to win the war.   
Consequently, propaganda, especially radio broadcasts, became important parts of the 
Cold War arsenal.  This was especially true for the United States that subsidized 
numerous radio stations that broadcasted to the East European Soviet bloc as well as to 
Soviet Union itself, from the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) to the Far East.   
 This chapter focuses on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Liberty (RL), which 
attracted the most listeners within the Soviet bloc.  Both, especially VOA, were very 
popular with the Soviet public and had millions of dedicated listeners.  What is more 
important, at least in the scope of this chapter, is the fact that both VOA and RL 
attempted to study and understand their listeners.  They did so with the goal of improving 
the stations’ message.  At the same time, however, these studies, although rather limited 
and of uncertain accuracy, provide us with some information about Soviet listeners’ 
reactions to America.  This is especially true of VOA studies considering that a large part 
of its broadcasting content focused on America. 
 Most scholars, and those who participated in the American broadcasting effort to 
the Soviet Union, tend to agree that it was successful in attracting large numbers of 
Soviet listeners.  Estimates put the number of regular listeners anywhere from 3 to 20 
million.  It is also true that Western5 radio stations achieved their intended goal of 
breaking the Soviet government’s monopoly on information inside the Soviet Union.  
However, whether this effort succeeded in changing the minds of regular Soviet citizens 
                                                        
5 While majority of the time I am talking about VOA and RL, both American radio stations, sometimes I 
will use the term Western when the statement can also be applied to other radio stations such as the BBC 
and Deusche Welle. 
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on domestic or international issues is a subject of debate.  In other words, the problem 
lies in how we should answer the following questions:  What were the reactions of Soviet 
listeners to American radio broadcasts?  In what way did these broadcasts shape listeners’ 
view of the United States? Did American broadcasts alter the average Soviet citizens’ 
view of their own country and the outside world?    
 Therefore, in this chapter I will focus mainly on Soviet public reactions to 
American broadcasting.  However, in order to provide context, I will also talk about other 
issues that surrounded Western radio transmissions to the Soviet Union, including 
broadcast content and its goals, American and Soviet official reactions.6  Finally, I will 
discuss the impact of these broadcasts on the Soviet Union.  I will show that for the most 
part Soviet listeners tuned into American radio broadcasts in order to supplement 
domestic media that failed to supply Soviet people with enough entertainment and 
information, particularly about the world outside Soviet borders.  Furthermore, it appears 
that Western radio did not have a drastic impact on Soviets’ view of America as a 
country.  Generally speaking,7 Soviet people’s perception of America closely followed 
that of official propaganda and did not change significantly due to American radio 
broadcasts.  However, American radio did force the Soviet media to account for 
information Soviet people heard on VOA and RL, and this constituted its greatest impact.   
 Uncovering information about Soviet reactions to American broadcasting is 
challenging as sources are scattered across various institutions, archives and countries.   
                                                        
6 The topic of Soviet official reactions to American broadcasts is well covered in Simo Mikkonen,  
“Stealing the Monopoly of Knowledge? Soviet Reactions to U.S. Cold War Broadcasting.” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 11:4  (Fall 2010), 771-805.  In order to provide context, I 
will mention the issue here as well. 
7 I making this statement I do not include the issue of Soviet youth that formed its own perceptions about 
America (this issue is discussed in more detail in the chapter about Soviet youth) and were more influenced 
by American radio than the rest of the population. 
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Here I use documents from the Russian archives, books by those who worked directly for 
the radio stations, accounts of foreigners who traveled to the Soviet Union, studies done 
by the United States Information Agency (USIA), primary materials on U.S. foreign 
relations (FRUS), as well as several American studies of Soviet immigrants.   
 Despite the large number of sources, there are some source issues that I must 
mention here.  Lack of access to the Soviet public limited the amount of information 
American sources could use.   Therefore, questions about reliability of the results were a 
problem that affected a majority of the American sources.  For example, surveys of 
Soviet immigrants and defectors contained much bias against the Soviet system and 
therefore could not be taken as a representative sample of Soviet population as a whole a 
fact acknowledged by those involved with these studies at the highest level.8  The same 
issue affected studies by the USIA, where lack of informants cast doubt on the value of 
its findings. Other issues include the fact that the memoirs of those who worked at these 
radio stations are usually loaded with the authors’ personal opinions on the matter. These 
opinions were formed through years of inter- and intra-departmental conflicts, and do not 
necessarily reflect any reality.9 
 Russian archives such as the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), 
Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and Russian State Archive of 
Socio-Political History (RGASPI) contain a wealth of information on the subject of this 
study.  For example, the GARF collection 5446 holds large collections of citizens’ letters 
to the Soviet government and collection 8009 holds numerous reports by and about 
                                                        
8 Discussion about the value of the Harvard project by two directors of research in Alex Inkles and 
Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily life in a totalitarian society  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), 3-58. 
9 Alan Heil, Voice of America: A History  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 33. 
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Soviet citizens who spent time in the United States.  RGANI houses numerous KGB 
reports (collection 89) and files from the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party 
(collections 5, 11, 72, 81).  RGASPI contains reports from Communist Party officials 
regarding public opinion on specific issues as well as on the general mood of the 
population (collections 17, 591, 599, 614).   
 While Russian archives do contain a wealth of useful information, they are not 
immune from a number of source problems.  Letters from ordinary citizens and some 
official reports that mention people’s reactions to American radio suffer from similar 
issues that affect the US sources.  They are usually scattered and therefore do not lend 
themselves to any kind of systematic analysis.  Furthermore, those who wrote letters to 
officials often had some sort of a grievance against the authorities.10  Reports by Soviet 
officials were often doctored to make the situation appear in the best possible light for 
those submitting the report.11  Some of the more thorough studies on the subject are 
locked away in Russian security archives are not available to researchers.   
 Therefore, reliance on a single source would produce inaccurate results.  
However, a combination of the above sources coupled with an understanding of their 
strengths and weaknesses permits us to draw some informed conclusions on the subject.   
 
The Voices: Western radio broadcasts 
 
“VOA and Amerika are our only means of presenting the US story”  
 – March 5, 1949 Airgram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to American embassy in the 
Soviet Union.12   
 
                                                        
10 Vladimir Shlapentokh, et al., The Soviet Union: Internal and External Perspective on Soviet society, 114-
115. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS) – 1949, volume 05, pp. 586 
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Goals and content 
 
 Following World War I, many nations realized the importance of using the new 
mass media in form of radio, movies, and mass-produced print to distribute information 
they deemed beneficial to their causes to a large numbers of people, friend and foe alike.  
This practice soon acquired a name: propaganda.  During World War II, all sides used 
extensive propaganda in one form or another to either support the war effort at home or 
undermine it for the enemy.13    
Once relations between the Soviet Union and America began to sour shortly after 
World War II, Americans turned its propaganda tools on its recent ally. Given the closed 
nature of the Soviet Union, Americans had few ways of delivering their message to the 
Soviet people.  Among the propaganda tools available to America during the Cold War, 
radio stood out as the most effective.  It did not require a physical (at least in macro 
terms) penetration of Soviet borders and it covered a large amount of territory.       
 Voice Of America (VOA), which was to become the backbone of American Cold 
War radio broadcasting, sent its first signal a few months after Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.  During the war, it served as a propaganda and entertainment tool by 
broadcasting news, commentary, musical and other entertainment programming in over 
40 languages.14  After the war, the station was enlisted in fighting a new war, the Cold 
War with the Soviet Union.  Officially, the U.S. announced VOA’s role in the Cold War 
                                                        
13 On the history of propaganda see for example Philip Taylor., Munitions of the Mind: a history of 
propaganda from the ancient world to the present era (New York : Manchester University Press, 2003). 
14 For history of VOA see Alan Heil, Voice of America: A History.  
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in 1947 when American Embassy in the Soviet Union issued the following announcement 
to members of the press:  
 
American Ambassador takes pleasure in announcing that beginning February 17, 
American Government's radio program Voice of America will include daily broadcasts in 
Russian language beamed to USSR.  These broadcasts will consist of music, news about 
America and world affairs and special features. They will be transmitted from 9 to 10 
p.m. Moscow time on two frequencies 6170 kilocycles (48.6 meters) and 9540 kilocycles 
(31.5meters). Ambassador believes that these broadcasts, which are in line with desire 
frequently expressed by representatives of governments of both countries for wider 
exchange of information of a cultural and scientific character will help to broaden base of 
understanding and friendship between peoples of Soviet Union and United States.15 
 
American ambassador Walter Smith suggested, and the State Department agreed, that the 
Soviets were not to be notified in advance, citing Soviet unwillingness to discuss their 
own radio broadcasts to the West.16 
 From the very beginning of its Cold War broadcasts VOA attempted to employ 
the best of American mass media talent.  As a result, despite its goal of not being in the 
“amusement” and “entertainment” business, VOA assembled a group people who did 
have a lot of experience in entertaining, among other things.  The first group of VOA 
employees contained “extraordinarily talented journalists, war refugees, dramatists, poets, 
philosophers, theater producers, radio announcers, musicians, artists, linguists, and 
bureaucrats [who] suddenly were thrust together overnight in crowded, makeshift offices 
and studios in New York City.”17    
 Following one of the original goals from its early days as a Cold War station, 
those deciding on the shape of VOA programming tried hard to gain trust and respect of 
its listeners, because they knew that without credibility VOA was likely to be dismissed 
as simply a propaganda tool of the American government.   “The USA should not 
                                                        
15 FRUS – 1947, volume 04, pp. 531-532 
16 Ibid, 514, 518. 
17 Heil, 32-33. 
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criticize Soviet system, Government or personalities.  Such technique would, on 
nationalistic and patriotic grounds, arouse resentment of Soviet listeners and would 
prejudice our relations with the Soviet Government,” warned the American ambassador 
to the Soviet Union a few months before VOA’s first broadcast.18   
 Early VOA programs included interviews and reports from America designed to 
familiarize listeners with history and culture of the United States.19  Other programs 
introduced listeners to American and international news and events that included a 
discussion by a number of American journalists and correspondents.  There was also a 
morning show that featured music and news.  Overall, early VOA programming focused 
mainly on informing the Soviet listeners about the United States.  And even though it was 
officially a government-sponsored radio station, people outside the station rarely 
interfered with its broadcast message.20   
 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RL) was the other major American station 
broadcasting to the Soviet Union.  Unlike VOA, RL was officially not a government-
sponsored station.  Its funding was supposed to come from private donations.  In reality, 
initial attempts to raise the funds for RL through private donations failed to net much 
money and it soon became apparent that these funds could only cover a small portion of 
the necessary expenses.  Therefore, the American government, mostly through the CIA, 
                                                        
18 FRUS – 1946, volume 06, pp.676. 
19 VOA’s early programs about the United States were usually selections from programs produced by NBC 
and CBS.  However, it was determined that at times these programs did not portray the United States in the 
best possible light.  Therefore, by late 1948 VOA discontinued its partnership with NBC and CBS as it 
sought more control over its content. Cull, 42. 
20 Heil, 55-68.  In its early days, the issue of VOA’s independence from the government line was brought 
up several times.  William Benton, a U.S. senator from Connecticut, was one of the most vocal defenders of 
VOA’s autonomy in its early years.  In the late 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reemphasized 
the importance of VOA being an independent news source  See Cull, 49, 69-74, 142-144. 
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took on the role of making sure RL stayed on the air.21  In fact, CIA’s funding of RL 
“was arguably the worst-kept secret in the history of statecraft,” noted a former 
employee.22    
  RL went on the air in July, 1950, with Eastern European exiles composing a 
majority of its staff.  Unlike other broadcasters such as Voice of America (VOA) that 
focused on events inside the U.S., RL program content dealt largely with news from the 
Soviet bloc countries.  Early on, there was little pressure, or even guidance, from the 
American government over the broadcast content.  The CIA, although unofficially 
funding the venture, rarely interfered with the station’s broadcast contents, and the station 
was officially listed as a non-governmental organization, allowing it more freedom in 
what it could broadcast.23  
 Much like VOA, from the very beginning RL sought to avoid outside meddling in 
the content of its broadcasting.  The man in charge of RL until 1975, Howland Sargeant, 
adopted a stance that the radio station would not become a tool of the CIA, even though it 
was secretly funded by it.  He seemed unaware of the irony of RL striving to bring the 
truth to the Soviet Union while at the same time lying about its funding source.  
Moreover, Howland resolved not to allow the station to be used by disgruntled emigres in 
order to broadcast vengeful and hateful messages to the Soviet Union.  Instead, under his 
policy, RL strived to “convey to listeners the genuine feelings of sympathy and friendship 
of Americans, but always speak to them from the viewpoint of Soviet citizens’ genuine 
needs and interests.”24 
                                                        
21 Puddington, 21-25. 
22 Critchlow, 15.  
23 Puddington, 18-19, 29-32. 
24 Sosin, 32. 
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 As planned, VOA transmitted its first broadcast on February 17, 1947.  Almost 
the entire American colony in Moscow tuned in.   In the opinion of the American 
embassy staff, judging by the reaction of the Americans living in Moscow, the show was 
a modest success. An embassy report to the United States State Department noted that 
most of the announcers had good diction and pronunciation, although it is not clear 
whether the American staff had a good enough command of Russian to be able to judge 
on this point.  This was particularly important so as not to alienate Russian listeners by 
sounding “foreign.”  On the other hand, the report noted, “we were a little too cultured in 
the Russian sense of the word.  Fifteen-minute talk on structure of American Govt was 
rather ponderous, particularly as Soviets are rather bored with long winded discussions of 
political conditions, which to them mean very little.”25  As we will see later in the 
chapter, this observation proved to be true as political commentary consistently ranked 
towards the bottom of topics enjoyed by Soviet listeners throughout the life of Western 
Cold War broadcasts.  
 In other reports, American embassy staff suggested that VOA broadcast its news 
with an eye for the Soviet listener, as American-style news did not work in Russia.  
According to the report, small factual news stories without proper context only further 
entrenched the Soviet view of America as a chaotic place.  For example, if VOA was to 
run a news story about a possible teacher strike in some small American town Soviets 
might interpret this singular event as a widespread and seriously problematic.  The 
embassy argued that such a report should also provide a background story and mention 
how this situation was to be resolved.  Moreover, any news story about America should 
focus on the differences between Soviet and American approaches to solving problems.  
                                                        
25 FRUS – 1947, volume 04, pp. 533-534. 
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The goal of the newscast stated the report “must be to show that we have our own ways 
for arriving at the better life.”26 
 Later embassy telegrams, supposedly in part based on conversations with Soviet 
listeners, called for more entertainment.  They recommended that programs avoid 
“esoteric” subjects because the audience was not limited to a “small group intellectuals.”  
In addition, embassy telegrams asked that broadcasts contain a lot more music.  “There 
has been too much solid talk and not enough music,” they complained, noting that music 
should be spaced out between various programs throughout the day.27 
 It did not take long for the embassy to report that program quality improved 
significantly following their initial suggestions.  Although reception still proved to be a 
problem, knowledge about VOA was spreading among the Soviet population, even 
beyond Moscow, according to embassy sources.  During the first few weeks following 
the first VOA broadcast to the Soviet Union, the American embassy sent a daily report to 
the State Department with their reactions as well as of those of Soviet listeners.   
 Assessment of Soviet listener reactions was far from a scientific procedure.  
Having no direct access to large numbers of Soviet citizens, the American embassy had 
to rely on information gathered from individual and random sources.  Therefore, early 
Soviet listener assessment took the form of reports such as: “’cultured Soviet executive 
type’ person from a provincial industrial city near Moscow declared that he and many of 
his acquaintances listened regularly to Voice of America broadcasts, chiefly for news, but 
would also like to hear more music.”28  Overall, wrote American ambassador Smith in his 
telegram to the State Department, “There is no question in my mind that our Russian 
                                                        
26 Ibid, pp. 537-538. 
27 Ibid, pp. 541-542. 
28 Ibid, 546. 
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language news broadcasts are of great interest to Soviet listeners.”29 
 It is clear that from its early days as a Cold War broadcasting station, VOA geared 
its content to a broader base by providing less high-brow political and philosophical 
discussion and more entertainment, such as music.  VOA quickly learned that if it wanted 
to attract Soviet listeners it could not dictate its preferences to the Soviet audience but in 
fact had to tailor its message to their wishes.  By doing this, VOA became “the” 
entertainment station of the Soviet Union, with jazz being by far its most popular product.  
Moreover, despite claims by former employees that VOA was largely immune from 
outside pressures, we can see that recommendations from the American Embassy did in 
fact influence early VOA broadcasts. 
 After several years without comprehensive and reliable studies of listener 
composition and reaction, the American embassy had to feel its way in the dark.  
Recommendations about VOA content therefore largely relied on educated guesswork.  
For example, the 1949 dispatch from US embassy to the State Department stated that:  
 
Soviet "intelligentsia," though by no-means the sole group deserving attention in 
planning VOA programs, are probably a more important target than the workers and 
peasants because they occupy more influential positions, own a disproportionate number 
of radios and, being better educated, are more responsive to the spoken word…they 
presumably suffer with boredom or mental numbness from the monotony of 'official 
propaganda’, and with frustration from being unable to express themselves sincerely and 
spontaneously. This state of mind should be admirably suited for seduction with 
forbidden fruit.30 
 
The “forbidden fruit” represented the various things mentioned by the Soviet press as 
being taboo, things such as Western music and news for example.  However, since the 
Soviet press rarely gave specific examples of taboos, Americans thought VOA could tap 
into the Soviets’ natural curiosity.  And if done right, along with satisfying curiosity, 
                                                        
29 Ibid, pp. 545-546. 
30 FRUS – 1949 – volume 05, pp. 578-579. 
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VOA could sow seeds of opposition to the official regime among the Soviet population.  
Consequently, the embassy report concluded that “Every effort should rather be made to 
tempt the Soviet listener to identify himself with heresy, and some third person or group 
(such as Party Leadership), with orthodoxy.“31   
 The 1950s and 1960s proved to be the most formative years for the VOA in 
general and its Russian service specifically.  Those in charge of VOA programming 
clearly understood that impartial and unbiased reporting was essential to its effectiveness.  
Therefore, during the Eisenhower administration VOA fought hard to make sure that its 
content and message to the Soviet Union was objective.  And by the beginning of 1960s 
VOA stressed these principles in its charter that stated: 
 
- The Voice of America must win the attention and respect of its listeners         
- VOA news much be accurate, objective, and comprehensive 
- VOA must represent America, not any single segment of the nation, including “ 
a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and 
institutions.” 
- As an official radio, it must present U.S. policies and “responsible discussion 
and opinion on those policies.”32 
 
 It is, however, hard to say with any degree of certainty whether VOA succeeded 
in its goal of content objectivity.  The main part of the problem lies in the fact that 
objectivity is viewed differently depending on a person’s worldview.  While VOA staff 
thought they presented a balanced story, its Soviet audience did not always agree.  The 
issue of the standard of living is a good example. VOA frequently stressed the fact that 
Americans had a much higher standard of living than their Soviet counterparts.  
Americans had more living space, more cars, more clothes and other consumer goods.  
And most Soviets did not dispute those claims.  What the VOA did not often mention 
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was the fact that the Russian lands endured a violent revolution, a destructive civil war, 
and two world wars, in less than half a century.  Therefore, the Soviet audience saw these 
omissions as a sign that VOA was not completely objective.  Soviets visiting American 
exhibitions in the Soviet Union frequently made similar observations.33     
 Political commentary was the one part of VOA broadcasting that clearly lacked 
objectivity, especially in the eyes of Soviet listeners.  From the very beginning this 
segment of VOA content became a propaganda tool of the American government.34  
Soviet listeners quickly took notice.  In fact, VOA’s political commentary was the least 
liked segment with the Soviet audience and many listeners cited it as the reason for why 
they preferred BBC to VOA.35 
 Even though many Soviets did not view VOA as completely objective, it did 
manage to win a degree of respect for its news service even from Soviet officials.  A 
1959 secret Soviet report on VOA content admitted that VOA did use a lot of factual and 
objective information in its news broadcasts.  However, it quickly noted that this was 
done only to give credibility to the rest of its content that was clearly biased against the 
Soviet Union.36   
 Without a doubt the music program was the most popular segment of VOA’s 
broadcasting with the Soviet audience.  This was largely due to the nightly jazz program 
called Music USA hosted by Willis Conover.  Started in January, 1955, Music USA stayed 
on the airwaves for over four decades until Conover’s death in 1996.  The program 
featured a fifteen-minute newscast, forty-five minutes of popular music, then followed by 
                                                        
33 See the chapter on American exhibitions below.  
34 Hixson, 38. 
35 NA P160/13/30 p. 35, 41-42, 62.  Harvard Project - http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:959199?n=4. 
36 RGANI f.5 op. 33 d. 106  l. 31-45. 
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forty-five minutes of jazz.  At its height Music USA was estimated to have more than 
thirty million listeners, a large percentage of them in the Soviet Union, and had the 
“largest audience of any international broadcast although it was done completely in 
English.”37     
 By the 1960s, VOA had a fairly regular program content that remained until the 
early 1980s.  According to Soviet sources, regular VOA broadcasts consisted of: 
 
- News (foreign and domestic) 
- Programs about history (foreign and domestic) 
- Reports about daily life in the United States 
- Music38 
 
 There were a number of consistent themes present in almost all of VOA’s 
programming.  These included exposing of such historical distortions by the Soviet 
government as the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union.  VOA frequently highlighted life under tyranny and freedom by stressing the 
Soviet government’s complete control over its citizens in such things as travel and 
freedom of speech and religion.  On the other hand, VOA talked at length about 
American electoral process.39  The KGB noted that broadcasts also frequently 
emphasized the superiority of Western life-style, pointing to a higher availability of 
consumer goods and focused on lack of freedoms in the Soviet Union as everything is 
subjugated to the State.40 
 In addition to setting up stable programming, VOA expanded its reach.  In order 
to get through to a wider Soviet audience it began broadcasting in languages of Soviet 
                                                        
37 Yale Richmond,  Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the West Won.  Available at 
http://mountainrunner.us/2009/12/yalerichmond_2.html.  Accessed April 12, 2012. 
38 RGANI f. 5 op. 33 d. 110  l. 1-75. 
39 Hixson, 40-43. 
40 RGANI f. 5 op. 33 d. 106  l. 31-45. 
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national minorities.  In 1951 alone VOA added Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, 
Tatar, Georgian, Azerbaijani, Turkestani, and Armenian languages to its broadcasting 
services.41 
 The first major shake up to VOA’s broadcasting content came with the election of 
Ronald Reagan as American president in 1980.  Under Reagan, all “free” radios’ budgets 
increased as Reagan placed more importance on beaming America’s message of freedom 
to the East.  Along with the budget increase, however, came a shakeup of broadcast 
content where new appointees wanted a stronger-worded message.42  As a result, VOA 
faced the most pressure to politicize the news and there were large purges of VOA staff.  
After the stormy early 1980s, however, VOA managed to regain its former form.43 
 Although it was the most popular, VOA was not the only American radio station 
broadcasting to the Soviet Union.  Attracting millions of Soviet listeners, Radio Liberty 
consistently placed behind VOA as the second most popular American radio broadcast in 
the Soviet Union.  RL began broadcasting in March, 1953 from Germany and differed 
from VOA in that most of its content dealt with matters inside the Soviet Union and 
Eastern bloc countries.      
 Since Soviet emigres composed the majority of RL’s staff, many of its programs 
were strongly anti-Soviet.  Moreover, because RL was not officially associated with the 
American government, it could therefore be less diplomatic in its broadcast content.  
According to one former RL staff member, the station’s original goals were “the 
identification of the broadcasters with listeners as fellow Russians,” ”obligation to bring 
                                                        
41 Hixson, 37.  It is not clear what Hixson meant by Turkestani langauge as “Turkestan” referred to a region 
divided among several USSR Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan.  
42 Paddington, 253-283 
43 Heil, 199-219. 
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truthful information to compatriots who were denied that opportunity by the regime,” and 
“unequivocal expression of the need for a democratic system to replace the Soviet 
Communist order.”  At the same time, he pointed out that RL “avoided inciting listeners 
to rise up against the Kremlin rulers.”44 
 In its regular broadcasting RL held reading of books banned by the Soviet 
government such as Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago.  Other programs featured 
discussions of Russian history and culture.  There was also a program exposing 
wrongdoing by individual communist officials as well as reporting of happenings in the 
Soviet Union that were not mentioned in official news sources.45  In its reporting on 
America, because VOA mainly focused on material (economic) aspects of America, RL 
decided to present other aspects of American life such as discussions of American 
political institutions.46   Much like VOA, RL featured a highly popular daily music 





 Few disputed the fact that American radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union had 
millions of listeners.  But who were they?  Were they peasants or workers, officials or 
intellectuals, male or female, rich or poor?  Did they listen alone or with a group of 
friends?  American radio stations such as VOA and RL, as well as Soviet and American 
                                                        
44 Sosin, 18. 
45 Ibid., 23-25;  
Paddington, 48-49. 
46 Critchlow, 113. 
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security agencies, all had particular interest in getting answers to these questions and 
understanding more about the kinds of people who listened to these broadcasts.  
 Obtaining any detailed information about the Soviet audience, however, proved 
quite difficult.  When asked by the RL to help with determining their listener base in the 
1950s, one Western communications expert compared their efforts to “a fisherman who 
drops his line through a hole in the ice and tries without any bait to identify the fish that 
brushes against the line.”47  Therefore, results often proved to be incomplete and spotty, 
even after considerable efforts to obtain them.  Many of those working to gather audience 
data for various Western radio stations from the 1960s to 1980s noted the difficulty of 
such an undertaking and expressed doubts about its accuracy.48   
 The problems were numerous.  For Americans, getting access to Soviet people 
was the main hurdle.  Locked behind well-guarded borders and rigid travel restrictions, 
few Soviets ever made it to Soviet bloc countries such as Hungry and Czechoslovakia, 
and even fewer traveled to the West.  Those who did leave Soviet borders underwent 
intense screenings to determine their ability to interpret their experience “correctly”: in 
other words, to make sure they remained loyal Soviet citizens even after seeing the 
temptations of the West. 49    For an added layer of protection they were under constant 
surveillance by a Soviet tour guide who reported to the KGB.   
 Of course, Soviets who traveled abroad were not the only source of information.  
Embassy staff, US exchange scholars and tourists, American exhibition staff, and Soviet 
informants provided information as well.  Yet obtaining honest opinion about Western 
                                                        
47 Sosin, 74. 
48 Donald Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 155. 
49 Eugene Parta, “Audience research in Extremis: Cold War Broadcasting to the USSR,” Participations 
8:1(May 2011), 107. 
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radio inside the Soviet Union faced far greater challenges considering Soviet people’s 
reluctance to associate with foreigners for fear of official reprimands.          
 Even the KGB had a tough time in determining the exact make up of the Soviet 
audience.  The authorities discouraged listening to foreign broadcasts but millions still 
listened.  It was not so much the listening part as discussion and dissemination of what 
one heard on the radio that had potential for serious consequences.  Therefore, average 
Soviet citizens were understandably cautious in discussing their listening habits.  
 Considering these difficulties, early attempts to understand the make-up and the 
nature of Soviet audience were largely based on “Soviet statements… as well as what 
was known about the Soviet society at the time,” recalled one former RL staffer.50  In 
other words, when the Soviet media launched attacks against those listening to foreign 
broadcasts, Americans used those characterizations as clues to determining the audience.  
First, the very fact that Soviet media admitted that some Soviets listened to Western radio 
led Americans to assume that in order to elicit such a response the number of listeners 
had to be sufficiently high.51  Furthermore, they assumed that the audience was most 
likely well-educated and urban, since those with education were more inquisitive about 
the outside world, and those living in the cities had more access to short-wave radios.  It 
was also assumed that more men than women listened because of the double burden of 
work and family faced by Soviet women.52 
                                                        
50 Sosin, 38. 
51 In this case, American assumptions proved correct.  Yet in other instances official ban did not necessarily 
imply a large following – see for example Emily Baran’s work on Jehovah’s Witnesses, “Faith on the 
Margins: Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, 1945-
2010” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 2011). 
52 Sosin, 38. 
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 Other attempts to obtain feedback from Soviet listeners included RL setting up 
mailboxes in West Berlin and encouraging Soviets to send in postcards with their 
opinions about the radio station.  RL did receive thousands of letters from Soviet citizens 
over the years.  However, considering KGB censorship of Soviet letters, especially those 
going outside the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that these in any way represented a typical 
Soviet listener.53  In fact, RL suspected that majority of the early letters from the Soviet 
Union were the work of the KGB.54  There is little evidence to suggest that the situation 
changed in later years.    
 Starting in the late 1950s and through 1960s, RL undertook a more ambitious 
program of understanding its audience by interviewing Soviet tourists who traveled to the 
West and intended to come home (this was important in order to weed out Soviet 
defectors to the West who did not represent a typical Soviet listener).  Covert 
interviewing efforts took place during events such as the 1958 Brussels World Fair where 
American researchers managed to contact as many as three hundred Soviet citizens.  
These efforts yielded some important data showing that there was indeed a large audience 
of Soviets listening to Western broadcasts.  However, the statistical sample was not 
significant enough to draw any kinds of general conclusions.55 
 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the RL audience research group began 
employing more sophisticated methods such as the use of standardized questionnaires.56  
                                                        
53 Ibid, 38-39.  We must assume that the KGB confiscated majority of letters praising RL.  Furthermore, if 
a Soviet citizen risked writing a letter that in any way approved of American radio broadcasts, it probably 
meant he/she had strong negative feelings about the Soviet system and therefore was not a typical Soviet 
listener. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Parta, “Audience research in Extremis”, 105-106.  
56 Dr. Max Ralis founded RL audience research group in 1956.  Before RL, Ralis worked for U.S. Army 
intelligence and the Harvard Project.  For brief overview of RL’s early audience research see Parta, 
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Highly trained specialists engaged Soviet tourists in a conversation when they were away 
from their tour group.  The interviewer then posed questions regarding Western radio in a 
subtle manner that did not scare the interviewee.  Results were recorded on the 
standardized questionnaire immediately following the interview.  Furthermore, with the 
coming of perestroika in the mid-1980s and the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, RL researchers managed to obtain more statistically significant data without the 
restrictions of previous decades.57     
 Even though the RL audience studies of the 1970s were the most extensive to 
date, American evaluators criticized them severely.  Critics cited the bias in the studies 
towards better educated people, since the majority of interviewees had some sort of 
higher education and came from Moscow or Leningrad.58  They also noted a gender bias 
as almost all of those interviewed by researchers were male.59  Therefore, the biggest 
criticism of RL audience reports was that they projected results from a non-representative 
sample onto the Soviet population as a whole.  In discussing a particular RL study some 
of the harsher critics went as far as stating it could “only be judged as invalid in major 
respects.”60  More objective evaluators put RL efforts in the context of “near-
insurmountable difficulties facing the researcher in this field.”61  One cannot reject these 
criticisms as unfounded.  However, a majority of RL’s findings did prove quite accurate 
when compared to some of the Soviet research on the subject.62               
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62 Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, Hoover Institution and the Cold War 
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 American attempts to understand the Soviet radio audience became more 
sophisticated when RL joined with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 
1973 to analyze audience data using computer technology.  The data used for these 
studies included a survey of over sixteen hundred Soviets citizens who traveled abroad, 
data from ComCom project,63 as well as “published Soviet audience studies on the radio, 
TV, and press audiences.”64  
 Other studies included panels of experts, usually those who specialized in 
Russian/Soviet studies, knew the Russian language, and spent some time in the Soviet 
Union.  These experts were provided with transcripts and tapes of radio broadcasts and 
asked to use their knowledge in offering suggestions on how to improve the radio’s 
message.  For example, a 1961 panel focused on assessing and improving VOA 
broadcasts included eight experts in fields of political science, sociology, history, and 
literature from institutions such as Yale, Columbia, Indiana, and Illinois Universities, as 
well as USIA.65 
 Despite the difficulties involved in audience research, it appears that most of the 
these studies were not too far off the mark.  As mentioned earlier, the RL/MIT project 
results turned out to closely match those conducted by the Soviets themselves, once the 
Soviet studies became available to researchers after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Moreover, as we will see below, some of the evidence from other Soviet sources 
corroborated parts of RL and expert panels’ conclusions.  Therefore, even with limited 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bashkirova, 103-120. 
63 The ComCom project was conducted by communication experts at MIT and used interview data from 
Soviet citizens to produce computer models of Soviet foreign radio audience as well as its impact; see 
Sosin, 112. 
64 NA 306/A1-1016/44. 
65 NA P160/17/36 p. 1. 
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data available on Soviet audience of Western radio stations we can draw some helpful 
conclusions about its makeup and listening habits.         
 How large was the Soviet audience of Western radio stations?  There is little 
reliable data from the 1940s and 1950s, primarily due to the difficulties mentioned above.  
Some rough estimates by Stephen White suggest that around 2% of the Soviet population 
listened to Western radio in the 1940s with the number rising to 8% in the 1950s.66  It is 
safe to assume that the number of Soviet listeners went up after the death of Stalin as the 
punishment for listening to foreign radio became less severe.67  Both American and 
Soviet estimates from the 1970s and 1980s put the number of Soviets listening to VOA at 
around 25% to 27% percent of the adult population who listened on weekly basis.68  
Numbers for BBC and RL were around 15% and 9%.69  These figures, however, do not 
take into account that much of the information from foreign radio was passed along by 
word-of-mouth.70  Therefore, these calculations tend to underestimate the number of 
those who received information from these broadcasts. 
 According to both Soviet and American studies, numbers of Soviets listening on 
regular basis remained largely stable throughout the1970s and 1980s.71  Large audience 
increases were usually attributed to important international and domestic events.72  
                                                        
66 Stephen White, Gorbachev in Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 58. 
67 Exact numbers on people prosecuted for listening to foreign radio broadcasts are not available but 
according to Brian LaPierre, Khrushchev adopted a “softer line”, such as public shaming, in dealing with 
lesser crimes compared to the Stalin period; see LaPierre, 216- 323. 
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Liberalization of Soviet radio in the early perestroika period (1985-1987) caused a 
serious drop in people tuning into foreign radio.73    
 Originally, American researchers believed that those listening to Western radio 
were predominantly male.  As mentioned earlier, this conclusion came from the 
assumption that because Soviet women faced a double burden of working and taking care 
of the family they had little time to listen to the radio.  Later American studies, done in 
the 1970s and based on interviews with Soviet tourists, confirmed the gender gap.  For 
example, a three-year study done between 1972 and 1975 found that males composed 
anywhere from 66% to 71% of listeners.74  USIA studies from the 1980s and early 1990s, 
also found that males were more likely to listen to Western broadcasts because they were 
more interested in their political content.75  Soviet studies, however, saw a 50/50 split 
between the genders.  Much like the discrepancies in entertainment as a motivating factor 
for listening, the gender differences in American and Soviet studies were probably due to 
differences in samples.  Soviet studies involved a larger percentage of young people 
many of who listened in order to hear American music.  Therefore, the gender difference 
in the studies can be explained if we are to assume that women were more interested in 
radio’s musical rather than political content.  Evidence from studies by Soviet sociologist 
Boris Grushin supported this assumption when data collected in 1972 showed greater 
preference for musical content among female radio listeners.76 
                                                        
73 Parta, “Audience research in Extremis,” 111. 
74 NA P160/36/6 p.2. 
75 Parta, “Audience research in Extremis”, 111. 
76 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii, 556. 
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 Those between the ages of 30 and 50 constituted the majority of Soviet listeners.77  
Most likely this was due to the fact that this segment of Soviet population was more 
interested in information from other than official sources as opposed to a younger 
generation (16-29 years old) that was more interested in music and entertainment topics.  
However, the last group accounted for a sizable portion of around 30% of the listeners.78 
 By all accounts the urban population made up the bulk of Soviets who listened to 
Western radio.  Most participants in the Harvard Project who touched on the subject, for 
example, revealed that urban population overwhelmingly exceeded its rural counterpart 
in listening to foreign radio.79  The ComCom project yielded similar results, as did the 
Soviet studies.80  At first glance, Soviet people in the countryside had better opportunities 
to listen to Western radio.  Jamming in rural areas was not as intense as in highly 
populated areas, due to the size of the area and low population density.  
 So why didn’t the rural Soviets tune-in more frequently?  There are several 
reasons for this phenomenon.  First, and most important, was the issue of education.  
Audience studies suggested that listenership of Western radio tended to increase with 
education.81  Therefore, it was not unusual to see lower rates of listening in the 
countryside as rural Soviet population tended to be less educated.  We cannot, however, 
assume uniformity of this trend.  American researchers of Soviet audiences found a 
strong correlation between holding a “divergent” opinion and one’s likelihood of 
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listening to foreign radio.82  In other words, the more someone disagreed with the 
government’s policies the more likely that person was to listen to Western radio.  As we 
saw in the previous chapter, certain groups such as some Ukrainian peasants83 and 
religious minorities living in rural areas had strong negative feelings about the Soviet 
government.  Thus, it would not be out of line to suggest that those groups had higher 
than average listenership rates. 
 The cost of radio sets was another factor impacting rural listening.  Short wave 
radios were expensive, at least in the 1940s and 1950s, and not many could afford such a 
luxury, especially in the decade of post-war reconstruction.  A 1957 survey of Western 
repatriates who spend many years in the Soviet Union concluded that “Ownership of a 
short-wave radio means that his [Soviet listener’s] socio-economic status is likely to be at 
least that of a semi-skilled urban worker.”84  Harvard Project respondents also frequently 
mentioned cost as the main reason for peasants not having access to a radio.85  An MIT 
study for years 1971-1978 found that “The groups at the lower end of the spectrum [these 
included majority of peasants and agricultural workers] will remain unexposed [to 
Western Radio].  But, it seems that these cannot be reached anyhow: they have no 
shortwave radios.”86  There was some evidence of peasants on state farms organizing 
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listening circles of VOA.87  These, however, coincided with major changes in the 
country, such as Khrushchev’s 1956 speech denouncing Stalin, or 1968 Soviet lead 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and therefore cannot be attributed to evidence of regular 
listenership among rural population.       
 In terms of geographical distribution, large urban centers such as Moscow and 
Leningrad saw the highest percentages of foreign radio listeners.  Again, this was most 
likely a result of those cities having higher educational levels since education was one the 
primary indicator of listener rates.88  Baltic States and Trans-Caucasia also saw high 
listener rates, probably influenced by strong nationalist and anti-Soviet feelings in those 
regions.  Moldavia and Central Asia saw among the lowest listener rates in the Soviet 
Union.89  
 While there is not enough reliable data to estimate listener rates in other regions, 
limited evidence suggests that people in all parts of the Soviet Union tuned in to Western 
broadcasts for news and entertainment.  For example, a 1960 report from the Ideological 
Committee to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party noted that radio 
committee directors and other sources reported instances of regular listenership of 
Western radio in republics of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and cities of Lvov, Odessa, Tom’, 
as well as many others.90  A taxi-cab driver in Barnaul, a Siberian city close to 
Kazakhstan, confided to one American traveler that he regularly listened to American 
music on the radio in 1950s.91  An American survey from the 1970s also discovered a 
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number of people from Siberia who listened to VOA, mostly for information.92  A 1959 
official report from the Far-Eastern Soviet island of Sakhalin complained that many 
people were able to, and did, listen to foreign radio programs such as VOA.  As a result, 
report noted, there was an upsurge of various provocative rumors and wrong 
interpretations of official policy.93   
 One’s occupation alone did not appear to be a major determining factor for 
listenership.  Neither was one’s membership in the Communist Party.94  Likely, this 
correlated with the fact that many people listening to Western radio did not see 
themselves as being disloyal to the Soviet state.95  Therefore, we see people in positions 
directly tied to the Soviet governing and defense institutions among those who tuned into 
foreign radio, people such as gorkom (city executive committee) officials,96 Red Army 
officers,97 and even one of the drivers for the Soviet Foreign Ministry.98  Like many 
others, these people might not have listened regularly, only in times of heightened 
domestic or international tensions,99 but the very fact that they did is evidence that 
listening to Western radio became a legitimized practice in post-World War II Soviet 
Union among all sectors of Soviet population.  
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 While occupation alone did not determine proclivity for listening, one’s 
attitudinal type100 was a major factor.  Those classified as Liberal or Moderate in their 
attitude towards civil liberties in the Soviet Union were far more likely to get their 
information from Western radio than did those classified as Hardline or Conservative.101  
Consequently, while we cannot establish a direct connection between one’s occupation 
and listenership of foreign radio we can make an educated guess.  It is quite probable that 
those employed at higher echelons of the Soviet system were more likely to hold 
conservative views (such as those supporting the status quo) and therefore less likely to 
listen to Western radio on a regular basis than people on the other side of the spectrum.  
There is some evidence to support this conclusion based on the fact that those most 
critical of the Soviet system listened to RL, the harshest critic of the Soviet system of all 
Western radio station.102   
 When people did listen to foreign radio, most likely they did so alone.  This was 
especially true of the late Stalin period (1945-1953) when consequences for being caught 
were still quite high.  When people listened with someone else it was with someone they 
absolutely trusted.  A young Ukrainian man, a participant in the Harvard Project 
described listening to VOA in the late 1940s: “I listened to the VOA broadcasts together 
with a friend of mine, a manager of a theater, by the name of Yefim Yefimovich. I did 
not talk to anybody else about this, since there was no other person I could trust. I was 
quite confident, that he would not report it, since he had invited me first to listen to these 
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broadcasts.”103  “[T]hey [news from VOA] will be told only to trusted people who will 
keep their mouth shut. As you know, it would be impossible to discuss it in the open,” 
stressed another respondent.104 
 Even after the death of Stalin, when chances of imprisonment for listening to 
foreign radio decreased, people were still careful about discussing what they heard with 
others.  If not careful, listeners could lose their job, or hurt their children’s chances of 
getting into a university.  There is little concrete evidence of this due to lack of any 
studies on this specific subject, as well as Soviet people’s understandable reluctance to 
answer truthfully if such a study was conducted.  However, there are some individual 
examples.  For instance, one interviewee who lived in Saratov in the 1950s recalled that 
his father did not discuss foreign radio because of his position as a university professor of 
political economy.105  It is safe to suppose that people with something to lose, in other 
words those who feared being denied chances of promotion, or foreign travel, or 
vacationing at resorts.  Even being called in and lectured was likely unpleasant enough to 
deter many people from letting others know that they listened to foreign radio.  
Consequently, one was much more likely to mention hearing the latest American pop 
song than discussing a news item heard on American radio that contradicted the official 
story of events. 
 In discussing Soviet society of the Brezhnev period (1964-1982), Soviet 
sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh concluded that despite a more politically relaxed 
climate of the period Soviets were still reluctant to discuss information obtained from 
unofficial (non-Soviet) sources.  He wrote:   
                                                        
103 http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:959204?n=4 Accessed April 22, 2012. 
104 http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:959205?n=5 Accessed April 22, 2012. 
105 Raleigh, Russia’s Sputnik Generation, 103. 
  158 
 
A majority of the Soviet people under normal circumstances (i.e., not at times of crisis) 
do not disseminate in public information they got from foreign radio or from other 
foreign sources of information (newspapers, magazines, contacts with foreigners inside 
the country, and so on).  Even the materials of the magazine America, which is 
distributed legally in the Soviet Union under the provisions of an international agreement, 
are not usually discussed in offices and workplaces.106       
 
 There is some evidence of differences in attitude towards discussing Western 
radio among Soviet generations.  Soviet youngsters, because of their age, did not have to 
worry about losing their jobs and ability to provide a better future for their family.  
Furthermore, they did not grow up under Stalin, and therefore appear to have been more 
open to talking with their friends about things they heard on foreign radio.  Talking about 
his childhood, one Soviet man recalled: 
 
Yes, we discussed it at school.  We weren’t afraid.  No. That’s our parents.  We talked 
about it and we had our own opinions about things, and I think this was a good thing.  In 
other words, in this regard, your generation differs.  In this regard, yes.  We lacked that 
genetic fear that was hammered into them.107  
 
 In part, it was the Soviet government itself that was responsible for the more 
relaxed attitude toward foreign radio among Soviet youth.  Writing about the Soviet 
generation of the last two decades of the Soviet Union, Sergei Yurchak pointed out that 
official encouragement of shortwave technology, and “ambivalent policies of jamming” 
led to “normalizing the practice of shortwave reception among the majority of Soviet 
people.”108  In addition, many Soviet young people did not see themselves as lazy and 
parasitic individuals, the type most often associated in the Soviet press with listening to 
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Western radio.  As a result, Soviet young people did not see the act of listening to 





 Beginning with the first VOA broadcast in 1947, Soviet officials did not turn a 
blind eye to Western radio broadcasts.  Over the course of the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union tried to block or at least limit the impact of Western radio in a number of ways.  
Some of these included attempts by Soviet authorities to alter Soviet radio sets in such 
ways as to make them unable to receive those frequencies used by Western radio stations.  
Soviets also attempted to jam Western broadcasts by setting up sizable jamming stations 
outside, as well as inside, of major cities.  Some of the less subtle means included 
kidnapping of radio station’s personnel as well as bombing of the stations themselves.  
Furthermore, Western radio forced Soviet authorities to take a long look at their own 
propaganda in order to make it more effective against the message from the West. 
 Overall, a majority of Soviet efforts to keep its population from listening to 
Western radio proved costly and largely ineffective.  Eager to hear something other than 
domestic propaganda, Soviet people found a number of ingenious ways to get around 
radio set restrictions and jamming.  What Soviet anti-Western radio efforts did 
accomplish, however, was to provide Western radio stations with proof that their work 
was having some effect on the Soviet population, enough to warrant a serious response 
from Soviet officials. 




widespread tool employed by the Soviets.  Initially, the U.S. Department of State did not 
think that the Soviets would rely heavily on jamming as it would suggest that Western 
radio was having an impact on Soviet population.  In 1946, U.S. ambassador Harriman 
wrote to the Secretary of State that “While USSR might attempt to jam American 
broadcasts it would probably be reluctant to do so because such action-or more extreme 
measure of calling in all short wave sets-would be an admission to its own people that it 
feared outside ideas and intensify public curiosity over American broadcasts.”110  
Harriman’s prediction proved inaccurate as first jamming efforts began within a year of 
VOA’s first broadcast (February, 1947).  Officially, the reasons for jamming were best 
summarized by one Soviet tourist guide in Leningrad.  When asked why the Soviet 
government is jamming Western broadcasts in 1962, he replied that “We must keep out 
hostile broadcast by VOA because Soviet living conditions haven’t yet caught up with 
those in the U.S., and VOA is designed to make us dissatisfied with our own system.”  
When asked whether or not jamming would stop when Soviet conditions were better, he 
replied, “Certainly.”111   
 Jamming interfered with VOA broadcasts by producing high pitched and irritating 
noises on the frequency of the targeted station.112  By 1949, jamming turned into an all 
out effort that “employed over 250 sky-wave transmitters and perhaps as many as 500 
ground-wave transmitters, drowning almost 90 percent of VOA transmissions and 
crippling millions of Soviet-issued shortwave receivers that picked up foreign 
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broadcasts.”113  In 1950 alone, the Soviets spent around $70 million dollars on jamming 
hardware and close to $18 million in operating costs.  The second figure in itself neared 
the total VOA budget for that year.114 
 By the late 1950s, Soviet jamming efforts grew in sophistication in part due to 
their early ineffectiveness.  A 1958 KGB reports noted numerous complaints from 
officials that jamming did not diminish the quality of Western broadcasts and stated that 
1660 Soviet radio stations were involved in jamming, more than the number used for 
domestic broadcasts. But “Despite these efforts and billions in spending, jamming is not 
achieving its goal.”115   In response, KGB censors that monitored Western broadcasts 
suggested that some of VOA programs should not be jammed as they did not contain 
anti-Soviet propaganda.  The ruling Central Committee agreed with the KGB assessment 
and jamming became more selective, limited to what Soviets saw as clear anti-Soviet 
propaganda.  In addition, Soviet authorities decided to stop the jamming of programs in 
rare languages such as Finnish, Hebrew, and Farsi. 116   The new strategy, therefore, 
called on Soviet jammers to leave VOA’s music and educational programs alone, instead 
focusing on programs with more political content.  Consequently, radio stations such as 
RL that devoted most of their broadcasts to criticizing the Soviet system received much 
more attention from Soviet jammers.117          
 Even regular Soviet people voiced their opinions regarding jamming.  In a 1960 
letter to Khrushchev, an electrical engineer from Stalingrad wrote that he had been 
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following Soviet radio jamming efforts since 1953 almost daily by listening to VOA, 
BBC, and RL.   In the letter he noted that Soviet jamming wasted millions of dollars 
without much success as the jamming mostly interfered with domestic stations.  
“[Americans] do not throw money to the wind,” he wrote, stressing that they quickly 
adapted by broadcasting to those regions where there was no jamming.  In the end, he 
suggested a number of technical methods to improve jamming.118   
 Besides pointing to the shortcoming of Soviet jamming, his letter revealed a 
number of other things about Western radio in the Soviet Union.  First, it is highly 
unlikely that an ordinary Soviet citizen would listen to numerous Western radio stations 
for over seven years simply to monitor jamming, or “to listen to them lie,” as he wrote in 
the letter.  Thus it is safe to assume that this loyal Soviet citizen (his letter was unsolicited 
and genuinely sought to help the government) listened because something in the 
broadcasts interested him.  This and numerous other examples demonstrate that it was not 
just dissidents and intellectuals who listened to Western radio broadcasts.119  “The lower 
classes didn’t listen, but the majority of the workers, of skilled workers, they all listened,” 
recalled one former resident from Saratov.  Moreover, American counter-jamming effort 
impressed this loyal Soviet man, if only from technical and economic standpoint, 
signaling at least some positive opinions about the United States, likely rooted in long 
standing admiration for American technology among the Soviets.120                 
 We must note that Soviet jamming did have an impact, as it did indeed create a 
number of serious problems for those trying to listen.  In fact, some American studies 
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120 See my discussion in the section on official pre-World War II propaganda and public opinion in my 
chapter on official propaganda. 
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from the early 1980s found that Soviet “listening habits [of Western radio] were 
significantly affected by jamming.”121  This was especially true for large urban centers 
where Soviet authorities used ground jammers that had a limited range but were much 
more effective.  Therefore people in cities such as Moscow and Leningrad had a much 
more difficult time catching a signal.  In 1958, a KGB report noted that even official 
Soviet censors had trouble listening to VOA because of jamming in the city of 
Moscow.122  A former Radio Liberty employee praised Soviet jammers in his memoir by 
writing “I always used to marvel at the efficiency of the Soviet jamming network.  
Operating over a vast space that embraced eleven time zones and one-sixth of all the land 
on earth, its staffs had to hear and identify “hostile” broadcasts on any frequency and in 
any language.”123  Years later, several residents of Saratov, a provincial Soviet city, 
recalled having great difficulty in trying to listen to foreign radio: “Yes, it was simply 
impossible.  You had to exert tremendous effort, which, well, who need this?  You 
literally had to sit for hours in front of the receiver to catch [it].”124  Some USIA studies 
also pointed to the fact that at times jamming did have “a significant impact on the ability 
of Soviet citizens to listen to Western broadcasting.”125     
   In the end, however, the Soviet jamming program’s results seemed like a poor 
investment.  By Western estimates, Soviet Union spent about 750 million to 1.2 billion 
dollars to jam RL alone.  This was twice the amount U.S. spent on RFE/RL and VOA 
combined.126  Trying to catch a signal was a challenge at times; however, someone who 
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wanted to listen to Western radio could do so a majority of the time.  Moreover, finding 
ways to get around jamming “bec[a]me almost a kind of hobby” for many Soviet 
citizens.127 
 
Abandoned jamming station outside of Moscow (photo by the author - 2011) 
 
 Another technical measure taken by the Soviet authorities was attempting to limit 
the number of radio sets capable of receiving Western radio signals.  During World War 
II, in order to more effectively broadcast to distant parts of the country Soviets developed 
short-wave capable radio sets.  After the war, Western radio stations used these to 
provide Soviet population with unofficial information.   In the late 1940s and 1950s, there 
were serious attempts by the Soviet government to alter Soviet radio sets, preventing 
them from receiving Western frequencies.128   These efforts, however, met with limited 
                                                        
127 Mikkonen, 789. 
128 Presidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964, ed by A.A. Fursenko et al. (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2003), 702. 
  165 
success.129    An official government report from 1959 admitted that there were roughly 
twenty million radio sets in the Soviet Union capable of receiving short wave 
transmissions.  For a small price many others could be “fixed” to do the same.130    
 A similar situation developed in Soviet-occupied Germany.  In 1948 Soviet 
authorities confiscated all radio sets from Soviet troops stationed in Germany.  This did 
make it harder for the soldiers to listen but those who wanted to still found a way.   
Furthermore, they left the officers’ radios untouched and some used them to listen to 
Western broadcasts.131 
 The Soviet press, and other media, also played an important part in counteracting 
Western broadcasts.  In fact, some of the earliest official responses to Western radio 
involved the Soviet press articles denouncing foreign broadcasts as harmful and 
misleading propaganda.  One such article appeared in the magazine Gudok in October 
1947, a few months after the first VOA broadcast.   It sought to refute VOA claims that 
life under capitalism was much better than in the Soviet Union.  A high ranking 
American embassy official at the time noted that the “Very defensive tone of this article 
indicates VOA hitting where it hurts.  Gudok type defense not likely be effective for long 
time since Soviet people have different idea of American living standards.”132 
 Another early Soviet press attack on Western radio involved pieces in the highly 
popular satire magazine Krokodil, where they depicted VOA as simply making up false 
stories.  A 1949 Krokodil featured a cartoon called THE VOICE ON THE RADIO.  It 
portrayed a group of men making sound effects in a room, while a commentator read the 
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news, saying:    
 
“Attention!  Attention!  You are listening to a special correspondent of the Voice of 
America.  I am speaking to you from the frontier of a certain eastern country.  This is an 
on-the-spot report.  A clanking column of tanks is passing by.  Following it is a regiment 
of red infantry- listen to the tramp of marching feet!  The crack of rifles alternates with 
the rattle of machine guns.  And now the red cavalry breaks out of cover.  You can hear 
their hoof beats on the pavement.  What is this new sound?  It is the communists 
massacring their enemies.  You can hear the blows of their clubs and the terrible cries of 
the wounded.”133   
 
1950 saw a debut of a “VOA” play that depicted the radio station as a crude tool of 
American propaganda.134  Overall, a 1950 American report on the subject described 
Soviet portrayal of VOA as: 
not only as the mouthpiece of American reaction, but as absurd, stupid, gross and 
“uncultured” – the sort of thing no Soviet citizen could or should want to listen to.  It 
shows its lack of culture by broadcasting about women who pour beer on their heads for a 
shampoo, about people who chew gum and blow bubbles with it, and by similar gross 
stories.  It seeks to sell America and American ideas in the same way in which it seeks to 
sell soap and soft drinks.  Why should the cultured Soviet citizen listen to the froth of the 
American soap salesman when he can turn to some Soviet station and hear a concert, an 
opera, or a serious and enlightening talk on some Soviet theme.135 
 
 An early 1950s American study of Soviet domestic media including newspapers, 
journals, and radio, found that during a four-year period beginning in April 1947, shortly 
after VOA’s first broadcast, Soviet mass media contained over nine hundred references to 
VOA alone.136  
 By the 1960s, Soviet propagandists admitted that press, radio, and TV 
countermeasures were not achieving their intended aim.  A 1960 report from the Soviet 
broadcasting department found that Soviet counterpropaganda had a defensive character, 
was too abstract, and did not vividly portray the life of Soviet citizens who were building 
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the brightest society on the planet.137  Other official reports from the period noted that 
foreign radio was popular among the Soviet people due to poor timing of Soviet radio 
broadcasts that left many parts of the country without news, because they were broadcast 
too late or too early (due to time zone differences).  As a result, the only information 
available was from VOA or BBC.  They also pointed to the fact that Soviet radio 
programming failed to provide interesting and entertaining programs to distract people 
from foreign radio.138  Some of the suggested recommendations for improving Soviet 
propaganda included forming a special department to study foreign broadcasting, 
improving domestic radio programs as well as more focus on television.139  For example, 
in 1960, in order to counter information from Western radio, the Latvian Central 
Committee instructed local authorities to publish more stories from Soviet tourists on 
difficult conditions of workers in capitalist countries as well as testimonies of repatriated 
persons, and foreign tourists with a positive view of the Soviet Union.  Other Soviet 
republics received similar directives.140  As a result, Western radio had the unintended 
effect of improving Soviet radio and television programming, much in the same way as it 
forced Soviet press and other propaganda to account for information received by Soviet 
citizens from Western channels.141 
 Despite the many changes to make Soviet propaganda more effective against 
Western radio the main message remained the same: Western radio was simply a 
capitalist ploy to mislead the Soviet public and turn it away from communist ideals.  A 
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1972 poem published in official print media warned Soviet citizens against these dangers:  
 
We will not crush you with loud wars, 
 but will get you with our short waves  
We will not crush you with our tanks, 
 But will get you with our jazz, dances… 
 
And with a million sparkling eyes, 
A foreign cobra is watching: 
Waiting until we are all swallowed by the “American way of ….142   
  
 At times, in addition to the above-mentioned efforts, Soviet authorities resorted to 
more direct and violent means of dealing with the problem of Western radio.  Over the 
years, there were several unexplained deaths of RL’s émigré writers which RL attributed 
to the KGB.143  In 1981, someone bombed RL’s Munich headquarters--an act frequently 
attributed to Romanian security agents.  Such tactics, however, were rare and KGB 
preferred more subtle means of affecting Western radio.  Throughout its existence almost 
every section of RL had been infiltrated by Soviet agents.  In one instance, a KGB agent 
spent more than twenty years working in RL’s Russian language service, at one point 
even being considered for the chief editor position.144   Many KGB spies did manage to 
penetrate the highest levels of Western radio stations but their role was largely limited to 
information gathering.  As one former RL employee pointed out:   
 
While the agents could provide many items of interest to Communist security officials-
staff biographies, program schedules, technical data, internal memos, information about 
the American managers (always of interest to East bloc security)-no agent, so far as is 
known, succeeded in influencing broadcast content. There is, in fact, evidence that agents 
were discouraged from meddling in broadcast policy, since that might lead to their 
unmasking. The spies provided their masters with cabinets full of files, and all manner of 
interesting gossip. But the radio’s message remained unchanged.145 
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 From their beginnings in the late 1940s and until Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
perestroika in the late 1980s, the Soviet government took the issue of Western radio 
broadcasts very seriously.  They often blamed it for stirring up trouble inside the country.  
On 19 December 1956, for example, Soviet leadership sent out a closed letter to Party 
officials for discussion.  The letter warned about the fast pace of de-Stalinization: “Much 
attention was devoted in the letter to ‘imperialist propaganda broadcasters’ (the BBC and 
Radio Liberty), which were accused of being in themselves a cause of the outbreak of 
‘anti-Soviet consciousness’ and ‘anti-Soviet actions’.”146  In a similar report a few days 
earlier Soviet officials complained about the rise of “unhealthy” attitudes in the 
population due to influence from the West on politically and ideologically unstable 
elements, who are influenced by bourgeoisie ideology which they get from the radio – 
VOA, BBC, RFE/RL.147  A few years later KGB blamed Western broadcasts for 
brainwashing a group of students at the Moscow State University, who then formed a 
discussion group and printed anti-Soviet pamphlets.148 
 In spite of these official fears, the government’s options were limited, especially 
since it no longer relied on the use of mass terror following the de-Stalinization process.  
It simply could not, and later would not, arrest millions of Soviet citizens simply for 
listening, particularly after admitting that shortcomings in Soviet broadcasting pushed 
many to turn to the West. 149  The resulting effort combined attempts to prevent Soviets 
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from listening by jamming and at the same time improving domestic programs.  Its 
success, however, was limited because it simply did not address the main reasons for 
popularity of Western programs – shortage of information and lack of quality 
entertainment in the Soviet Union.          
Public response 
 
 In 1947, VOA sent the first Western Cold War radio transmission to the Soviet 
Union.  As we saw earlier, this greatly alarmed Soviet officials who within months 
launched campaigns aimed at countering these broadcasts.  It was clear that Soviet 
authorities viewed Western radio as a threat.  But were these fears justified?  
 In talking about official Soviet expectations of its citizens in regard to Western 
radio, a noted Soviet sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh wrote: 
  
The good Soviet individual takes a hostile public stand toward the West, its policy, 
ideology, and style of life, and rejects Western views on the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries…As Yuri Zhukov, a leading Soviet journalist, said during his 
appearance on Soviet TV in the early 1980s, “a decent Soviet person does not denigrate 
himself by listening to all these voices.”150 
 
 Within a decade of VOA’s first broadcast, however, by some of the more 
conservative estimates, millions, many loyal and decent Soviet citizens, “denigrated” 
themselves by listening. 151  So what motivated these people to tune-in to VOA, RL, BBC 
and other Western radio stations despite official condemnation?  Below, I will argue that 
while there were many reasons for listening, the two main ones were clearly the shortage 
of information and lack of quality entertainment.  Moreover, despite official fears that 
Western radio had a harmful effect on Soviet people there is little evidence to support 
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such statements.  As we saw from earlier examples, Soviet authorities uncovered 
instances where Western radio did influence some people to question official policies.  
Some scholars have also pointed out such moments.152  These, however, were rare and 
for the most part influenced people who already had a negative view of the Soviet 
regime.  If it were not VOA, it would have been something else.153  As a rule, a majority 
of those listening remained loyal to the Soviet Union.  
 Gauging the Soviet public response to Western radio broadcasts presents a serious 
challenge as there were few institutions in the Soviet Union that undertook the study of 
public opinion.  Perhaps KGB came the closest to serving that role; however, its archives 
are currently closed to most researchers.  There are, however, a number of KGB 
documents that are available for study, either because they were published before the 
archives were reclosed, or because they were transferred to a different archive.  Another 
possible source, sociological studies, did not get an official blessing until the 1960s, and 
even then they experienced heavy censorship, although a number of these studies had 
been published in full since the fall of the Soviet Union.154  
 Some of our best sources regarding Soviet responses to Western radio are 
accounts of foreign travelers to the Soviet Union as well as Soviet citizens who left the 
Soviet Union for the West.  Since a majority of those who left the Soviet Union did so 
because of their dislike of the Soviet system their opinions are not representative of 
Soviet population as a whole.  For the very same reason, however, they are representative 
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of a certain part of the Soviet population--a part that was, for some reason or the other, 
not satisfied with the Soviet Union.   
 Accounts of foreign travelers to the Soviet Union are quite valuable because many 
kept a journal throughout their travels.  Many events and claims, however, appear to have 
been exaggerated to various degrees so as to make the books more appealing to American 
readers.  Another invaluable resource that sheds some light on public reactions and 
perceptions of Western radio in the Soviet Union came from the USIA.  It produced a 
number of reports dealing with the Soviet public and Western broadcasts.  Many of these 
reports were in turn based on studies done by RL that relied largely on discreet interviews 
with Soviet travelers abroad.  Some scholars criticized these studies as having serious 
statistical mistakes where the authors made assumptions based on statistically negligible 
differences.155  We must remember, however, that few other means were available to 
researchers conducting studies on the subject at the time.  It is also possible that some of 
the criticism arose out of inter-station rivalry between RL and VOA.156  Furthermore, RL 
studies tend to support information found in most other sources.  
 In addition to the RL studies, in 1957 USIA conducted an extensive survey with 
repatriates from Western Europe who spent their “formative years” in the Soviet 
Union.157  A majority of those interviewed came to the Soviet Union from Western 
Europe as children.  Therefore, it is not exactly clear how representative they were of the 
Soviet population as a whole.  The report itself put the chances of the group being a 
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delineative sample at 50/50.158  Despite a number of drawbacks, all of the above-
mentioned sources contain enough reliable information for us to draw an accurate picture 
about Soviet public reactions to Western radio broadcasts.            
 The first question we must answer is why, despite all of the obstacles and dangers, 
did some in the Soviet Union listen to Western radio?  There is no single answer to this 
question.  This was not simply a case of people wanting to hear the truth that was denied 
to them at home.  Nor was it merely people’s desire for better entertainment.  While 
information and entertainment were clearly the two major reasons for listening they are 
not the whole story.  
 In 1946, in one of the earliest predictions about broadcasting to the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. ambassador pointed out that if the Soviets started jamming VOA this “would be 
an admission to its own people that it feared outside ideas and intensify public curiosity 
over American broadcasts.”159  It appears that for many Soviet people this was one of the 
primary stimuli to start listening.  Harrison Salisbury, an American correspondent for the 
New York Times, recalled hearing the following story from a Soviet engineer in 
Leningrad in the early 1950s:  
 
“My friends and I never used to listen to the American radio.  It simply never occurred to us.  
Then, not so long ago, something happened.  Our Government started a big campaign against the 
Voice of America.  There were articles in the paper denouncing it, and special stations were set 
up to interfere with the broadcasts from America and make it impossible to hear them.  We 
thought that there must be something to hear, an American truth which was important.  
Otherwise, our Government would not have taken such measures to keep us from listening.  So 
we started to experiment to see if we could hear the American stations because we all wanted to 
know what it, this new American truth.”160  
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 Another Soviet citizen recalled years later: “I listened to Voice of America.  Ever 
the more so because it was jammed, and everything that’s secretive and off-limits elicits 
interest.”161  A young Irish woman visiting the Soviet Union in the late 1950s wrote at the 
time: “I found more fanatical jazz enthusiasm in Russia than anywhere else I’ve been.  
Almost everyone loved it, if only as an expression of resentment at the ban.”162  This 
“forbidden fruit” effect did not go unnoticed by the American embassy staff in their 
feedback about VOA’s early programs.  American diplomats suggested that in its 
broadcasts to the Soviet Union, VOA include more subjects deemed taboo by Soviet 
authorities.163 
 Desire for information was perhaps the single most common reason for Soviet 
people to tune into Western radio.  The state controlled Soviet media presented the 
people with only one side to the story.  And most Soviets suspected that there was a lot of 
information out there besides what they read in Soviet newspapers, heard on Soviet radio, 
and saw on Soviet TV.  In the early 1950s, when asked if VOA was a good thing for the 
Soviet Union, a former Soviet citizen replied, “Of course, it is a very good idea. Because 
people are informed of news that can't be found in the local newspapers or heard over the 
local radio.”164  Another former citizen praised VOA by saying “The main thing is that 
the VOA informed the Russian people about things that were hushed up by the Soviet 
regime. These things, which the Soviet regime would like to keep secret, are picked up by 
the VOA discussed, and the reasons explained.”165  Soviets living inside the Soviet Union 
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at the time of questioning provided similar reasons for listening.  An American woman 
traveling in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s noted that most Soviets she talked to 
listened in order “To pick up news they don’t get at home.”166 
 However, just because many Soviets listened to Western broadcasts to receive 
information not available from official channels did not mean that they completely 
distrusted those channels.  In fact, most sources from the period show a majority among 
the Soviet public was simply skeptical that Soviet media provided them with the whole 
picture.  According to a 1957 USIA report based on interviews with repatriates from the 
Soviet Union, most people thought that the Soviet press/radio coverage was not so much 
false as it was slanted, emphasizing the good and omitting the bad in domestic coverage 
and vice versa in reporting about the West.167  In a representative statement, one of the 
survey respondents stated: “VOA and BBC.  I had doubts about the Soviet version, but 
still couldn’t make out who was right and who was wrong.”168 
 Ostensibly, Western radio broadcasts preached to the choirs.  They reinforced 
negative opinions about the Soviet Union among those who disliked the Soviet regime 
and strengthened beliefs that Western radio was just propaganda among those who 
strongly supported the Soviet government.  The majority in the middle, deprived of 
opportunity to check most of what was said, simply stayed in the middle, not sure whom 
to believe.  There is little evidence to show that any significant number of Soviet people 
radically changed their opinion about their country, or the rest of the world, because of 
Western radio.   
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 Eugene Parta, former director of audience research for RL, concluded that 
Western radio had an “important role” in shaping Soviet public opinion on events.169  
This conclusion, based largely on data of Soviet opinion on the Afghan war,170 however, 
is problematic.  First, as Parta himself acknowledged, a lot of information about the war 
came from returning Soviet soldiers.  Second, RL survey on the issue compared numbers 
in 1984 to 1987.  Therefore, one must take into account the liberalization of the Soviet 
media with coming of perestroika and glasnost in 1985, and its impact on public opinion.   
 The audience for Western radio included societal elements, such as dissidents, 
who were alienated from the Soviet system, and they were the ones whose opinions were 
most likely to reach the West.  A more accurate view of the impact as a whole would 
need to start by separating out listeners who already held the opinions Western radio was 
trying to impart from those who changed their opinions as a result of Western radio.  
Considering all of the issues discussed in this section, the evidence on the question of 
“importance” of Western radio in forming Soviet opinion, as opposed to simply 
preaching to the choir, tends to support the latter.  Although more research is needed for 
more nuanced conclusions, it is clear that Western radio did force the Soviet media to 
provide more information to the public.   
 To examine the issue in more detail we must answer the question:  What did 
Soviet citizens do with the information they received from Western radio broadcasts?  
Most Soviet citizens not happy with the Soviet system often looked to Western radio 
stations to take the lead in providing the Soviet population with the truth.  A participant 
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in Harvard Project (most of who escaped from the Soviet Union to the West), in a typical 
response called on VOA to:     
 
furnish the Russian people with true information, thus opening its eyes.  America and the 
VOA have sufficient data to tell about the true life in the Soviet Union. If the Russian 
people shall be informed about these facts, they will adopt a critical attitude towards 
Bolshevism, and recognize the truth about America, for America does not hide anything 
from the Russian people and reveals all shortcomings of the Soviet regime. This is the 
main thing.171 
 
In fact, many others in the Harvard Project thought that Western radio was too timid in 
their criticism of the Soviet Union.  Many of those asked about the VOA saw its 
programming as not “biting, sharp and straight-forward,” as “very delicate” and “not 
convincing.”172  One former Soviet high school teacher faulted VOA with being too 
indecisive “Because through the Voice of America we guess, we suppose, we assume, but 
we never state and assure.”173  Another thought that VOA should respond to all of the 
information provided by the Soviet radio, domestic and international, providing Soviet 
citizens with the truth in these matters.174 
 There were those who called for Western radio to openly denounce and call for 
the overthrow of the Soviet system.  One of these was a young Soviet soldier who 
escaped from Berlin.   “Time is short,” he said.  “One should not - so to say -  
monkey around with Bolshevism too much. We should tell everybody, that the Soviets 
are scoundrels, that they are striving towards their own ruin, I wish the VOA would not 
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mince words any longer.”175  "They should hit them right on the head," suggested 
another.176 
 Many participants in the Harvard project risked death in escaping to the West.  
Some had spent many brutal years in Soviet labor camps.  Therefore it was only natural 
that many had very strong negative feelings about the Soviet Union.  And as is often the 
case, they assigned those feeling to those around them whether this was true or not.  A 
former Soviet army officer, citing the dangers of listening to Western broadcasts, stated 
that the average Soviet citizen “does not want to listen to programs about new music in 
America.”177  “They [Soviet listeners] do not like the musical program of the VOA. They 
say, that nowadays it is essential to expose Soviet lies, and not dawdle the time away with 
music,” stated another.178  Yet another Soviet, interviewed in 1951, claimed that the:  
Soviet masses are not interested in history. They are hungry and they want to know when 
Stalin's power will be destroyed. The Voice of America speaks about American history, 
about the colonial period and God knows what else. The Soviet masses know that in 
America there are no concentration camps, bread lines, etc . And they want to know when 
in Russia it will be the same. The Voice of America should say that America is going to 
liberate them and to destroy Communism in Russia.179 
 
 In reality, however, most other evidence (discussed below) pointed to the fact that 
a majority of Soviet listeners enjoyed American music and programs about history more 
than they desired the end of the Soviet state.  And indeed were extremely sensitive to any 
criticism of the Soviet Union by Western radio stations.  In other words, this group of 
people, representing a radical segment of Soviet population, looked to the West, and 
specifically America, to help topple the Soviet system that wronged them or they did not 
agree with.  To them, most of what they heard on Western radio simply underscored the 
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negatives in the Soviet regime.  If the broadcasts tried to be objective they were seen as 
not being tough enough.  As we will see later, such views were not in line with the 
majority of the Soviet population. 
 On the other side of the spectrum were people who simply dismissed Western 
radio as mere propaganda.  Typically they saw it as having only one goal in mind: 
slandering the Soviet Union and making it appear in the worst possible light.  In a 
conversation with an American journalist in the early 1950s, a Soviet man told a story of 
spending a lot of time trying to catch the VOA signal together with a friend.  Once they 
did, “We had heard the new American truth.  But it wasn’t truth.  It wasn’t truth at all.  It 
was propaganda.  American propaganda.”180  A woman from Saratov remembered 
listening to foreign radio broadcasts as child in the 1960s, “When they [Western radio] 
broadcast things that deviated from our radio broadcasts I didn’t believe it.  It seemed to 
me that they were slandering us, that’s what they [Soviet authorities] pounded into our 
heads.”181  In that respect, she claimed to have been a typical Soviet child of that time.  
Many Soviets made similar remarks at some American exhibitions in the Soviet Union.182 
 There were a number of reasons for negative opinion about, or outright rejection 
of, foreign radio.  Fatigue with propaganda in general was one of the more common ones.  
On a daily basis, many in the Soviet Union faced a barrage of government-crafted 
information.  In turn, some projected that view onto all governments, assuming that 
everything they heard on the radio, domestic and foreign, was simply government 
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propaganda.183  Furthermore, most Soviets understood that America was if not the 
enemy, then at least a rival superpower, one that had its own interests in mind.  
Therefore, they were bound to view information from American radio with a grain of salt.  
A 1964 USIA study, for example, concluded that “Most Soviet citizens look upon VOA 
as the Washington counterpart to their own Radio Moscow.  Many believe American 
‘propaganda’ as presented by the Voice is just as self-serving as the Soviet brand.”184  
Yet another segment simply believed official statements about Western radio and thus 
saw foreign broadcasts as just attempts to denounce and slander the Soviet state. 
 While there were strong opinions about Western radio among those who strongly 
opposed or strongly supported the Soviet state, the majority of those listening to foreign 
radio stood somewhere in the middle.  As we saw earlier these people simply wanted 
more access to information that was not adjusted to support one point of view or the 
other.  They hoped to find raw information in order to form their own opinions. 
 In other words, Soviet citizens longed for some kind of a measuring stick.  Their 
government insisted that they lived in the best country in the world.  Yet many did not 
feel that way.185  So they wanted to compare it to something.  And since they kept 
hearing mixed messages about the West (unofficial vs. official information) they were 
hungry for any information they deemed objective, or at least information that differed 
from what they heard on official channels.  As one former Soviet citizen put it: 
I understood listening to two points of view as part of that very personal search for truth.  
For that reason I saw listening to foreign broadcasts as normal.  I never felt that I was 
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some sort of freedom fighter.  Not at all.  It was simply interesting for me to know the 
truth.  That’s all.  It was a view of the world.  I’d put it that way.186 
  
 For most Soviets, this search for truth usually expressed itself in looking for 
information that related to their day-to-day lives.  We will see a similar phenomenon in 
my discussion of Soviet reactions to American exhibitions in the Soviet Union.  
Similarly, when Soviets listened to Western radio they wanted information in order to put 
their lives in the context of a wider world.  Most frequently, this manifested itself in 
terms of economic wellbeing.  By far, the most common questions faced by American 
exhibition guides from Soviet visitors touched on subjects such as the average American 
salary and prices of various consumer goods.  Similarly, Soviet listeners of Western radio 
programs craved analogous information.     
 One survey of VOA listeners found that “life in the West; life in the United 
States, life of working people in the West,” and comparison of living conditions in the 
West and the USSR, ranked as number one and two suggestions for themes for Western 
broadcasts.187  Most other theme requests centered around similar subjects.188  For 
example, one VOA listener noted that shoes in the Soviet Union were expensive and of 
poor quality.  He requested that VOA announce figures of how many pairs of shoes an 
average American worker could buy with his monthly salary.189   Another recalled “a 
program (on VOA) which compared the purchasing power of an American workman’s 
wages with a Soviet worker’s pay.  We all liked that type of program very much.”190 
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 Some used information obtained from Western radio, directly or through a social 
grapevine, to voice grievances over living standards.  At a 1957 meeting, a student from a 
forest management institute openly complained that the: “The Russian muzhik 
[workingman] was and will be poor.  Soviet power did not better his life….In America a 
worker can buy an automobile, but here even an engineer cannot do so.  And we keep 
talking about how we overtook capitalist countries in the standard of living for 
workers.”191  The same year at a factory meeting one worker pointed out that: “As for our 
country’s achievements that are constantly written and talked about, they are miniscule.  
For example, Ford in the U.S. produced few cars in the 1920s, but now produces 9 
million cars per year, our country is still stuck on 500,000 cars.”192  Along with several 
other examples from archival sources,193 other scholars also noted similar phenomenon at 
times of social unrest in the Soviet Union, and pointed to Western radio as the primary 
source of information used by those comparing USSR to the West.194 
 The above mentioned examples should not be taken as proof that foreign 
broadcasts fermented popular uprisings in the Soviet Union.  They appear to have simply 
served as supporting material for already existing grievances within the Soviet 
population, usually dealing with economic conditions.  Open disapproval of the Soviet 
system by Soviet citizens based on information from foreign radio, however, was rare.  
And even then, as is clear from examples above, Soviets tended to use information that 
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they felt was more or less objective and without political overtones, such as numbers of 
cars produced.   
 For the most part, at least in the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet people tended to put 
information from Western radio into context.  As one foreign repatriate from the Soviet 
Union noted in the late 1950s:  
Soviet citizens are aware of the reasons for their less comfortable life, such as the belated 
industrialization of their country, and the wars.  For instance, they are neither impressed 
by, nor envious of the many workers’ families in the West who have their private 
bathrooms.  They are satisfied to go to a public bath, remembering that their fathers were 
denied even of this facility.  If VOA would describe the life of the working population in 
Western countries without making comments or insinuations, and without trying to arose 
envy, such broadcasts would be more interesting and would draw more listeners.195 
 
Similar statements were frequently heard from Soviet visitors to American exhibitions in 
the Soviet Union. 
 A number of Soviets did get their news from Western radio on regular basis.  
These, however, appear to have been limited to university students, a small number of 
intellectuals and dissidents with the taste for news and information from the outside 
world.196   When large numbers of Soviets listened to Western radio to get the news it 
was usually “during the times of international tensions between the U.S. and USSR.”197  
 Many Soviets did tune in to foreign radio for information; however, it was music 
that consistently took the number one spot among Soviet listeners.  For decades, every 
night millions of Soviet citizens from all walks of life turned on VOA to hear Music USA, 
a jazz program hosted by Willis Conover.  At its peak, the program had an estimated 
global audience of thirty million, a large percentage of those Soviet citizens.198  There 
were reports of Soviets stopping Americans on the Red Square and passing along music 
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requests to Conover.199  One scholar of Soviet jazz called Conover “the single most 
influential ambassador of American jazz in the USSR.”200  And years later, the famous 
Canadian-American news anchor Peter Jennings wrote of Conover: “In the midst of the 
Cold War, Conover landed at the Moscow airport and was greeted by a line of generals 
who proudly showed him the medals covering their jackets.  Only underneath the medals, 
the Russians wore buttons which read Jazz USA.”201 
 A young Western tourist in Moscow in the late 1950s reported hearing jazz 
almost everywhere she went: “They [Soviets] listened religiously every evening to the 
Voice of America jazz hour,” she wrote.202  When asked by a British journalist about 
where he got his music in the early 1960s, a young Soviet engineer replied: “From the 
'Voice of America,' of course.  It's the favorite music of most young people today.”203  
Other Western tourists reported hearing of Soviets listening to American music on 
foreign radio as far away as Barnaul, on the border with Kazakhstan.204  According to 
historian Sergei Zhuk, however, by the 1970s the situation changed.  “For the new 
generation of rock music of rock music consumers, the first and most popular source of 
rock was not foreign radio stations such as the Voice of America or the BBC.  Instead, 
most developed their first taste and enthusiasm for this new music on the dance floors in 
their schools, in offices, or at private parties,” he concluded from his study of Ukrainian 
city of Dnepropetrovsk.205   
 The Soviet fascination with jazz appears to have started with stiliagi, a group of 
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Soviet young people, usually but not always rich, who tried to imitate Western culture.206  
It, however, quickly caught on with the rest of Soviet population, especially the youth.  A 
late 1960s, survey from industrial city of Sverdlovsk, found that 70% of those in the 18-
19 age group “prefer jazz to all other types of music.”207  A later 1983 survey noted that: 
“Even young workers who with their more traditional tastes have to be less captivated by 
Western music ascribed a score of 4.5 (on a 5-point scale) to jazz, whereas folk music got 
a 4.0 and opera 3.4.”208   
 Much like the news, most of the time listening to American music on VOA did 
not make one turn against the Soviet state.  In his study of Soviet rock and roll culture 
Timothy Ryback stressed that “By the mid-1950s, it was not simply the iconoclastic 
stiliagi who were indulging in decadent Western music.  Loyal and industrious socialist 
men and women, the models of the socialist upbringing, not only danced to but also 
publicly defended the “ape culture” coming from the West.”209  He pointed out an 
example of a 1957 letter to a newspaper by a young Soviet factory worker who had 
“driven cattle”, “rebuilt mines” for the Soviet state, and was a dedicated Communist.  In 
his free time he admitted liking to dance to swing music, as did a lot of his friends, and he 
saw nothing wrong with that.210    
 Sergei Zhuk came to similar conclusion when he pointed out that the vast 
majority of Dnepropetrovsk (Ukraine) youth who listened to Western radio was 
“interested in new music, popular culture, and fashion – not in politics.”211   Soviet youth 
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was simply too tired of political topics from both sides.  According to one USIA report 
from 1962 young Soviet listeners of Western broadcasts did not seem to differentiate 
between the types and themes of political programs, they simply “switch stations.”212  An 
American scholar who spend some time among Soviet students in the early 1960s made a 
similar observation: “I found that often what interested them [Soviet students] most were 
not the political stories, regrettably, but the news of Western culture, technology, sports, 
and other general non-political news items.”213  
 In fact, most Soviets listened to Western music because domestic radio did not 
meet their entertainment demands.  As early as 1947, American embassy staff noted, 
“Russian people are starved for humor, bright music, folk songs and any form of 
entertainment which offers an escape from grim reality of daily existence.”214  While 
most Soviets probably did not consider their daily existence grim, they did expect options 
when it came time to relax. The options the government provided, which were designed 
first of all to conform to official goals of self-improvement and building Socialism, were 
simply deficient as forms of relaxation.  One Soviet author recalled listening to VOA jazz 
program because he “needed relief from the strictures of our minutely controlled 
everyday lives, of the five-year plans, of historical materialism.”215 
 There is substantial evidence that many Soviets listened to Western radio, be it 
news or music, because domestic programs failed to address their needs.216  In one telling 
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case from the late 1940s, one Soviet person tuned in to VOA simply to understand what 
was meant by “formalist” music that was frequently denounced by the Soviet mass media 
at the time.217  Two letters from the late 1970s further highlighted Soviet people’s 
frustrations with domestic media.  One, addressed to Literaturnaya Gazeta, talked about 
the need to improve Soviet mass media, especially in regard to domestic affairs.  The 
author complained that too many young people listened to foreign radio.  If we improve 
Soviet mass media “then there will be fewer people wanting to listen to various Voices,” 
he wrote.218  The other letter, sent to Izvestiia, asked the question: “Why are we forced to 
get information about the Soviet Union from foreign radio?”219  In fact, the number of 
Soviet listeners to Western radio decreased by as much as twenty percent in the early 
years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika (1985-1987) when Soviet media became more 
open and less censored by the government.220 
 These numbers support several conclusions about Western broadcasts in the 
Soviet Union.  First, the Soviet government did not actually succeed in intimidating 
people who wanted to listen to foreign radio broadcasts.  If it was only government 
intimidation keeping people away, then when Gorbachev released the holds on it, the 
number of listeners should have increased dramatically.  Second, when Soviet media 
became less propagandized, with fuller consideration of issues and criticism of the Soviet 
Union, and had broader entertainment value (with greater importation of foreign music 
and film), then ordinary Soviets found domestic media to be sufficient to satisfy their 
interest.  
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 In assessing the credibility of Western radio, Soviet listeners largely focused on 
their treatment of the Soviet Union.  The harsher the criticism of the Soviet Union in the 
broadcast the more likely it was to be labeled as less reliable.  Already in 1950, the 
American embassy reported some informants choosing BBC over VOA because the 
former was less aggressive in their treatment of the Soviet Union.221   A 1956 note from a 
British Embassy to the American State Department mentioned a visit to the Soviet Union 
by a well-known Soviet expert, Louis Fischer.  After talking to a number of Soviet people 
over his month long stay, Fischer found that most Soviets preferred BBC to VOA 
because VOA’s broadcasts “reek of propaganda.”222  A 1957 USIA report also suggested 
that Soviet listeners found VOA more entertaining but BBC more objective when it came 
to news coverage.223  The same report ranked Radio Liberty, the most aggressive station 
in its criticism of the Soviet Union, last in perceived objectivity.224  Even Harvard study 
participants, many of whom had negative views of the Soviet Union, admitted that BBC 
had more effective news programs because “BBC often does not use severe criticism, its 
broadcasts do not try to impose their views.”225  
 In the end it appears that the vast majority of Soviet listeners of Western radio 
tuned in not because of strong opposition to the regime, but because of frustration with 
the amount of information and entertainment available to them. One Soviet citizen was 
not too far off when in the late 1950s he told an American friend: “no matter what we 
think of regime, we are patriots.”226  Those who did use information from Western radio 
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to criticize the Soviet Union did so mostly in relation to economic rather than political 
issues.   
   For the most part, Western radio did not turn Soviet citizens into dissidents or 
rebels.227  People unhappy with the Soviet system for political reasons developed these 
views not because of VOA or RL, but instead turned to them in order to further solidify 
their opposition to the Soviet government.  One overview of the 1960’s generation, for 
example, stressed that the choice of radio program was simply a form of social self-
identification, with loyalists listening to Maiak and non-conformists to Voice of 
America.228  Alexei Yurchak’s study of the last Soviet generation produced similar 
results where he asserted that most of the Soviet youth who listened to Western radio and 
dressed in Western fashions still saw themselves as loyal Soviet citizens.229  However, 
forcing authorities to account for information and entertainment Soviet citizens got from 
Western broadcasts was one way in which Western radio made a major impact.   
 Overall, a 1962 USIA report described Soviet listenership of Western radio best 
when it concluded: 
[The Soviet listener] does not regard his own curiosity about the non-Soviet world as 
disloyalty to Communism.  So when he tunes in the Voice of America his motivation is 
not primarily political.  More likely, he listens because of willingness to experiment and 
boredom with the Soviet media.230  
 
                                                        
227 There were rare exceptions.  For example, a pair of Soviet pilots defected to the American zone in 
Germany in October, 1948 claiming they did so after hearing a VOA broadcast about a Virginia State Fair a 
few years before.  Eventually one of the pilots returned to the Soviet Union voluntarily after getting 
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 Radio was neither the first nor the only way for America to present its case to the 
Soviet people.  While radio attracted a much bigger audience, American magazines also 
played an important role in providing Soviets with images and information not coming 
from official Soviet sources.  Unlike radio, magazines allowed the Soviet reader to not 
just imagine but actually see America.  This, along with the high quality design and 
production that exceeded most Soviet counterparts, made American magazines extremely 
popular with the Soviet people. 
 Most of my discussion of American magazines in the Soviet Union will center 
around Amerika, a magazine published by the American government and intended for 
distribution in the Soviet Union.  Amerika, while the most popular among the Soviets, 
was not the only American magazine available in the Soviet Union.  Foreigners and black 
market entrepreneurs smuggled magazines such as Time, Vogue, Good Housekeeping, 
Life, Playboy, and others, into the Soviet Union on a regular basis.  Therefore, Soviet 
people had a chance to look and react not just to Amerika that represented images and 
stories selected by American government officials, but also to material designed for the 
American reader. 
 In the next pages I will argue that the Soviet public responded to American 
magazines much in the same way as they did to Western radio.  Soviet people, starved for 
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quality entertainment231 went wild for pretty, colorful pictures of American houses, cars, 
movie stars, and fashion models.  I note a similar phenomenon in the chapter on 
American exhibitions with Soviet visitors’ reactions to American gift bags and pins.   
 Even more than radio that also dealt with news and politics, American/Western232 
magazines filled the entertainment void in Soviet consumer culture.  Indeed, a few Soviet 
intellectuals and students did read magazines such as Time for news and political 
analysis.  However, the vast majority of those who went to great lengths and paid lots of 
money to get their hands on an American magazine did so not because of news, but 
because they wanted to see something different, something pretty, and something new.  
In other words, they sought to see the world outside of the Soviet Union. 
 In addition, I argue that Soviet people used these magazines as status symbols 
because they signaled one’s position in Soviet society.  Due to shortages of high quality 
consumer goods, Soviet society saw more value in social connections over more “direct” 
symbols of wealth (such as money).  As a result, one’s ability to obtain rare and desirable 
commodity such as American magazines elevated one’s social status.   Therefore, as we 
saw in the chapter about American exhibitions, Soviet people exerted a lot of effort to 
obtain any American item, including American magazines. 
 Furthermore, I will show that one’s possession and readership of 
American/Western magazines did not identify as, or make, a person hostile to the Soviet 
government.  For the most part, those loyal to the Soviet regime saw nothing wrong with 
                                                        
231 The term “quality entertainment” does not lend itself to be easily defined.  For the sake of clarity, here I 
define “quality entertainment” as things that satisfied aesthetic (colorful) and curiosity (something new) 
needs of the wider Soviet public.  A few examples include pictures of American cars and latest fashions, as 
well as stories about African Americans and American Indians.      
232 There appears to have been little difference in the way Soviets reacted to American as opposed to other 
Western (mostly from Western Europe) magazines.  Therefore, I will use the terms American and Western 
interchangeably.  However, when talking about consumer products, especially starting in the late 1970s, 
one must also include Japan under the term Western. 
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their desire for, or possession of, American goods including American magazines.  
However, American magazines did help to solidify average Soviet’s view of America as 
a country of immense wealth and power, if only for the rich.  
 In 1944, the U.S. State Department published the first run of the magazine 
Amerika meant for distribution in the Soviet Union, still America’s ally at the time.  With 
the onset of the Cold War, Amerika remained as the only officially sanctioned American 
magazine for sale in the Soviet Union.  Originally, the magazine intended to provide the 
Soviet reader with a multi-faceted view of American life.  As relations between two 
nations degenerated following the war, some in the U.S. State Department sought to turn 
the magazine into a propaganda tool, similar to the planned Voice of America.   
 It quickly became apparent, however, that the magazine was poorly equipped for 
such a mission.  Already in 1946 American ambassador Harriman wrote to the Secretary 
of State that Amerika was “primarily a cultural project.”233  He explained that “While 
there is no doubt that those Russians, who see it, are tremendously impressed by it as a 
symbol of progressive American technics and culture, it does not and cannot act as a 
medium for presenting American point of view on immediate national and international 
events.”234  He pointed out that Soviet censorship delays would make any news obsolete 
by the time they reached the Soviet reader via printed material.235  The State Department 
agreed, and throughout its existence Amerika remained largely a picture of American life 
for the Soviet audience. 
 The Soviet public developed a strong interest in Amerika from the very beginning.  
In the above-mentioned telegram American ambassador Harriman wrote: “[Amerika’s] 
                                                        




influence far exceeding its limited 10,000 circulation” and “is a great success.”236  A year 
later, when hearing of possible funding cuts the new ambassador Walter Smith defended 
the magazine in a telegram to the State Department saying:  
we could have a subscription list of a quarter of a million if Soviet Govt would allow us 
to do so. It would be a tragedy if this one sure source of information to Soviet people on 
life in America were discontinued. Confidentially, I can tell you, that single shoots of this 
magazine are sold on black market for price of average magazine in US..237 
 
 Despite the recent launching of the VOA and feared budget cuts, Amerika 
survived.  Moreover, several months later, in an agreement with the Soviet government, 
the number of magazines distributed in the Soviet Union increased five-fold to fifty 
thousand.  Tensions over Soviet attempts to limit Amerika’s distribution in the Soviet 
Union saw the magazine canceled in the early 1950s.  However, as the Cold War tensions 
eased in the mid-1950s, Amerika came back from the dead.  In 1956, the new agreement 
between the two countries called for distribution of fifty thousand Amerikas in the Soviet 
Union (distributed in eighty four cities) and fifty thousand SSSR magazines in the United 
States.238 
 In its content Amerika continued its focus on showing American life in the best 
possible light.  It was no secret that the Soviet economy struggled to provide its 
consumers with high-quality and attractive products.  Consequently, Amerika devoted the 
most energy in exploiting this weakness.  It did so by allocating a large portion of its 
content to pictures and stories about the latest consumer products available to the 
American public.  To underscore its point, the State Department printed the magazine on 
high quality glossy paper and used high-resolution photographs and graphics--something 
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the Soviet people did not see in domestic magazines. 
 In large part based on articles taken from magazines such as Harpers, Life, 
Saturday Evening Post, and Vogue, Amerika’s first comeback issue in 1956 featured life 
of average American people, efficient and large scale agriculture, industrial 
achievements, latest fashions, and cars.  Knowing Soviet problems in the area, cars 
received particular attention on the magazine’s pages.  First 1956 issue included a large 
article with the title “1956 Automobiles: This year about six million Americans will 
choose a car from a large assortment of models.”239  In addition, the article featured 
numerous colorful high quality pictures of various car models.   
 Cars were not the only consumer items featured in the magazine.  Almost every 
issue included articles about the newest kitchens, telephones, and clothing fashions.  In a 
typical example, one article told a story of a large American family shopping for a big 
house, including pictures and information (including price) about the houses they looked 
at.240  The magazine also responded to Soviet claims that only the rich could afford to 
live comfortably in the U.S. by publishing articles about affordability of consumer 
products such as a large article about an array of inexpensive furniture on sale in 
American furniture stores.241  Clearly, one of magazine’s main goals was to impress the 
Soviet consumer with the diversity of consumer goods available to the average American 
citizen, thus highlighting the superiority of the American system in satisfying its citizens’ 
desire for a more comfortable life.  
 Along with a heavy focus on consumer products, Amerika sought to show the 
U.S. as a country of high technological achievements in all spheres of life.  Almost every 
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issue saw articles dealing with achievement in areas of medicine,242 construction,243 mass 
communication,244 space exploration,245 agriculture,246 and manufacturing.247  Again, the 
choice of article themes was not coincidental.  Plainly, they correlated with major areas 
of emphasis of Soviet propaganda that admitted shortcomings in sphere consumer 
products yet stressed Soviet superiority in all of the above-mentioned fields.  Therefore, 
Amerika put a lot of energy in attempting to show the Soviet people that the U.S. was 
excelled not only in standard of living for ordinary people, but in the same spheres in 
which the Soviet Union claimed leadership.     
 Countering Soviet propaganda about America was another one of magazine’s 
goals.  The Soviet media devoted a lot of time and effort to depict America as a country 
of a few extravagantly rich individuals while the rest of the people as overworked and 
poor.  Therefore, almost every issue of Amerika allocated space to describing and 
showing that American workers were well paid and had plenty of time for rest and 
relaxation.  One such article titled “Robert Forrester has lots of work and good pay” 
profiled an airplane factory worker.248  The article focused on his family life, showing the 
wife using a modern kitchen and the newest ironing machine as well as a brand new 
family TV. 
 Racial and gender inequality always featured prominently in official Soviet 
portrayal of America.  And Amerika sought to refute these perceptions with a variety of 
stories about African-Americans and women in American society.  Surprisingly, early 
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issues mentioned African-Americans only in relation to music or sport, precisely the kind 
of thing mentioned by Soviet propaganda.  For example, one of the biggest issues dealing 
with African-Americans in 1956 did so only in relation to the Melbourne Olympics.  By 
the early 1960s, however, the magazine’s editors began to publish different types of 
articles, which focused not only on music and sport, but showing the progress and 
achievements of African-Americans in other areas of American life since the days of 
slavery.249 
 From the very first issues, in an attempt to counter Soviet claims that American 
women were second-class citizens,250 Amerika featured articles about American 
workingwomen.  A large number of articles did profile women as homemakers, however, 
there were also frequent stories of women in the workplace.  For instance, a 1962 issue 
highlighted careers of five women who worked for NASA.251 
 By the early 1960s, Amerika assumed a more aggressive stance in its portrayal of 
American life.  Along with the usual colorful pictures of American consumer products 
and technological achievements, Amerika now featured a number of articles about 
American political and social systems.  One article described in detail American labor 
unions and their progress in bettering the lives of American workers.252  Another 
discussed JFK’s fight with major U.S. steel producers against hikes in steel prices.253   
Continuing in the same manner, several early 1960s issues featured a long discussion of 
private property and social good as well as freedom of opinion and the progressive 
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intellectual climate.254  While stronger worded and dealing with more controversial and 
complex subjects, these articles continued a previous trend.  In showing American unions 
improving worker lives, American president fighting with big business, and private 
property bringing social benefits, Amerika once again responded to Soviet propaganda 
about the U.S.  that depicted American unions and the American political system as 
helpless slaves of big business and private property as causing widespread social 
injustice.            
 Soviet authorities treated Amerika as a tool of American propaganda from the 
very beginning of U.S.-Soviet tensions following World War II.  Considering the fact that 
distribution of Amerika in the Soviet Union was authorized by high-level official 
agreements between two countries, Soviet officials had to resort to covert means in 
limiting its circulation.  Government hostility was already evident in 1946, during 
discussions about increasing the number of Amerika magazines shipped to the Soviet 
Union to fifty thousand.  A secret memo from the Soviet Propaganda Department to the 
Central Committee, suggested that the magazine be distributed only in major urban 
centers and only among trusted individuals.  Furthermore, the memo recommended that 
only ten of fifty thousand copies be made available, in spite of the fact that the Soviet 
government was to take a loss of almost two million rubles since it would have to 
purchase the remaining forty thousand with state funds.255 
 In 1947, an American embassy official managed to get a first-hand look at Soviet 
distribution policies during his visit to several Soviet cities.  In his report to the embassy, 
he noted that cities such as Gorkii, Baku, Ordzhonikidze, and Tbilisi received copies of 
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Amerika.  These, however, were only available through “special party channels” and only 
to a handful of “leaders of the workers.”  When questioned by the American official, 
Soviet authorities replied that this was simply a “logical distribution policy for desirable 
commodities in short supply” and was not intended to “lessen effectiveness of 
magazine.”256  Subsequent checks by American officials and visitors to the Soviet Union 
several years later, discovered “complete absence of Amerika mag[azine] on sale at local 
outlets comparable with those which display the magazine for sale in Moscow.”257  In 
further efforts to impede Amerika’s circulation, Soiuzpechat’ the Soviet agency 
responsible for distribution of Amerika, regularly delayed payments for the magazine 
claiming the magazine simply did not sell well among the Soviet public.258   Moreover, 
there were reports of harassment of people found to be reading the magazine.259   
 Blatant attempts to limit the magazine’s distribution by Soviet officials caused 
serious diplomatic friction with the American embassy.  In 1947, because of Soviet 
attempts to limit Amerika’s distribution, U.S. stopped circulation of Information Bulletin 
distributed by the Soviet embassy in Washington.260    By 1950, after several telegrams of 
protest over the Soviet handling of Amerika, the American ambassador wrote a long note 
to the State Department.  He questioned “whether it is worthwhile attempting to continue 
[the] magazine in [the] face of apparent Soviet intention to effectually prevent it being 
read.”261  Furthermore, he suggested that “In view of expense and improbability Amerika 
will reach any appreciable number of Soviet readers, we doubt it is in our interest to 
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continue and feel timely cessation… [is] considerably preferable to gradual 
strangulation.”262  The State Department, however, did not agree with the ambassador’s 
assessment, viewing the magazine as an important part of the American effort to reach 
out to Soviet people.  In his reply, the Secretary of State stressed that “Abandonment of 
this effort, on U.S. initiative might be interpreted as surrender in our efforts for peace.”263  
 Along with limiting the distribution and circulation of Amerika in the Soviet 
Union, Soviet authorities turned to mass media and party propaganda organs in order to 
undermine the magazine in the eyes of Soviet readers.  Already in 1947, the Soviet 
magazine Culture and Life published a long article about Amerika.  The article, titled 
“Catalog of Noisy Advertisement” accused the magazine of deliberately glossing over the 
true nature of American society where “workers [are] oppressed, Okies wander homeless, 
Indians discriminated against and the Negro is lynched”.264  Instead, stressed the article, 
Amerika simply showed a made-up reality produced by the capitalist PR machine.265  
Continuing in a similar trend, the popular satirical magazine Krokodil featured a 1949 
cartoon called THE DISCOVERY OF “AMERIKA”.  It showed a poor black family 
talking to each other while reading the magazine Amerika with the caption: “See why it’s 
so important to keep up with the magazines!  I would never have guessed that we 
Negroes led so happy a life.”266 
 The official Soviet critique of Amerika and other American magazines remained 
largely the same into the late Soviet period.  It emphasized that most of what readers saw 
in American magazines was simply window-dressing that lacked any real substance.  
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However, it became a little subtler considering that the Soviet people had a lot more 
exposure to America since the 1940s.  A New York Times journalist stationed in Moscow 
in the late 1970s attended a lecture by a Soviet journalist who just returned from a trip to 
America.  During the lecture, the Soviet journalist shared details of his trip with a group 
of Soviet students:   
I must say that American life, as well as its nature, is beautiful, especially in one looks at 
it in such magazines as Amerika, Newsweek, Time, and others.  But when you look at it 
more closely, it doesn’t smell.  There is no more than beauty.  There is none of that 
coziness, that goodness, and trust of one another, which can be observed on the other 
side, in the socialist camp….267 
  
 When the magazine returned to the Soviet Union in 1956 after a four-year 
absence, the official view and reaction to the magazine remained largely the same even 
under the new Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev.  This is clearly evident in a draft letter 
to Party organizations written by the Soviet propaganda department and sent to the 
Central Committee for approval in preparation for Amerika once again being made 
available in the Soviet Union.  The draft letter stressed that Americans will use the 
magazine as propaganda to promote the so-called “American way of life,” unrestrained 
praise for American “achievements” in economic and cultural spheres, especially 
production of consumer goods, etc…  The publishers of Amerika, continued the letter, 
will try to show that the people in the U.S., including the workers, are living better than 
Soviet people.  Selection of facts and materials in this magazine will be thematic and one-
sided, and advantageous to the ruling circles in the U.S.      
 The letter suggested that local Party organs (obkom, kraikom, etc) make every 
effort to help press institutions to establish correct procedures in distribution of Amerika.  
Specifically, magazine subscriptions should be done in a way where subscriptions go to 
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“politically literate” and “ideologically reliable” individuals.  The letter also 
recommended that subscriptions take place not in post-offices but through factory and 
enterprise press distributors.   During the retail sale of the magazine, it should not be sold 
in kiosks that are near crowded places (bazaars, parks, railroad stations), but distributed 
to kiosks in factories, enterprises, theaters, central streets and only in limited quantities.  
There is no reason to try to sell all of the magazines noted the letter, because in 
agreement with the U.S., it was possible to return up to half of the unsold magazines to 
the publisher.  Furthermore, it stressed that Party organizations must ensure that there is 
no unhealthy environment and panic around the sale of the magazine. 
 Some of the magazines will end up in the hands of politically unstable and 
politically inexperienced people, and there might be unwanted conversations centered on 
materials from the magazine, warned the letter.  In order to neutralize effect of Amerika, 
the Central Committee instructed Party organizations to organize correct counter 
propaganda.  To ensure that the local press, radio, lectures and discussions exposed the 
true nature of “American way of life” and “American democracy.”  In addition, local 
authorities were to counter, without mentioning Amerika directly, figures and materials 
published in the magazine.   “Our propaganda must show that the real ‘American way of 
life’ is far from what is portrayed in Amerika”, noted the letter.268  
 The Central Committee approved the letter.  Although it questioned the wording 
as being overly strong and “fear inducing,” especially in sections dealing with the 
possible negative effects the magazine might have on “politically illiterate” individuals.  
Overall, however, the official Soviet view of Amerika as an instrument of American 
propaganda, one that distorted the truth and had to be contained and countered, remained 
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unchanged. 
 Besides limited distribution, Soviet authorities resorted to more direct methods.  
A 1965 KGB note reported confiscating nineteen hundred of the two thousand “free 
distribution”269 copies of Amerika.   “Trusted” institutions such as the Ministry of 
Culture, received the remaining hundred copies.270  
 Amerika, it must be noted, was not the only American magazine deemed harmful 
by Soviet authorities.  From the start of the Cold War and into the late Soviet period, 
Soviet officials regularly scrutinized and confiscated other American magazines brought 
into the Soviet Union, even ones meant for internal consumption in the U.S.  Western 
tourists reported Soviet border guards scrutinizing and confiscating copies of Time and 
Good Housekeeping magazines in the 1950s and 1960s.271  A KGB memo from 1970s 
also revealed that authorities regularly confiscated copies of Time magazine, smuggled in 
mostly by Asian and African students, from Soviet university students.  However, 
officials confiscated only those editions determined to contain anti-Soviet propaganda, or 
of anti-Soviet character such as pornography.272  At times border guards commandeered 
foreign magazines for their own benefit.273       
 Despite, or possibly because of, official hostility to Amerika and other American 
magazines, they remained hugely popular with the Soviet public.  Already in 1947, 
representatives from the Soviet printing department responsible for selling of the 
magazine complained that demand far exceeded supply.  “Tell Moscow we want more 
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copies of your magazine down here,” said one official from a provincial Soviet town to a 
member of the American embassy staff.274  Several others requested ten, and even 
thousands more the amount that they were getting.275  A number of Soviet citizens wrote 
letters to members of the Politburo complaining that Amerika enjoyed widespread 
popularity among Soviet people.276  
 The situation changed little once the magazine reappeared in 1956.  Due to high 
demand, copies of Amerika were still nearly impossible to obtain even when they were 
available to the general public.277  Some Soviets reported standing in line from early in 
the morning and still not able to purchase the magazine.278  The magazine was one of the 
most requested items at American exhibitions that toured the Soviet Union in 1960s and 
1970s.279  At times, Soviet visitors asked American exhibition guides to request that the 
American government purchase more Soviet Life magazines so as to have more copies of 
Amerika distributed in the Soviet Union.280  At one exhibition, two Soviet girls told an 
American guide that they once followed a drunk home because they saw him carrying a 
copy of Amerika, hoping he would drop it along the way.  Unfortunately for them he 
never did.281   
 For the most part, a majority of the copies went to officials of various Soviet 
ministries, with only a few available to the general public.  As a result, “the journal 
became a much cherished commodity on the growing black market.”282  There were 
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reports of the magazine fetching American style prices, a luxury few average Soviets 
could afford.283 
 Amerika’s, as well as other American and Western magazines', popularity with 
the Soviet people, rested not so much in the content but in the presentation.  When 
Soviets mentioned Western magazines it was almost always in relation to their aesthetic 
qualities.  When in 1947 American officials asked a Soviet journalist his opinion of 
Amerika he noted the “the fine paper, the color pictures, the typography, everything about 
the publication struck him as being “first class.”284  Even Western tourists complimented 
the physical quality of the magazine.  Once told of Amerika’s immense popularity, a 
young Irish woman who visited the Soviet Union in the late 1950s commented: “I could 
see why, if only because it was something beautiful in a world of shoddy production.” 285   
 For a lot of Soviets, Western magazines, with their vibrant colors and high quality 
paper served as a sort of window into the mythical West.  These had a particular effect on 
the younger Soviet generation that wanted a better, more comfortable, more colorful life.  
Unable to realize these dreams in the Soviet Union they projected them onto America, a 
country most knew only from distant rumors, radio, films, and magazines.  The America 
they imagined in their minds sprang into life from the colorful photos of shiny American 
cars and beautiful supermodels wearing the latest fashions featured on pages of 
Amerika.286  Andrea Lee, an American student who lived in Moscow for ten months in 
the late 1970s noted that her friends, a young Soviet couple, spent many hours looking 
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through her Good Housekeeping magazines,287 probably imagining themselves living in 
American homes and using American appliances.  
 Soviet young people, limited in their choice of status and identity symbols,288 
often decorated their rooms or workspace with cutouts from Western magazines, much 
like American undergraduates would decorate their dorm-rooms with posters of their 
favorite bands, films and sex symbols.   Andrea Lee described a room of her Soviet 
guide: “the walls of his small green cubicle are decorated, almost papered, with liquor 
and automobile advertisements cut carefully from the American magazines Grigorii has 
received as presents from other foreign acquaintances.”289  In addition, she noted his 
fascination with underwear ads in her copies of Vogue.290  In talking about the younger 
generation’s desire to separate themselves, Michael Binyon, a New York Times Russian 
correspondent in the late 1970s to early 1980s, noted: 
Whereas the middle-aged careerists look back to the disciplined days when they proudly 
pinned up their class photographs, their sports trophies and Komsomol awards, today’s 
28-year-old gives pride of place in his room to a centerfold from an old edition of 
Playboy.291 
  
 Furthermore, while the evidence is limited, it does appear that when something in 
American magazines challenged imagined America, people simply refused to believe it.   
An American tourist riding in a train compartment with a Soviet general recalled reading 
a Life magazine with an ad showing American woodsmen riding floating logs with bare 
feet, when the general saw the ad “[he] thought this barefoot business was too primitive.  
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He couldn’t believe that the United States did not have some more modern method.”292  
In another example, a guide with an American exhibition in the late 1970s reported that 
after looking at Ebony magazine, Soviet visitors absolutely refused to believe that there 
were middle-class African-Americans.293 
 Much like listening to Western radio did not indicate one’s anti-Soviet tendencies, 
or make one rebel against the state, the same was true of Western magazines.  In fact, 
people at the highest levels of the government subscribed and read Western magazines.  
In a 1958 note to the Central Committee, the Soviet ministry of literature (Glavlit) 
reported that a number of Soviet officials subscribed to Western magazines that had little 
to do with their day-to-day operations.  The note added that proliferation of these 
magazines is responsible for dissemination of anti-Soviet views.  However, a look at the 
list of magazines provided in the Glavlit report reveals a different picture and pointed to 
the fact that starved of high quality consumer decorative items, Soviets sought 
American/Western magazines for esthetic and recreational purposes, again plugging the 
hole left by the low level of domestic publishing.  Therefore, the vast majority of 
magazines on the list were of the entertainment variety such as sports, outdoor recreation, 
film, celebrity, and fashion.  Only a handful could be considered political publications.  
Furthermore, Glavlit complained that professional journals constituted a tiny fraction of 
overall subscriptions.294  This was not a new phenomenon.  Looking at the 1946 list of 
magazine subscriptions from the Soviet Radio Committee one finds magazines such as 
National Geographic, Life, Collier’s, Time and many others that had little connection to 
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radio.295 
 The fact that a number of highly-placed Soviet officials, including assistant 
ministers, openly approved and even requested these magazines shows that this was done 
for other reasons besides ideological purposes.  It also showed that even high members of 
the Soviet government saw no discrepancies between their loyalty to the Soviet state and 
their readership of foreign magazines.  An American journalist for the New York Times 
noted a similar phenomenon where Soviet people managed to reconcile their patriotism 
with their love of Western consumer products.  In one example, he told a story of a 
Soviet woman who married an American and was subsequently vilified by her 
nationalistic neighbors as a traitor to her country.   At the same time, the same neighbors 
“shamelessly acquired every possible electronic or wearable item from the West…  They 
talked about these goods constantly and seemed to see no inconsistency between their 
material and social views.”296  In another case, an informer for the KGB and a loyal 
Soviet citizen decorated his room almost exclusively with pictures taken out of Western 




 Along with radio and newsprint, American movies were another source of 
unofficial information about the United States available to Soviet audiences.  However, 
unlike American radio broadcasts, out of reach for Soviet authorities, and American 
magazines (although Amerika was constrained by certain bilateral agreements on 
content), movies, at least the ones shown officially, faced heavy censorship.  One must 
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keep this fact in mind when talking about the impact of American movies on Soviet 
audiences.   
 The very fact that the Soviet government chose which American movies to screen 
constituted heavy censorship in itself, especially after the start of the Cold War.  Not 
wanting to portray the United States in a positive light, Soviets selected movies for pure 
entertainment value, or ones demonstrating the negative aspects of America.298  
Furthermore, movies’ subtitles and titles were often changed in order to align them with 
the official statement about America.299  For example, the 1939 classic gangster film The 
Roaring Twenties became The Fate of a Soldier in America on Soviet screens.300 
 Before relations between the two nations soured following World War II, Soviet 
audiences saw a number of Hollywood films during the war.  Entertainment films such as 
the Western Stagecoach (1939) starring John Wayne and those highlighting the wartime 
alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (North Star (1943), Mission to Moscow 
(1943), Song of Russia (1944)) made up the majority (there were around twenty movies 
and two Disney cartoons) of the types of Hollywood films available to the Soviet public.  
Writing about the influence of American movies on the Soviet Union during World War 
II, Sergei Kapterev pointed out that while these movies   “constituted typical Hollywood 
entertainment…. [they] still had a momentous impact upon Soviet life.”301  Alan Ball 
noted similar effects by American movies on Soviet audiences in the 1920s.302   Working 
in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, New York Times correspondent Harrison Salisbury 
remembered: “The questions I got about the U.S.A. were about the movies (No. 1 topic 
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by far – they wanted to know what has happened to Deanna Durbin, Bing Crosby, Shirley 
Temple, and Charlie Chaplin),” 303 American actors familiar to the Soviet public from 
wartime films.  Interestingly, some Soviets also found it ironic that “Soviet villages, 
towns, and homes” portrayed in American movies of the time “seemed fantastically 
luxurious” by Soviet standards.304  
 A stock of trophy films captured by the Soviet Army in Germany during the war 
made up the first wave of American movies to hit post-war Soviet Union.  By far, the 
most popular of the American trophy films with Soviet audiences was a collection of 
Tarzan movies following adventures of a man raised by apes in the heart of African 
jungle, starting American Johnny Weissmuller, ironically an actor of German ethnicity.  
The Soviet public did not see the Tarzan films until 1952.  They were, however, shown 
regularly at Stalin’s private screenings in the Kremlin.  While criticizing them in public, 
Stalin reportedly enjoyed the films, and saw each one of them.305  Finally, in February 
1952, after much deliberation and negotiation, Soviet authorities allowed Tarzan movies 
(trophy copies as well as those acquired from the U.S. in trade agreements) to be 
screened in the Soviet Union.306  In order to ensure the correct ideological interpretation 
among the Soviet population, the first movie featured a preface noting that Tarzan was 
raised by monkeys and therefore was primitively innocent in his political outlook –his 
first brush with capitalist culture coming during his encounter with American explorer 
party.307   
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 Immediately after appearing on the Soviet movie screens, American ape-man 
became a major sensation.  Overall, around 120 million Soviets saw the first three Tarzan 
movies308 - a staggering number, considering the total Soviet population of 200 million.   
Many foreigners visiting the Soviet Union in the 1950s noted Tarzan’s popularity with 
the Soviet public.309  Harrison Salisbury, writing about living in Moscow in 1954, 
described Soviet fascination with Tarzan: 
Children often sat through a whole day’s showing in a movie house.  Nine and ten 
performances per picture was a common score.  And everyone from baby to babushka 
was delighted and charmed by Tarzan.  Many a taxi driver and even schoolchildren asked 
me whether Tarzan really lived.310  
 
Around the same time, another American visitor to the Soviet Union wrote:  
 
Many Russians tell one with a great air of superiority that the Tarzan pictures are only for 
children or are nye kulturni [literally meaning “not cultured.”  An equivalent of “trashy”.]  
But the reason that they speak with such authority is that just about every Russian who 
has had the opportunity has gone to see the so-called nye kulturni Tarzan films.311 
 
 Soviet youngsters were especially affected by the Tarzan craze.312  Tarzan style 
haircuts were all the rage and it was not uncommon to hear boys address passing girls on 
the street as Jane, Tarzan’s female partner in the movies.313  Postcards featuring 
Weissmuller, illegally smuggled into the Soviet Union were a popular item on the black-
market.314  The Nobel prize winning Soviet poet Joseph Brodsky wrote that “one series of 
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Tarzans did more for de-Stalinization than all of Khrushchev’s speeches.”315  Therefore, 
it was not long before Soviet authorities began to worry about the influence of Tarzan on 
Soviet youth and launched a campaign denouncing these harmful imitations.316 
 What accounted for Tarzan’s, as well as most other American movies’ popularity 
with the Soviet public?  The post-war years were ones of extreme hardship for the Soviet 
people.  The war destroyed not only houses and factories, but also families and people’s 
physical and mental health.  Those hoping for improvement after the war were to be 
greatly disappointed as the country struggled to rebuild.317  Tarzan’s light-hearted 
adventures, and high-quality Hollywood production, was exactly what the Soviets needed 
to escape the struggles of their everyday lives.318  The Soviet young people, in particular, 
many deprived of their parents and a chance to be children by the war saw an opportunity 
to recapture some of that lost youth through Tarzan.  As Sergei Kapterev put it “people 
desperately needed distractions; and in its usual manner, Hollywood was to bring them its 
well-tested medicine—albeit without getting anything in exchange.”319 
 Soviet authorities showed many of the captured German, Italian, and British 
movies directly to the Soviet public by playing them in public movie theaters.  Given the 
growing post-war tensions between the Soviet Union and the U.S. captured American 
movies (these accounted for roughly 43% of the total) were first screened at the so-called 
“Movie House” (Dom Kino), a private movie theater for members of the film industry 
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union.  The initial showing of fifty some American movies proved a smashing success.320  
The magnitude of success, however, attracted official attention and Movie House 
showings became a target of the press that accused the movie theater of exposing Soviet 
people to “tasteless Western films” despite availability of quality Soviet features.321  In 
1947, in another example, Mikhail Suslov, head of the Soviet Ideology and Propaganda 
Department complained to Andrei Zhdanov the man in charge of Soviet cultural policy 
about unhealthy obsession with foreign films in certain Soviet organizations.  
Specifically, he pointed to officials in All-Union Society for Cultural Ties with Foreign 
Countries who sought contact with foreign diplomats, in this case American, in order to 
obtain foreign films.322  The same year, satirical magazine Krokodil, noted that 
Americans were trying to infect Europe with the “red scare,” but not to fear, Americans 
also promised an antidote summed up by the slogan: “American movies are the best 
defense against communism.”323        
 So why, in spite of the quickly escalating Cold War and denunciations in the 
press, did the Soviet government allow many of these movies to be shown in public?  
Much like many other industries, the war had a major effect on Soviet movie production.  
A lot of film studios had been destroyed by the war and they did not feature prominently 
in the post-war rebuilding effort.  As a result, between 1946 and 1953, the Soviet movie 
industry made a total of 124 true feature films,324 a far cry from hundreds of movies 
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produced annually in pre-war years.325  Noting the immense popularity of the first few 
trophy films among the Soviet moviegoers, authorities saw their chance.  Here was an 
opportunity to provide a much-needed escape for the war-weary country and at the same 
time help the beleaguered native film industry without having to use any more of the 
already thinly spread resources.  Moreover, some of these funds could be used on other 
vital projects.  As a result, concerns about the ideological content of these movies were 
put on hold, trumped by the country’s need for post-war reconstruction funds. 
 A 1947 case file from the Communist Party Central Committee’s document 
collection helps illustrate the point.  The file deals with the 1944 German musical The 
Woman of My Dreams (Die Frau meiner Träume) that had been shown in Soviet movie 
theaters with great success.  A Soviet citizen wrote a letter to the Central Committee 
complaining that the movie was offensive to those raised on communist morals.  In 
rebuttal, Soviet film officials stated that the movie was bringing in a lot of money that 
could be used to rebuild Soviet film industry instead of using scarce hard currency on 
purchasing films from abroad.326  While the movie in question is German, the logic 
applied to all of the trophy films including American ones, which constituted a majority.  
Writing about post-war American trophy films in the Soviet Union, Sergei Kapterev 
concluded:  
The Soviet regime was using American films…to obtain money needed for the implementation of 
its grand projects, to satisfy the population’s hunger for light entertainment, and to restore its 
psyche, shattered by war. This time, however, it was not ready to pay for the products it was 
using—the fact that they turned up in the USSR seemed to be fully justified by its contribution to 
the war effort.327  
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 Did the success of many American movies among post-war Soviet audiences 
signal their affinity for the country and its culture?  Cold War film historian Tony Shaw 
thought so when he wrote: “Indeed, given the popularity of American trophy films, it 
might be argued that moviegoers were the segment of the population most likely to 
admire Americans and American culture.”328  Shaw’s statement cannot be discounted 
outright, but it is problematic.  As Shaw himself pointed out in talking about the 
popularity of Soviet post-war anti-American films: “The Cold War films’ popularity does 
not necessarily imply that Soviet moviegoers were particularly anti-American.  By the 
standards of Soviet cinema, these were first-rate pictures, with invariable high production 
standards.”329  So if the popularity of anti-American films did not signify anti-American 
attitudes among the Soviets than why did the popularity of American films point to 
admiration for American culture?  As noted above, German pictures were also quite 
popular but it is highly doubtful that Soviets held much admiration for German culture at 
that time.   
 Taking into account success of other foreign movies, the above noted German The 
Woman of My Dreams for example, as well as some of the Soviet movies, a more likely 
explanation is that Soviet audiences simply would have watched any quality 
entertainment movie regardless of its country of origin.  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
large numbers of Soviet moviegoers began to admire America after watching American 
movies.  That is not to say that these movies did not solidify certain perceptions, many 
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positive, about America that already existed in the minds of many Soviets from the 
countries’ wartime alliance.330 
 American trophy films continued to account for the bulk of American movies 
playing in the Soviet Union for the next decade.   This changed in the mid-1950s, when 
the Soviet Union bought a number of American movies, and the U.S. acquired a number 
of Soviet films as part of the deal.331  As before, the Soviet choice of American pictures 
focused on two major categories: ideology (movies critical of certain aspects of American 
life) and entertainment.  Films such as Salt of the Earth (1954) dealing with labor and 
racial issues represent the former category, and the romantic comedy Roman Holiday 
(1953) the latter.   
 However, the popularity of films produced in capitalist countries quickly drew 
attention from the top.  In December 1960, Cultural department of the Central Committee 
(otdel kul’tury TsK KPSS) sent several notes to the Central Committee criticizing 
repertoire of Soviet movie theaters. The notes complained that too many Soviet theaters 
showed foreign movies, especially those of capitalist countries: 
Movies from capitalist countries received an unreasonable share of our box office.  As a 
result, the Soviet viewer’s attention is fixated on themes and ideas distant from our 
ideological goals and at times contrary to them.332  
 
Officials noted that movie theaters reserved the most popular night showings for foreign 
movies, ignoring many quality Soviet titles.  Moreover, Soviet theaters reproduced 
foreign movies in different formats, making them suitable for showing in almost all 
Soviet theaters, urban and rural.  Among other capitalist movies, American films received 
particular attention.  Roman Holiday was consistently used as an example of 
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ideologically harmful movie (without stating specific reasons) that attracted large 
numbers of Soviet viewers.  In the end, the notes recommended limiting the number of 
capitalist movies played on Soviet screens.333 
 In addition, the Department of Culture criticized the method of selecting movies 
to be acquired from abroad.  It stressed that there were too few people involved in the 
selection process, and too many ideologically harmful movies getting through as a result.  
Along with several other foreign pictures, the note pointed to the American films Gigi 
(1958) and Apartment (1960) as movies that glamorized “adulterous adventures of 
spoiled bourgeoisie.”334       
   As with the post-war movies, the financial situation was the primary driving force 
behind large numbers of Soviet theaters showing foreign movies.335  Soviet movie 
theaters had to fulfill a certain government dictated plan, and much like the rest of Soviet 
industry, fulfillment of the plan took precedence over most other considerations, because 
jobs and bonuses depended on it.  Therefore, it was the plan that dictated the types of 
movies shown on the screen.  Soviet movie theater managers simply screened movies that 
would be the most popular with the movie going public, thus bringing in the most 
revenue and assuring fulfillment of the plan. 
 Despite some apprehension, Soviet officials, not wanting to lose a sizable revenue 
stream, continued releasing American movies in the Soviet Union well into the 1960s. 
Even months after Soviet downing of the American U2 spy plane, 63 out of 103 Moscow 
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movie theaters still showed American movies.336   In fact, one of these movies went on to 
become one of the most popular in the history of Soviet box office.   
 Released on Soviet screens in 1962, the American western The Magnificent Seven 
(1960), an adaptation of Akira Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai (1954), took the country by 
storm.  Featuring lots of high action gunfights, it told a story of a group of American 
cowboys who teamed up to save a Mexican village from marauding bandits.  The 
movie’s popularity with Soviet people, particularly the Soviet youth, was such that at 
times it was shown in stadiums – Soviet theaters unable to meet the demand.337   
 Yul Brynner, the star of the movie, who incidentally was born in the Russian city 
of Vladivostok and immigrated to the United States in 1940 via China and France, 
became an icon for Soviet children of all ages.  They imitated his walk, his style, his way 
of talking, and anything else they could think of.  As a result, “Shaven heads became the 
high fashion of the day, jeans were desperately sought after, and the lines from the movie 
provided an endless source for cryptic passwords between the initiated.”338   
 The movie’s popularity caught the Soviet authorities off guard.  When they 
bought the license to show the movie in the Soviet Union, they had no idea that American 
cowboys would so quickly replace Soviet heroes among scores of Soviet youngsters.  
And it did not take long for the Soviet government to strike back. One Soviet movie critic 
wrote the following: 
One must look a little deeper into events on screen in order to understand that all the glitz 
in the form of circus stunts and pyrotechnics hides something much more 
                                                        
336 Hixson, 223. 
337 Sergei Lavrentyev, “Red Westerns – A Short History,” in Red Westerns: The communist answer to the 
American Western.  Booklet.  Rotterdam International Film Festival.  2011. pp.5 Available at 
www.crossingeurope.at/uploads/tx.../Red_Westerns.Booklet.pdf  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
338 Moscow News interview with Rock Brynner (Yul Brynner’s son).  Available at 
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1160528/posts. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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substantial…This is a film with a fake bottom.  The sweet stuff on top, with sourness 
hidden a bit deeper… 
And therein lies the second layer of the film.  Apparently, noble aspirations and unselfish 
bravery are only inherent to American cowboys, these knights without fear and reproach.  
If not for them who would save Mexican villagers from devastating raids?...  
This professionally produced film-fairytale, however, does not correspond with known 
facts… 
It is true, in America there is no shortage of cutthroats who expertly use hot [guns] and 
cold [knives, swords…etc] weapons.  Is it not from their midst that they recruit hired 
assassins who commit sabotage against revolutionary Cuba, ignite war in Congo and 
Vietnam, and terrorize Taiwan… 
Glaring contradictions surround the made-up legends about kind Americans who rush to 
help nations in trouble.339   
 
Another critic, writing in the Soviet film magazine Sovetskii Ekran, stated: 
 
Try to remember how many people were killed by the “brave seven” during the film.  
You will not succeed.  The counting would be too complex and take too much time.  
With incredible ease the heroes shoot their Colts left and right.  For them it is nothing to 
shoot some man for no reason, just in case.  While watching these never-ending fights 
and shoot-outs…one becomes fearful for the young boys in the theater.  [Any] 
production, willingly or unwillingly propagating violence and murder, is spiritually 
foreign to us.340     
 
Even Khrushchev himself weighed in.  In an interview with American reporters he 
remarked:   
 
I saw the movie The Magnificent Seven.  The acting is great.  We screened this movie 
and received many reprimands.  Many teachers responded on the pages of our press.  A 
critical article called “Seven receives a Two” [referring to Soviet grading system where 
two equals a D] was published.  It noted that the movie has a negative influence on our 
youth.  I agree with the teachers.  In America such movies are everywhere, where people 
hit each other in the face, torture and kill each other.  There is a lot of perversion.  In your 
country this is deemed as entertaining.  In ours, dissemination of such things is deemed 
harmful…341 
 
 What bothered the Soviet leadership was not necessarily the fact that Soviet 
children imitated violence.  Soviet children stores always had large numbers of toy 
handguns, machine guns, tanks, fighter planes, etc available for sale and were quite 
popular with Soviet boys.  Soviet literary heroes such as Alexander Dumas’ Three 
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Musketeers killed as many if not more people than the Magnificent Seven, and for lesser 
reasons.  What really bothered authorities was the source of imitation - American 
cowboys, with emphasis on the former.  Even the 1964 movie Lemonade Joe, a Czech a 
parody of an American Western, was quickly banned by Soviet censors “who decided 
that Soviet viewers missed the parody.”342  If the cowboys on screen came from France, 
Italy, or Sweden, it is doubtful that they would have faced as much criticism as cowboys 
from the Soviet Union’s main Cold War rival, especially coming on the heels of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.    
 Tarzan was also made in America, but the character’s origins lay in the African 
jungle.  The Magnificent Seven heroes were quintessentially American.  Soviet 
ideologists could hardly spin their on-screen actions into a positive narrative.  These 
cowboys saved the Mexican villagers from wicked banditos instead of some greedy 
factory owner or exploitive plantation boss, something that could have be presented as 
class warfare.  The movie glamorized the primal fabric of American society, in a way 
legitimizing contemporary America and American way of life, areas of particular concern 
for Soviet officials tasked with portraying America as a country sitting on a rotten 
foundation of greed and exploitation. 
  It is therefore even more remarkable that the movie continued its run in the 
Soviet Union for a number of years, signaling the primacy of financial considerations 
over any misgivings over ideological content.  That is not to say that Soviet authorities 
gave up on trying to dull what they saw as the movie’s more harmful effects.  Besides the 
critique in the press, Soviet officials altered attendance numbers, making them appear 
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lower, and finally canceled the film all together in 1966, almost a year before its Soviet 
license was due to expire.343   
 The movie’s influence on the Soviet film industry, however, continued for years 
to come.  Less than a year after the Magnificent Seven ended its run in Soviet theaters, the 
Soviet public was introduced to a homegrown version of the American cowboy.  
Although not the first Soviet Western,344 Elusive Avengers [Neulovimye Mstiteli], 
produced by Moscow studio Mosfilm and released in 1967, featured many of the high 
paced horse and gun action of American Westerns, yet with a much more palatable 
ideological message.  Here, the main heroes helped the communist Red Army against the 
monarchist White Army in the Russian Civil War.   
 The movie’s success at the Soviet box office suggests that the Soviet moviegoers 
were not so much captivated by the Americanness of the Magnificent Seven as by its 
entertainment value, something not provided by the Soviet movie industry at the time.345  
Tony Shaw made a similar observation about the popularity of anti-American movies in 
the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, noting that it was not the ideological message that 
brought people to the theaters but high quality of production.346            
 Of course not all of the Soviet people got swept up in the Western craze.  As 
noted earlier, to a large extent these movies appealed to a younger Soviet generation.  
There is some evidence that those Soviets who truly believed information from official 
sources saw American movies through a prism provided by the government-controlled 
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media. May 1968 issue of popular Soviet magazine Ogonek, featured a letter from a 
factory worker titled “Poisonous cine-food” [Iadovitaia kino-pisha].  In the letter, the 
author claimed that majority of foreign movies, including The Magnificent Seven, 
provided Soviet youth with terrible role models of violence and debauchery, which many 
of them imitated.347  Subsequent issues of the magazine published a variety of reader 
responses to the letter.  While a number of readers agreed with the letter, many others, 
primarily younger ones, defended themselves as conscious members of Soviet society 
who were able to think for themselves and who would not go out and commit murder 
after watching a foreign adventure film.348    
 In another example, in a 1978 letter to Komunist, an official ideological magazine 
of the Soviet Communist Party, one Soviet reader complained about the numerous “bad” 
American movies playing in Soviet theaters.  His chief complaint was the fact that they 
often showed American Indians getting killed by the hundreds, often in gruesome 
ways.349  The sentiment closely resembled official media portrayal of American Indians 
as victims of genocidal policies of the American government.    
 Throughout 1960s, 1970s, and into the late 1980s, Soviet people continued 
watching American movies with great interest.  Besides officially sanctioned hits such as 
Some Like It Hot (1959), Mackenna’s Gold (1969), and Tootsie (1982) many copies of 
other, those not approved by official censors, made their way into closed theaters of 
various unions and government agencies.  Therefore, those privileged enough to have 
access saw a much wider variety of American movies.  American literature professor Jay 
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Martin, visiting the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, wrote about a conversation with one 
Soviet intellectual: 
He wanted to know all about the costumes in Chinatown – were they wonderful?  And 
the special effects in The Towering Inferno.  And had I seen Deep Throat? – all 
Americans had been to see that movie, hadn’t they?  And The Godfather, Part Two – he 
had read the reviews.  Did it really show that the Mafia were the heroes of America?350 
 
 VCR technology that gained mass appeal in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
introduced American movies, among others, to a much broader section of the Soviet 
public.  The size and low cost (as compared to movie projectors) of the VCR equipment 
made it possible to reproduce and watch movies in one’s apartment.  In turn, this 
technological advancement caused problems for Soviet authorities trying to control the 
flow of information into the country.  In a 1982 note to the Central Committee, KGB 
head Yuri Andropov reported that there had been an increase in underground showings of 
foreign video films, dubbed into Russian, copied and either resold or rented.  In a three-
month period the KGB arrested seven people in various cities and confiscated 22 color 
TVs, 20 VCRs, 5 video cameras, and 397 videotapes.  The report noted that foreign and 
Soviet citizens brought them into the Soviet Union as contraband, along with instances 
where Arab and Yugoslav diplomats smuggled them into the country.351     
 Andropov’s report classified the movies as having pornographic and ideologically 
harmful content that promoted violence, sadism, moral laxity, and had a corrupting 
influence on Soviet public.  It went on to state that gathered information pointed to the 
fact that the enemy [that is, the United States] actively and purposely used this form of 
ideological sabotage against the Soviet Union, trying to indoctrinate some segments of 
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Soviet population with certain attributes of Western lifestyle.352  Clearly, KGB and Soviet 
leaders, who approved the report, saw unauthorized foreign movies, many of them 
American, as a weapon employed by its Cold War adversaries. 
 As we have seen, from the end of World War II, Soviet authorities tried to strike a 
delicate balance between the large financial rewards brought in by American movies and 
the perceived ideological damage to the Soviet public.  Their concern, however, was 
exaggerated.  Soviet people who watched American movies did not suddenly turn into 
fanatical admirers of America or the capitalist social system.  Most remained loyal Soviet 
citizens, and imitation of American cowboys or disco moves from Saturday Night Fever 
(1977)353 by Soviet young people did not translate into large-scale opposition to the 
Soviet government.  
That is not to say that these movies did not have some kind of effect on the Soviet 
people.  As Yale Richmond noted: 
From foreign films Soviet audiences learned that people in the West did not have to stand 
in long lines to purchase food, they did not live in communal apartments, they dressed 
fashionably, owned cars, and lived the normal life so sought by Russians. 
Soviet audiences were not so much listening to the sound tracks or reading subtitles as 
watching people in the films--how they lived in their homes, the clothes they wore, and 
the cars they drove. And when refrigerators were opened in Western films, they were 
always full of food.354 
 
In other words, Soviet audiences focused on the things that they did not have at home, 
consumer goods, entertainment, and living space being the primary focus.  For example, 
American movie Marty (1955) was very popular with Soviet audiences.  The Soviets 
particularly enjoyed parts 
 
when Marty’s girl tells her mother that she doesn’t think in-laws should live with their 
married children.  Intense interest was shown in the modest Bronx kitchen of Marty’s 
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home, the bar and lunchrooms he frequented, the elevated trains in the Bronx, the lively 
music at the dance-hall.355  
 
In another example, instead of focusing on the ideological message about the capitalist 
society’s greed in It’s A Mad Mad Mad Mad Mad World (1963), Soviet people instead 
admired American superhighways shown in the movie.356 
 In the same way that fighting through Western Europe during World War II 
opened up Soviet soldiers to consumer and other accomplishments of the non-communist 
Europe, American movies, along with other unofficial information, did the same for 
Soviet viewers of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.  Soviets might have thought of the United 
States as full of crime and inequality but there was no denying that America had more 
consumer goods and better roads.  And as the World War II spirit of sacrifice moved 
further into the past, Soviet people demanded more from their government, in part using 
what they saw in American movies as a benchmark.    
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 As I have previously mentioned, Soviet sources regarding public perceptions and 
reactions to the United States are often limited and therefore provide an incomplete 
picture of the topic.  Fortunately, the archives of the United States Information Agency 
(USIA), located at the National Archives in College Park, MD, contain a wealth of 
information on Soviet public reactions to the U.S.  Throughout the Cold War, USIA, 
created in the mid-1950s to promote U.S. national interests abroad, hosted a number of 
exhibitions in the Soviet Union.  USIA exhibitions covered areas from agriculture to 
plastics, from sports equipment to space exploration.  While these exhibitions served to 
promote a positive and often sterilized image of America in the Soviet Union, they also 
functioned as a barometer of Soviet public opinion toward the United States.1   
As we will see, for Soviet citizens, American exhibitions in the Soviet Union were not so 
much a “window to the West,” although this played a significant role, but rather served as 
a mirror in which Soviet people viewed themselves.   
 More so, they wanted to know what others saw in the mirror.  Did Americans see 
Soviets in the same way that Soviets saw themselves?  And did they like what they saw?  
In short, through American exhibitions, Soviet people sought to understand the world 
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outside of their own country and find themselves within it.   Otherwise, they knew this 
world largely through the heavily-filtered information the Soviet government provided, 
but they suspected that was not the whole picture.  Finally, here was a chance to see if 
what they have been told about the Soviet Union and the outside world was true. 
 In talking about the American exhibition program, some scholars have concluded 
that it had a deep and long lasting impact on Soviet citizens by successfully promoting 
American consumer culture.2  Some even credit the program with having a role in ending 
the Cold War.3   In studying the 1959 Moscow Exhibition, others pointed out that it came 
up short of its intended goals of turning Soviet people onto an American life style.4  This 
chapter will show that subsequent exhibitions of the 1960s and 1970s, while having some 
success, did not have the intended effect on the Soviet public.  It will argue that despite 
some mistrust of the official mass media, the Soviet people largely adhered to the picture 
of America presented in official sources.  
 A number of USIA staff that organized exhibitions in the Soviet Union also 
collected and recorded reactions of Soviet citizens attending these exhibitions.  Entries 
from Comment Books, voluntary questionnaires, and recollections from their interactions 
with Soviet citizens by American exhibition guides reveal unguarded reactions on the 
part of Soviet citizens.  A lot of the comments in comment books, both positive and 
negative, were anonymous, and thus most likely reflected the real thinking of ordinary 
Soviets.  However, sometimes KGB agents planted comments in exhibition comment 
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books. 5  Therefore we have to be careful in assessing some of the more negative 
comments. In many cases, these responses were organized and printed in forms of 
research reports.  In general, research reports dealt with questions such as who came to 
the exhibition and why they attended, as well as visitor reactions to the exhibit 
specifically, and America generally.  Therefore, USIA research reports offer an 
invaluable opportunity to glimpse into Soviet public reactions to America.   
 Of course, these reports offer only a partial picture of Soviet perceptions of 
America.  In some cases, Soviet authorities restricted visitors to the exhibits to 
individuals they deemed reliable.  Moreover, depending on the category of exhibition, 
only a specific type (determined by profession) of a person was represented.  
Furthermore, visitors knew that the KGB maintained surveillance over the exhibit, and 
that could have affected how honest they were in their comments.  However, frequent 
comments voiced good will towards Americans, and at times American way of life, 
although these tended to be anonymous while many others contained at least some 
information about the author(s).  This suggests that in general people were not too 
intimidated by the prospect of getting into trouble with Soviet authorities.  Furthermore, 
Soviet citizens had become accustomed to voicing their complaints through comment 
books since the 1920s and they knew that people did not get in trouble for writing critical 
comments.6  Despite these limitations, USIA exhibition research reports offer a wide-
ranging sample of Soviet public reactions simply by their number (exhibitions averaged 
ten to twenty thousand people a day) and diversity, both in content and location.   
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 I will use the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow (the first major 
American exhibition in the Soviet Union) as a starting point and a template of analysis 
and will discuss this exhibition as a whole.  The 1959 exhibition was unique; it was larger 
(2.7 million Soviets saw the exhibit) and more significant, as evidenced by the presence 
of the American vice-president Richard Nixon, than those that followed.  Later 
exhibitions will be broken down and analyzed as parts of separate category.  Also, 
because the goal of the exhibits and the tenor of Soviet reactions did not change through 
the mid-1980s, the exhibitions over the space of 2 1/2 decades can be analyzed as a unit.    
 Looking at the 1959 exhibition as well as Soviet responses to America from later 
exhibitions, the chapter will address questions such as:  What issues figured most 
prominently in Soviet reactions to America? Did the exhibits change the opinions visitors 
held of America?    
  
1959 Exhibition in Moscow 
  
 The 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow was perhaps one of the most 
famous of all American exhibitions in the Soviet Union.  It was the first time average 
Soviet citizens came face to face with American way of life and American people in form 
of exhibition guides.  The Moscow exhibition was part of a cultural exchange between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, with Soviets organizing an exhibition in New 
York earlier in the year.  American vice-president Richard Nixon opened the exhibition, 
highlighting its importance.   Consumer products were the main focal point of the 
exhibition.  And the model American kitchen became the site of the famous Nixon-
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Khrushchev “Kitchen Debates” (see Illustration 13) where the two discussed the merits of 
capitalist and communist systems.7   
 
 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev debates American Vice-President Richard Nixon 
during the 1959 American Exhibition in Moscow (Illustration 13)8 
 
 The post-exhibition USIA report analyzed 924 questions asked by the Soviet 
public.  The report based its analysis on questions that came from RAMAC (an IBM 
computer designed to answer over three thousand questions about America), questions 
posed to American exhibition guides, as well as questions asked of American travelers to 
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8 Original photo curtesy of http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2009632334/.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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the Soviet Union.9  Analysis found that over 60% of all questions focused on six topics: 
living conditions, American awareness of the USSR, technology (especially consumer 
technology), education, music (especially jazz), freedoms and ideals.10  More hostile 
questions accounted for 13% of all questions.  These largely dealt with topics of: 
unemployment, the “Negro problem,” and [American] bases around the USSR (U.S. 
military installations).11  
 The report concluded that in their interests about America, Soviet citizens were 
quite similar to other foreign audiences.  Much like other foreigners, Soviet people were 
most interested in how an average American lives, how much money he earns and what 
that money is spent on.  Soviet public showed little interest in American religion and in 
most expressions of American culture.  According to the report, Soviet audience was no 
more preoccupied with negative images of America (racism, unemployment) than were 
the Western European audiences.12 
 Other features, specific to Soviet audience, included lack of interest in important 
international events such as the Berlin crisis (the USIA report attributed this to “42 years 
of Communist indoctrination and censorship”), as well as political and enterprise freedom 
(although there was strong curiosity about freedom of access to information and to 
travel).  On the other hand Soviets expressed strong interest in what Americans and the 
rest of the world thought about the Soviet Union (“They want to be liked”), on how much 
Americans earned and how much things cost, and American technology.  The report 
noted that interest in technology was not so much technical but rather on how technology 
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12 Ibid. 
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related to consumers (automobiles, washing machines).  In other words, Soviet people 
looked at American technology as a child would look at a new and shiny toy, and were 
disappointed that there were not more of them; they evinced little interest in the science 
that lay behind the objects.13  
 Living conditions in America received the most interest from the Soviet audience.  
The most popular questions were, “How much are wages? How much is needed to live? 
Does every worker have a car? Can one buy land in the U.S.?”14  According to the report, 
this was not simple curiosity but rather a sign of frustration with everyday life in the 
Soviet Union, especially the consumer goods situation.   
 Given acute shortages of consumer goods such as cars, washing machines, stylish 
clothes, and many others, the Soviet people viewed the United States as the land of 
plenty.  Lacking reliable information about the West, Soviet people amplified this myth, 
imagining Americans to be much wealthier than they really were.  The exhibition, 
therefore, served as testing ground for the myth, where Soviets could finally hope to see 
whether indeed every American had a car.  But even more, as the USIA report put it, “It 
was as if the question uppermost in many visitors’ minds was ‘How would I be living (in 
material terms) if I were in America?’”  In other words, Soviet visitors were actively 
comparing an American chimera with their own reality. The report also noted, however, 
that while questions about living conditions in America were more frequent in the Soviet 
Union, this was a world-wide phenomenon.15  
 American awareness of the Soviet Union was the second most common theme in 
Soviet questions at the exhibition.  Some of the more typical included, “Which Russian 
                                                        
13 Ibid, p.ii-iii. 
14 Ibid, p. 1. 
15 Ibid. 
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composers are the most popular in the U.S.?  What Russian writers are known in 
America?  How many people are studying Russian in the States and why?  How do you 
like Moscow?”  While the USIA report was unsure as to the underlying reasons for such 
questions, Ronald Hingley, an expert in Russian literature, suggested that conversations 
with foreigners cause a conflict “between Russians’ outward self-confidence and inner 
uncertainty.”  As part of his evidence he uses the notes of the prominent French writer 
Andre Gide who, after his 1936 trip to the Soviet Union, wrote:  
It is not so much understanding of, it is recognition by, the West that Russian crave. 
Though they do take some interest in what is happening in foreign parts.  They are far 
more concerned about what the foreigner thinks of them.  What really interest them is to 
know whether we admire them enough.  What they are afraid of is that we should be ill-
informed as to their merits.  What they want from us is not information but praise.16  
 
This is further evidenced by some anonymous questions written on pieces of paper and 
passed to American guides during the exhibition.  These included questions such as, 
“What is your impression of as to how well the Soviet people are informed as to what 
does on in America? Is it true that we paid you on Lend Lease? How much?”17  
 In addition to perennial anxiety about Russian inferiority to the West, such 
questions also reflected Soviets wanting to understand their standing in the wider world, 
as little information of this sort was available to them.  This frustration with lack of 
outside information and inability “to see for themselves” was evidenced again in the 
anonymous questions. These included things such as, “Why do Soviet agencies not 
permit wide travel of Soviet citizens to the U.S.A.? I would like to see all with my own 
eyes?”18  Interestingly, this question is not a question at all.  Why would American 
exhibition guides have better insight as to why Soviet agencies do not allow more Soviet 
                                                        
16 Quoted in Ronald Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977), 145. 
17 NA P142/1/15 p.3-4. 
18 Ibid. 
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people to travel to the U.S.?  In fact, this question/statement was a simple voicing of 
irritation with the Soviet system, perhaps hoping that Soviet authorities would read them. 
 The topic of technology and science elicited frequent questions such as, “Has U.S. 
medicine discovered any drugs successful in the treatment of cancer? What development 
first made possible miniaturization of mass-produced radio sets? How many satellites has 
the U.S. fired successfully?”  According to the report, what the Soviet visitors were most 
interested in was not technology itself, but rather how that technology could be applied to 
daily life (see Illustration 14).  Consequently, the USIA report suggested that more 
consumer-oriented technology be included in future exhibitions.19  As with the questions 
about living conditions in America, Soviet interest in consumer technology reflected not 
only curiosity about America but also a commentary on the Soviet system that failed to 
provide adequately for people’s consumer demands. 
                                                        
19 Ibid, p.5-6. 
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Soviet visitors checking out American TVs at the 1959 American Exhibition in 
Moscow  (Illustration 14)20 
 
 Just as questions about American living conditions and consumer goods reflected 
Soviet deficiency in those spheres, questions regarding American education signaled 
Soviet pride in their own accomplishments in the area.  “Can workers’ children go to 
college?”  “What sort of fellowships do you have?  How much is average?” “Is education 
free in the U.S.?” “How do students pay for education?”21  These, the more common 
questions about American education system (the second most popular topic), showed 
Soviet people’s desire to verify what they had been told for years by domestic 
propaganda—namely, that education in America was only available to the rich.  In 
                                                        
20 Photo courtesy of http://publicdomainclip-art.blogspot.com/2010/05/television-sets-at-american-
national.html.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
21 Ibid, 35. 
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addition, it showed pride that the Soviet Union was able to provide free quality education 
to all.  The assumption of superiority in this realm had been further reinforced by recent 
Soviet achievements in area of space exploration. 
 American music, particularly jazz and rock and roll, ranked high among Soviet 
interests about America.  USIA noted that in large part, this interest was fueled by 
“Music USA” a popular Voice of America (VOA) broadcast run by Willis Conover.  In 
fact, Willis Conover “would be considered one of the big names of the decade by the 
majority of Soviet youth. His programs have an enormous following,” wrote one 
American exhibition guide in a letter back home.22  At one point, American Newsweek 
magazine ran an article about an American who was stopped on the Red Square and 
asked if he could pass some music requests to Conover.23  Furthermore, interest in 
American music was “not confined to excitement-loving younger generation” but ran 
across various age and social groups.24  
 American culture and other forms of American music, such as classical, received 
little interest from Soviet audiences.  One exception was exhibition of American abstract 
art.  It evoked both strong positive and negative feelings, but mainly a sense of confusion 
from the Soviet people, who asked “What explains the impulse towards abstract paintings 
and sculpture in Europe and the U.S.?” “What is abstract painting as practiced by 
American artists?”  “Is the work of contemporary artists in the U.S. intelligible to the 
general public?”  “What do the pictures mean?  What do they say?” “Do Americans 
                                                        
22 Interviews with former exhibition guides conducted by the State Department. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110892.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
23 RGANI f. 5 o. 33 d. 95 l. 44. 
24 NA P142/1/15 p.7-8.  I discuss this further in my chapters on unofficial information and Soviet youth. 
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really understand abstract art?”25  It appears that in their responses to American art, 
Soviets received their cue from official statements on the subject, considering that 
popular comments closely resembled those of Nikita Khrushchev, who described one of 
the American abstract paintings at the exhibit as if  “a little boy pissed on the canvas. ”26  
 Soviet attitudes towards the American system of government pointed to the fact 
that what the Soviet people were most interested in was not America as a country, but 
how America related to the Soviet Union in areas Soviets deemed themselves deficient – 
salary, access to consumer goods and freedom of movement.  According to USIA, the 
subject of American freedoms, American politics and American foreign policy received 
little attention from Soviet visitors.  The two exceptions were freedom to travel and 
freedom of access to information.  “Are there really no passports for traveling within the 
United States?”  “Are the works of Marx and Lenin available in the U.S.?” were some of 
the most popular questions on the topic.27  On the other hand, questions regarding 
American salaries, American prices, and availability of living space consistently ranked 
at the top of Soviet questions.28  
 Since the Soviet government restricted both travel and information, the Soviet 
people wanted to see how this aspect of their own system compared to others, in this case 
America.  “In many minds [of Soviet visitors] the question might have been “You boast 
                                                        
25 Ibid, 44-45. 
26 Interview with former U.S. Embassy cultural attaché at - 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOl2imi10Q0.  Accessed April 22, 2012. Khrushchev made similar 
remarks about Soviet avant-garde artists while attending an art exhibition at Manezh Exhibition Hall in 
1962; see William Taubman, Khrushchev : the man and his era (New York : W.W. Norton, 2003), 530-
532. 
27 Ibid, p.10. 
28 Interviews with former exhibition guides conducted by the State Department. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/c26659.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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so much about your freedom, but are you actually much more free then we are?” noted 
the USIA report.29  Consequently,  
Most of the questions on communication through the press and other media (obviously a 
particularly sore subject at home) show that they have about American academic freedom 
and freedom of the press and assembly much of the ingrained skepticism that they do 
about their own.  It is often assumed, for example, that Soviet broadcasting in the U.S. is 
jammed that books on Marxism-Leninism are forbidden to the general public, and that 
when the press fails to give full coverage to Soviet news it is by government order.30  
  
 The negative, or antagonistic, comments ranked low on the most frequently asked 
questions list.  The IBM computer RAMAC, designed to answer questions about 
America, received far fewer negative comments than did the exhibition guides.  USIA 
attributed this to the fact that, in part, Soviet people wanted to see a human reaction to 
these types of questions.  “Courtesy bias” also contributed to the relatively low numbers 
of negative questions/comments.  In wishing to be good hosts and in the spirit of peaceful 
coexistence, many Soviets deliberately avoided what could be considered as rude 
questions.  The USIA report also speculated that many people asking seemingly 
accusatory questions in fact were looking for American guides to answer these questions 
in a way that would reaffirm their belief that the Soviet press distorted facts about 
America.31  This was a reasonable assumption given a general Soviet distrust of more 
sensational facts about the West in official media. 
 The types of negative questions centered around three major themes: 
unemployment, racism, and American military bases.  Not surprisingly, these topics were 
also central in official (newspapers, radio, lectures) Soviet criticism of the U.S. “How do 
the unemployed live in America?” “Why do you have unemployment?” “How many 
                                                        
29 NA P142/1/15 p.10. 
30 Ibid, 17. 
31 Ibid, p.11. 
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Negroes have been lynched in the U.S. since 1950?”  “Can Negroes and whites go to the 
same schools?” “Why does the U.S. have bases around Russia?” “Why doesn’t America 
want peace?” asked Soviet visitors.32  
 Such questions reflected not so much curiosity about America but a way of testing 
and confirming their ideas about their own country, specifically the media.  Under the 
surface of these questions, Soviet citizens were asking, “To what level is the Soviet press 
distorting the image of America?”  This was a way to reaffirm their already set ideas 
about America, and in some ways about the Soviet Union.  Many Soviet people knew 
that America was a much wealthier country, at least in terms of the standard of living.  
Due to Western radio broadcasts such as the VOA and BBC and the weakening Soviet 
censorship, Soviet people began to realize that an average American family had much 
more living space, more consumer goods, and higher wages.  As the leading Soviet-
American sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh noted,  
 
Since 1953, this situation [censorship] has changed substantially.  Even when the 
jamming of foreign radio broadcasts is in effect, a significant segment of the population 
is able to listen.  In our survey of Pravda readers in 1968, about 10 percent of the 
respondents acknowledged that they listened regularly to foreign radio broadcasts. 
 With foreign radio systematically informing the population of developments on 
the domestic and international scenes, and with the vast network of informal 
communication, it is more difficult for the leadership to ignore information from the 
West.  All propaganda dealing with major events must take into consideration how 
foreign radio broadcasts will deal with these events.33  
 
Soviet authorities took note and incorporated new realities into official propaganda.   
Thomas Robertson, one of the American exhibition guides, also noted this trend in Soviet 
treatment of the unemployment issue in America: the official Soviet news sources began 
                                                        
32 Ibid, 12-14. 
33 Shlapentokh, Soviet public opinion and ideology, 43. 
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to mention existence of unemployment benefits in the US.  Although quickly stating that 
these were not available to only a few.34  
 Thus, the Soviet mass media also acknowledged the gap in consumer products, 
but at the same time stressed that the Soviet Union had a better social safety net.  As we 
saw earlier, this was quite evident from the popularity of questions about American 
consumer culture and critical questions about poverty in America. 
 It would be inaccurate to say that the Soviet people did not believe their sources 
of official information.  In fact it appears that they did, especially in regard to 
international affairs.35  They were, however, concerned that they were not getting the 
whole picture.    
 
Exhibitions in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 
Visitor Demographics and factors influencing attendance 
 
 Exhibition attendance ranged anywhere from 3600 per day (102,450 total over 28 
days), as was the case during Agriculture: USA in Kishinev in 1978, to around 20,000 per 
day (28 days total) at same exhibit in Kiev.36  Several factors influenced attendance: 
location, theme, weather conditions, time of year, advertising, as well as the attitude of 
local authorities.  At times it was simply a matter of physical capacity.  At Agriculture: 
USA in Kiev, for example, “The walls actually started to burst out sometimes, just 
                                                        
34 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110523.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
35 Shlapentokh notes, “Surveys in the USSR show that the majority of people perceive life in the United 
States much as it is presented in the official mass media.  Yet when the issue is domestic life in the USSR, 
people are substantially more critical of official description, partly because these descriptions clash with 
their own experiences, but also because they are more emotionally involved in their everyday concerns than 
with developments in other countries,” Soviet public opinion and ideology, 120. 
36 NA P142/47/5 (cover). 
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because of the press of people,”  “I mean, we had lines out the door that were sometimes 
a mile long;”  “I will never forget that despite the difficult climate conditions, we would 
have people who would show up at six, seven o’clock in the morning and just stand in 
line until the exhibit opened at ten,” remembered several of the American guides.37   
During particularly hot and busy days a number of people fainted.38      
 The location (what city) and theme of the exhibit played an important role, as 
during the Agriculture: USA exhibit.  For instance, a significantly higher number of 
people attended the Dushanbe, Tajikistan, exhibit because it was a provincial town and it 
was the first American exhibit in the city.  The same was true of Rostov-na-Donu.39  On 
the other hand, the same exhibit in Moscow drew fewer people because of the 
exhibition’s theme, as highly urban Muscovites had little interest in agriculture.40  
 At times, local authorities tried to influence exhibitions’ attendance.  The 
authorities’ cooperation depended on the location; in provincial locales they were 
generally less helpful, and cooperation waxed and waned in relation to the current state of 
Soviet-American relations.41  At Plastics U.S.A. in Moscow in August, 1961, Soviet 
authorities went out of their way to make sure that the exhibit was a success.  
Newspapers ran positive reviews and troublemakers were quickly escorted out.42  The 
same was true of Technical Books: USA exhibit in Kiev in 1963.43 
 Along with observations of the American staff, we have some concrete evidence 
from the Russian archives dealing with the subject of local Soviet authorities and 
                                                        
37 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110528.htm, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110523.htm, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110533.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
38 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110528.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
39 NA P142/47/33. 
40 NA P142/47/7 p.5. 
41 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/c26659.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
42 NA P142/5/48 p.7. 
43 NA P142/16/160 p.1. 
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American exhibitions.  One such document includes a list of actions to be taken by 
authorities in Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) to counteract the “Photography: USA” exhibit in 
1976.  In it, Alma-Ata officials were instructed to:  
 
- Hold propaganda events focusing on the general crisis of capitalism, 
unemployment, crime, and racism.  (600 people were assigned to this task.) 
- Form a special militia to patrol the hotel and place of exhibition to maintain order. 
- Keep away people known for bad behavior – people with mental problems, easy 
women, beggars…etc 
- Make sure Americans are comfortable and well fed. 
- Schedule events for Americans during their free time, for the duration of their 
stay. 
- Have local newspapers publish more information on Soviet accomplishments – 
domestic and foreign.  
- Schedule more entertainment events in the city as well as outdoor excursions.44 
 
As we can see, the main goal was to limit interactions between Soviet people and 
American staff by occupying their time with various activities.  Furthermore, Soviet 
authorities sought to downplay and counteract any positive information about America 
that the average Soviet person might pick up at the exhibition.  In general, we see that in 
case of Alma-Ata, official instructions did not call for active or aggressive attempts to 
interfere with the exhibit or limit its attendance.      
 In other cases, however, American personnel not only received little help from 
local authorities, but at times were met with resistance.  At Agriculture: USA in Kishinev, 
in December 1978 for example, local authorities discouraged attendance of the 
exhibition.  According to some reports, workers at several factories were told not to 
attend the exhibition or write positive comments in the comment book.  Students at local 
schools were warned that exhibit was little more than anti-Soviet propaganda and a 
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majority of guides were CIA agents.45  At the same exhibit in Dushanbe (1978), volunteer 
security (druzhinniki) were rude to the visitors and did attempt to intimidate some people 
from writing in the comment book and from talking to the American guides.  Several 
visitors (those involved in long conversations with American staff or visiting the exhibit 
more than once) reported that local officials questioned them afterwards.46  
 Such methods, however, had little if any effect.  The Dushanbe exhibit, for 
example, did not see a decrease in number of visitors or in their disposition, despite 
harassment and negative local press.47  In fact, the only thing that kept the Soviets away 
from American exhibitions was when they coincided with New Year holidays--a time 
when the Russians were busy rushing around buying presents and food.48  
 At times, hostility from Soviet authorities had the opposite of the intended affect.  
During Architecture: USA in Minsk (1965), negative articles in local newspapers helped 
spread the knowledge of the exhibit.   Local officials apparently warned Soviet citizens to 
stay away from the exhibit at lectures at factories and other locales; large posters 
criticizing American foreign policies were hung up around town; and pamphlets 
depicting America in a negative light were distributed.49  Despite all this official 
discouragement, around nine thousand visitors a day came to the exhibit for the month it 
was open. 
  In general, American exhibitions received a colder reception in provincial cities.  
Along with attempts to limit attendance, there was a lot more surveillance of the 
American guides, and at times even harassment.  Some of the guides reported incidents 
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46 Ibid, p.1,4. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, p.3. 
49 NA P142/27/144 p.ii. 
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where people, presumably undercover security officials, came up to them and said things 
such as “You American imperialist. American imperialist bastards.”50  Others noticed 
heavy surveillance in places such as Tbilisi and Minsk.51  The most likely explanation for 
this phenomenon was that while Moscow and Leningrad were accustomed to receiving 
foreign visitors, almost all other Soviet cities saw very few.  Therefore, authorities were 
trying to be extra vigilant in preventing American “propaganda” from infecting virgin 
territories. 
 According to USIA report advertisements during Voice of America (VOA) 
broadcasts and word of mouth served as some of the primary ways by which Soviet 
people heard about American exhibitions.52  Mention of exhibit in the Soviet press, even 
negative ones, also spread the word about the existence of the exhibit.   
 An average exhibition saw more men than women visitors.  Some of the guides 
attributed this to the fact that Soviet women had to both work and take care of the family, 
leaving little spare time to attend exhibitions.53  Even Soviet publications of this period 
admitted to this reality, and a survey of former Soviet citizens both men and women 
agreed that Soviet women had a more difficult life in the Soviet Union.54  Regional 
differences also played a role in gender distribution.  Thus, in Dushanbe, men constituted 
a much larger proportion of visitors at the Agriculture: USA (1978) exhibit, most likely 
due to old tribal customs that were still present in Soviet Tajikistan, especially in rural 
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areas.55  In general, though, exhibit’s subject matter had the most noticeable effect on 
whether more men or women attended.   Thus Agriculture: USA exhibits consistently saw 
fewer women, regardless of location, than the Technical Books: USA, where at times 
women outnumbered men.56  In almost all cases, however, men constituted an 
overwhelming majority of those who filled out questionnaires provided by the exhibit 
staff.57  
 The type of people who attended American exhibitions varied depending on 
whether it was held in the two major cities (Moscow, Leningrad) or somewhere else.  
Almost always, exhibitions in Moscow and Leningrad drew a more refined crowd that, 
on average, was better informed and better educated.58  Other cities saw a different 
audience, such as at the Technical Books – USA exhibit in Kiev (1963), where a majority 
(around 90%) of those attending the exhibition tended to be “common people” (industrial 
and farm workers, rather than experts in technical fields).59  A few years later American 
guides noticed the same thing at a Minsk exhibition where “the audience was noticeably 
less sophisticated on the average than the audience in Leningrad.”60  As a result, 
concluded USIA report, “visitors in Minsk stuck more stubbornly to their preconceived 
notions or to propaganda about the U.S. domestic scene and foreign policies.”61  
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Why people came 
 
 
 Considering the highly specialized nature of some of the exhibits, such as the 
Plastics: USA for example, we must ask: why did so many Soviet people attend 
American exhibitions?  Based on the nature of the visitors’ questions and observations of 
American guides, with a few exceptions, Soviet visitors in the 1960s and 1970s came for 
largely the same reasons as those who attended the 1959 Moscow exhibition.  In 
particular, they came out of simple curiosity about America, and a desire to know where 
the Soviet Union stood in the larger international community and to see if what the Soviet 
press wrote about America was true.  This was especially true of the “common people” 
(industrial and farm workers, rather than experts in technical fields) who, in contrast to 
the specialists looking for concrete technical information, came largely to “see Americans 
first hand [and to] view a slice of American life and American products.”62  They also 
may have heard about souvenirs that were being distributed at the exhibitions, as will be 
discussed below.63  
 As a rule, visitor questions had little to do with the theme of the exhibit.  “[T]hey 
didn’t care about the exhibit. They mostly wanted to ask about life in the USA: What 
does you father do? What does your mother do? How much does he make? What does 
your education cost? How much will you make when you get a job? Do you have a car?” 
                                                        
62 NA P142/16/160 p.1, P142/15/119 p.1,3-5. 
63 American souvenirs were very popular with Soviet visitors as early as the 1959 exhibition where “You 
had to work with your elbows [to get] where cans with ‘USA’ written at the bottom were produced and 
given away.” Quoted in Gretchen Simms, “The 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow and the 
Soviet Artistic Reaction to the Abstract Art” ((PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2007), 114.  
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remembered one guide at Plastics: USA exhibit.64  A guide from a photography exhibit 
recalled that:  
Very quickly, step by step, the questions went from specific to the camera, or whatever 
other aspect of photography we were demonstrating, into economic questions and then 
political questions. The jump from ‘who can afford to buy this camera?’ to ‘how much 
does a kilo of meat cost?’ was usually only one step. And from there, questions about 
your personal upbringing, your background as an American was fair game, how much 
you made, how much you were being paid to be on this exhibit.65   
 
This was especially true of cities that received few foreign visitors due to their remote 
location or not being part of official tourist itineraries.  At Agriculture: USA in Dushanbe, 
for example, questions about agriculture were few and far between, usually serving as 
“ice-breakers” in order to steer the conversation towards other aspects of American life 
not related to agriculture.66  Guides at other exhibits reported similar observations.67  The 
Plastics: USA exhibit in Tbilisi in 1961 was the first American exhibition in the city and 
therefore people showed up less interested in the exhibition itself and more in making 
“first contact” with real Americans, and finding out first-hand about life in America.  As 
a result they asked the guides many more personal questions than Muscovites.68  One 
notable exception was the 1962 Medicine: USA exhibit in Moscow.  There, almost all of 
the exhibit visitors were medical professionals, a majority of whom were interested only 
in medical topics.  Therefore, questions “run between 90 and 95 percent about matters 
specifically related to or growing out of the exhibition itself and its subject matter.  
Personal queries directed at the guides have been few, relatively.  Questions about life in 
the U.S. have been even fewer,” reported USIA.69  Unlike almost all others, this exhibit 
                                                        
64 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110892.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
65 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110528.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
66 NA P142/47/33 p.8. 
67 NA P142/27/144 p.3, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110519.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
68 NA P142/6/59 p.5. 
69 NA P142/7/25 p.1. 
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showed “acceptance of the idea that it is essentially a professional medical display rather 
than a popular engagement.”70  In contrast, the same exhibit in Kiev drew far fewer 
professionals and more ordinary people who, much like visitors in other provincial towns, 
wanted to know about typical life in America.71  
 The exception of Medicine: USA in Moscow notwithstanding, the vast majority of 
American exhibitions were not simply a way of familiarizing the Soviet audience with 
various aspects of American industry, technology, or other narrow fields, but rather they 
served as important points of contact between ordinary citizens of two superpowers 
standing on opposite sides of the Cold War.  When given the opportunity, Soviet people 
were eager to know about the details of the daily lives of their rivals, and how those lives 
compared to their own existence.  Moreover, people in towns outside of Moscow and 
Leningrad saw American exhibitions as a kind of a carnival.  Lacking the leisure options 
of the big two, they tended to treat them as “public entertainments, as a kind of recreation 
in an existence comparatively barren for opportunities for amusement.”72  One American 
guide recalled talking to a man in Ufa, who brought a button and a brochure from a 
previous American exhibit, four or five years prior, and talked about it as one would 
about a time when “a circus came to town.”73    
 Soviet curiosity about America revolved primarily around the subject of 
American standard of living.  Many Soviets thought themselves behind the US in this 
area.  So they frequently asked questions about the American standard of living such as 
the number of cars an American family owns, or the size of an average American house, 
                                                        
70 Ibid, p.6. 
71 NA 142/8/45 p.2. 
72 NA 142/8/45  p.6-7. 
73 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110523.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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all signs of American wealth that the Soviet media could hardly deny.  Writing about the 
Architecture: USA (1965) exhibition in Minsk a USIA report noted that “Visitors in 
Minsk followed the usually pattern of seemingly endless enquiries about the price of 
butter in the U.S., the average wage, and how much one can buy for a dollar, how much 
does a car cost, how much rent do you pay for an apartment, and so forth.”74 
Furthermore, in private conversations, a majority of visitors tended to admit that Soviet 
standard of living lagged behind that of America.  However, most of them attributed that 
to recent devastation from World War II than to any flaw in the Soviet system.75  
 The question of “Is it really like that?” came up over and over again, at the 1979 
Agriculture: USA exhibit in Moscow, when visitors wanted to talk about the American 
standard of living.  Many Soviet visitors thought of Americans as being rather well off, 
despite official Soviet portrayal of the U.S. as a country with a small and ultra-wealthy 
elite oppressing half-starved masses.  A majority of the questions about American 
standard of living revolved around issues most faced by the Soviets in their own daily 
lives.   Many asked about housing, a major problem in the Soviet capital.  How much 
living space does an average American have?  How much does it cost to buy/rent a house 
or an apartment?  What are American houses/apartments like?  As in other places, many 
Muscovites asked about prices of various consumer goods, a constant concern for the 
average Soviet citizen.76  For the most part, Muscovites took a largely objective view of 
American life, as a USIA report observed: 
there were individuals at both extremes- those who idealized conditions in the U.S., and 
those who painted American life in the grimmest colors.  But the mass of people seemed 
able to take a relatively balanced view, appreciating to some extent the generally high 
                                                        
74 NA P142/27/144 p.12. 
75 NA P142/5/32 p.18. 
76 NA P142/47/7 p.22-23. 
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standard of living in American society but recognizing that the American system and way 
of life has its disadvantages and virtues.77  
 
In short, Soviet questions about America reflected issues that were central to their lives in 
the Soviet Union.  Through these questions, Soviets seem to be wondering how they 
personally would live as Americans.  
 At the same time, they expressed reservations when told about the existence of 
various American social safety nets such as social security and medical insurance.  
Official Soviet propaganda taught that while a small percentage of Americans were 
wealthy, the rest were poor and had few options to safeguard themselves from 
exploitation by the rich.78  
 While most Soviets agreed that certain consumer goods were cheaper and more 
accessible in America, they still preferred the Soviet system with free education, medical 
care and subsidized housing.  Many envisioned America as a frightening place with 
criminals taking over cities at night and unemployed dying on the streets.  In short, they 
preferred their more structured and secure lives in the Soviet Union.79  “On a few 
occasions, visitors even asserted, “We would prefer to have a lower standard of living 
and full employment than to have cars and refrigerators – and joblessness.”80  All of this 
tends to confirm that majority of the Soviet population largely believed the image of 
America painted in the Soviet mass media. American exhibition guides confirmed this 
general tendency, when they noticed that many Soviet visitors asked questions that were 
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78 NA P142/15/119 p.10-12. 
79 NA P142/47/33 p.14, 19. 
80 NA P142/7/1 p.10. 
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“motivated more by a desire to reaffirm preconceptions than to increase understanding,” 
an understanding largely gained from Soviet mass media.81 
 The availability of free American souvenirs, ranging from pins to copies of 
American Constitution, placed high on the list of factors that influenced attendance. 
At the 1976 USA: 200 Years exhibit in Moscow, souvenirs were the most popular items 
at the exhibit.  The most popular item turned out to be, surprisingly, the plastic bags.  
When they ran out after four days “there were very many disappointed visitors.”  In talks 
with the guides some visitors hinted that the majority of people came only for the 
souvenirs.82  In fact, the overall attendance of the exhibit appeared to have been 
determined by the speed with which Americans could hand out the gift package that 
included a lapel pin, record, plastic bag, exhibit brochure, and a copy of American 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution in Russian.83  This was true of other 
exhibitions as well.84  
 At times, souvenirs were the only things responsible for high attendance.  This 
was especially true in larger cities such as Moscow.  For example, being the capital, 
Moscow received a fair number of international exhibitions and Americanness was no 
longer sufficiently novel to draw large crowds.  As a result, few outside a specialized 
audience were interested in attending, unless an exhibit had “desirable souvenirs (such as 
colorful plastic bags).”85  
 Exhibition pins were another highly coveted item.  Each exhibition had its own 
original pins that were handed out to Soviet visitors at the entrance.  If for some reason 
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83 NA P142/42/10 p.1. 
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85 NA P142/47/7 p.5. 
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there were no pins to hand out, many Soviets let their disappointment be known.86 
Collecting pins, or znachki in Russian, was (and still is, although to a lesser extent) a 
popular Soviet pastime.  Consequently, American exhibition pins were a hot commodity 
because of their rarity and association with America.  American exhibition guides 
recalled seeing American exhibition pins still being sold in Moscow as late as 2007.87  
 Having little outside information about America, Soviet visitors to American 
exhibitions often sought to get their hands on American magazines because of the 
difficulties of obtaining them in Russia.  Many complained that it was nearly impossible 
to buy or even subscribe to magazines such as Amerika, a magazine published by the U.S. 
State Department in the Soviet Union.88  In fact, starting with the 1959 Moscow exhibit 
questions about Amerika and America Illustrated were as frequent as requests for pins 
and plastic bags.89  
 Sometimes people complained that they could not get hold of America Illustrated 
journal and asked Americans to purchase more Soviet Life magazine so more America 
Illustrated would be made available in the Soviet Union.90  In one conversation “two girls 
related how they had once seen a drunk carrying a copy of Amerika, and they had 
followed him down the street hoping he would drop it (he did once, but he picked it up).  
They said they were afraid to ask him for it.”91  
 At times, visitors took souvenir acquisition into their own hands.  At the USA: 
200 Years exhibition in Moscow, for instance, people stole labels off picture frames at a 
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rate of about a hundred fifty per day.92  At the same time, Soviet people would get highly 
offended when exhibition personnel did anything to suggest that such practices took 
place.  For example, there was quite a backlash at the Donetsk R&D exhibit when 
American organizers put the comment book pen on a chain to prevent it from being 
taken, undoubtedly a frequent happening at previous exhibits.  As a result, a typical 
comment from the Donetsk exhibition read, “The exhibit is very good, but it’s not good 
to have your pen on a chain.”93  To the Soviets, the chain signaled that Americans 
thought of Russians as thieves.  And some visitors responded directly to such 
insinuations: “Soviet people are not thieves!” stated one Soviet visitor.94  
 Soviet young people were frequent and enthusiastic--at times too enthusiastic-- 
visitors to American exhibitions.  Young people comprised majority of the so-called 
“exhibit groupies,” “those that make the rounds of all the exhibits, or those who seek out 
anything and everything American” at exhibitions such as Agriculture: USA in Moscow, 
February 1979.95  At times, the younger audience was unhappy with the lack of music 
records and tapes, as well as other “cool” items such as jeans.  Consequently, “guides 
were constantly asked if they had anything to sell or if they could give away exhibit 
display items as souvenirs.”96  As a USIA report noted, 
On some days, well over half the visitors were young people, and in Moscow, unlike 
Kishinev, many of those attending were adolescents (14 to 18 years of age).  After school 
let out in the afternoon, the exhibit was usually overrun by boys in the 8 to 13 age bracket 
who created a nuisance with their tireless efforts to collect “souvenirs” (chewing gum, 
pens, badges, etc.) from exhibit personnel, and their repeated tours past the button and 
brochure give away stand, where they sought to get as many items as possible.97  
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It was not just the young, however, who hoped to obtain some of the exhibition items.  At 
1961 Plastics: USA Moscow exhibition, for example, many visitors were disappointed 
that it was impossible to purchase the goods on display at the exhibit.  “Why can’t you 
sell us something,” was the most frequent complaint/question.98  This “something” did 
not always imply souvenir items.  Short on many products, Soviet visitors attempted to 
procure any deficit item they could get their hand on, especially if these products came 
from the West, as they were deemed higher quality.  During Medicine: USA in Kiev, for 
instance, many visitors asked whether they could purchase American drugs.99 
 Even more professional exhibits such as the Medicine: USA in Moscow were not 
immune to the “exhibit groupie” phenomenon.  USIA American guides observed:  
There continues to be the accustomed attendance of “Americanophiles” – primarily 
youths and students interested in first-hand contact with Americans, in practicing and 
demonstrating their knowledge of English, and the juveniles and teenagers among whom 
things Americans are apparently a cult, a possible gesture of bravado, and sometimes a 
source of profit.100  
 
In its report, the USIA also noted that these “Americanophiles” comprised an important 
segment of Soviet population.  They were willing to accept American, or at least, 
different ideas.  Therefore, US representatives hoped that as these children grew up, they 
would make up a “strategic audience” for American propaganda.101  
  In fact, this audience of young Soviets was so enamored with the West (or 
Western popular culture to be exact) that popularity was guaranteed simply by the fact 
that the thing or a person was from the West.  For example, in Kishinev, a musical 
performance by an Irish group received a far more enthusiastic response from the 
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audience than the local music group even though American guides judged the Soviet 
group to be better than its Irish counterpart.102  Western jeans were so popular that some 
people reported that several people in Kishinev were killed because assailants wanted 
their jeans.103  Furthermore, young people were into Western disco music and often tried 
to turn school dances into kind of discothèques.104 
 Soviet youth posed similar questions a decade earlier, in the 1960s, when young 
people often asked about the latest developments in rock music, especially their favorite 
rock groups and rock lifestyle in general.  Some asked questions about pornography and 
“free love” and how these affected American society.  The persistence of these questions 
over two decades signals the durability and longevity of the “cult of the West” among a 
certain segment of Soviet youth.105  
 Soviet young people were also generally very interested in all aspects of 
student/college life in the United States.  How did American students spend their free 
time?  What classes did they take?  How were they graded?106  In short, they were 
interested in the same things as the Soviet adults, asking the question “How would I live 
if I lived in America?” 
 At times, visitors took the opportunity to vent their frustrations with the Soviet 
system, hoping that sharing their grievances with American exhibit personnel would 
somehow help their situation.  As a result, some Soviet visitors came seeking help in 
immigrating, often dropping off letters to American president, Congress, Voice of 
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America and the U.N.107  At one exhibition, some of the visitors complained about 
shortages of certain goods in the Soviet Union to the American guides.  One family, 
apparently frustrated by inability to purchase a car, wrote a detailed description of their 
struggles in the exhibit comment book, likely hoping Soviet officials would read the 
comments and help.108  
 
 
Public reactions to the exhibits 
 
  
 Soviet visitors’ reactions to the content of American exhibits reveal not only what 
interested them about America, but also what they felt was lacking in their everyday life 
in the Soviet Union.  Specifically, things with any type of aesthetic quality, especially in 
consumer products (cars being the most popular), received the most attention from 
visitors.  This response reveals that visitors recognized how the Soviet Union still lagged 
behind America and the West in terms of quality consumer goods well after the 1959 
Moscow Exhibition.  Furthermore, Soviet reactions pointed to the fact that the Soviets 
were extremely sensitive to any kind of a perceived slight on the part of the Americans.  
This indicates, perhaps, a high level of insecurity about Soviet status in the world—a 
concern already expressed at the 1959 exhibition.         
 The list of missing/stolen books is an odd, yet rather telling, source of information 
about what really interested Soviet visitors.  At the 1963 Technical Books: USA exhibit, 
for example, art and music (specifically jazz) books comprised majority of those missing, 
indicating a strong preference for aesthetic/entertainment subjects.  This preference for 
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aesthetic, or “pretty” things, is also evident from the questionnaire answers where two of 
the most popular answers to “What did you particularly like about the exhibit?” were 
“External appearance of the books” and “General layout of the exhibit.”109  At the 1965 
Architecture: USA exhibitions, similar to Soviet fascination with external book bindings 
at the Technical Books exhibitions, Minsk and Leningrad audiences showed particular 
interest in things with aesthetic qualities.  This was especially true of transparencies—an 
item unknown in the Soviet Union.  Many commented on their beauty, wondered if these 
were paintings or photographs, and asked about the process of making them.110 
 One of the explanations for this phenomenon was the lack of what the general 
public would see as aesthetically pleasing consumer products in Soviet life, in this case 
books (usually exemplified by absence of bright/vivid colors).  This was still the case 
more than ten years later at the 1974 Odessa exhibit when American officials noted that: 
“[Exhibit’s] kaleidoscopic colors have an obvious impact.  A woman in her twenties 
commented wistfully, “It must be very pretty in your country where everything is not dull 
grey, green, brown, or black.”  A young man said that compared to the exhibit, 
everything in the Soviet Union was colored as if the country were expecting war.”111  At 
the 1978 Agriculture: USA in Dushanbe, the exhibit’s aesthetic qualities were again one 
of the most popular features with Soviet visitors.  Visitors especially liked the 
“colorfulness” of the exhibit presentation.112 
 Another explanation (I think both probably play a role), for Technical Books: 
USA questionnaire answers, is that there were simply not enough questionnaire options to 
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choose from and “External appearance of the books” and “General layout of the exhibit” 
seemed like the most generic, friendly options.  And Soviet people, not used to filling out 
questionnaires, (that is, solicitations of public opinion) just put them down because they 
thought they had to put something.  Another sign of this was the fact that the option of 
“general approval” was the number one choice.  
 Technology, especially consumer technology, consistently drew a lot of attention 
from Soviet visitors.  Various agricultural machines, for example, were the stars of the 
Agriculture: USA exhibits in almost every city.113  This was particularly true of the 
Dodge pickup truck, which was usually the most popular item in the whole exhibit from 
Dushanbe to Kishinev.114  The popularity of the pickup truck highlighted the general 
appeal of American cars among Soviet people.  “American automobiles seem to be an 
object of fascination for many Soviets,” noted one USIA report,115 an accurate statement 
for other American exhibitions.116  
 Years later an architect from Kiev remembered how an American automobile 
shaped his career decision: 
My memory often strays back to a summer day in 1967. Then 6 years old, I was taken by my 
mother to the "Industrial Design in the USA" exhibition put on Kiev. It was an United States 
Information Agency (USIA) exchange expo. I was struck by the looks of gorgeous, sculptural 
lines of 1967 Buick Riviera in gold paint. Such an automobile was very unusual in the former 
Soviet Union.  This event has become one of the brightest days of my childhood, sparked my 
interest in design and influenced my decision to become an Architect. 117 
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 Smaller consumer technology was also extremely popular with Soviet audiences.  
Things such as the eight-track tape player, headphones, and home canning and preserving 
equipment, for example, produced a high level of excitement from Soviet visitors.118 
  Frequently, expectations exceeded reality.  Having imagined America as the 
leader in many technological fields, some visitors complained that technology at some of 
the exhibitions was outdated, that they anticipated better from a country like America. “If 
such are really your latest achievements, then the exhibit could stand much 
improvement,” wrote a Soviet visitor at the 1972 exhibition in Kazan, a sentiment echoed 
by many other visitors to that and other American exhibits.119  
 In fact, it was not just technology that carried heightened expectations, but almost 
all American products.  Soviet visitors, used to inferior and bland quality of their 
domestic consumer products, and having little objective information about the West, 
envisioned American products to be light-years ahead of the Soviet Union.  When these 
unrealistic expectations were not met, they came away disillusioned.  A USIA report 
from a Kiev exhibit noted that: 
Whatever his attitude towards American political and economic system may be (and it 
often appears to be most contradictory), he views America as a golden land.  This view 
creates expectations, often extravagant ones, about showings of American products.  
When the average Kievan comes to an American exhibition, he frankly expects to be 
wowed.  If he is not, he is often disappointed and not infrequently responds with 
exaggerated complaints and sometimes suspicion.120  
 
 Once again location played a part in shaping Soviet reaction, as there was a 
marked difference between large open cities such as Moscow and Leningrad and other 
Soviet cities.  Having fewer newest and best domestic products, little exposure to 
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foreigners, or outside information about America, Soviets living in cities besides Moscow 
and Leningrad were easier to please than their more sophisticated compatriots.  A USIA 
report stated 
It would appear that the average Soviet citizen who lives in the provincial city is far less 
discriminating and sophisticated than his counterpart in the United States.  He seems 
most easily impressed by the sheer size, the illusion of great variety, availability and low 
prices of consumer goods, by vividness of color and novelty.121   
 
 While many Soviets were indeed dazzled by what they saw at American exhibits, 
they also sought to find something to redeem their own country.  Echoing Soviet press 
statements, one of the more frequent comments complimented America on its 
accomplishments but at the same time remarked that these were only accessible to a 
handful of rich Americans.  “The exhibit is good—I wouldn’t say anything against it, but 
I don’t want to forget the bad aspects.  Our Soviet achievements are for our use; that is, 
available to all.  And yours?” “There are a lot of interesting things but everything is made 
for the upper classes, not for the common people –a bunch of lies,” wrote a visitor from 
Donetsk.122  
 At another exhibition, Soviet visitors did not dismiss American claims outright 
but still questioned their validity: “Guides in the home area were repeatedly asked, ‘Are 
these goods really sold in the stores, or were they only produced for the exhibit?  Can 
ordinary people buy them?’”123  In this case, Soviet visitors not only questioned whether 
the exhibit was merely propaganda, but also projected their own worldview:  most Soviet 
exhibits contained goods that were not readily available to the general public.  As a rule, 
audiences in provincial cities voiced more defensive responses to American exhibitions 
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than people in Moscow or Leningrad.  “We have it too,” “Ours is better,” “America is 
good – USSR is better,” were the most common remarks.  Most likely this was due to 
more “common” people, having little information about the outside world, attending 
exhibitions in provincial cities. 124 
 Similarly to the 1959 Moscow Exhibition, Soviet visitors at later American 
exhibitions also responded negatively to abstract art.  At the 1961 Plastics: USA Kiev 
exhibition, for instance, the abstract art portion of the exhibit produced by far the most 
hostile reaction from Soviet visitors, with a consistent disapproval rating of over ninety 
percent.  Most visitors objected on the basis that art should be more realistic, educational, 
and accessible to the masses.  Those expressing the harshest criticism compared abstract 
art to “monkey smearing.”125  However, the same exhibit received a more sympathetic 
response from an audience in Moscow, where close to half the people had a positive 
reaction to abstract art.126  This contrast highlights differences in opinion and 
understanding between the ordinary and the more culturally-sophisticated visitors.  It is 
likely that those overly critical of modern American art simply imitated official 
statements, thus signaling effectiveness of official propaganda on this issue.127 
 Exhibits did produce a fair number of misunderstandings that resulted in comical 
or at times tense situations.  For example, one American agricultural exhibit featured a 
number of life-sized stuffed pigs.  As a sort of a joke, organizers made the pigs out of 
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calico fabric with flower patterns.  The reaction of Soviet visitors, however, was not one 
of amusement.  One American guide recalled: 
Why do you have your pigs in fitochka, why are they flowered? And so it was like, well 
it’s just a joke. And they’d think well this is just not funny, you think we think pigs look 
like them, and we’re like, no, of course not. But it was quite offensive to people. People 
really got on our case about that.”128   
      
At another exhibition, it was the American football showcase that caused mass confusion 
and even produced some negative reactions about the game among Soviet visitors. 
““American football is murder,” “Three or four players must be killed every game,” and 
“How many casualties do you have per game?” were typical of the response.  One visitor 
compared the game to a “lynching party.”129   
 During 1961 Plastics U.S.A. exhibition in Kiev the guides made a list of strange 
questions asked of them by Soviet visitors.  Some of the more remarkable include: “Do 
they permit capitalism in the USA?” “Do Negroes speak English?”130 “How old is the 
average American horse?” 
“How successful would a Russian woman be on a Nevada love ranch?”131  One Soviet 
visitor stated that Jimmy Hendrix and Janis Joplin killed themselves because they were 
forced to work for months without stopping so the music company owners could make 
more money.132  
 Sometimes, questions dealt with American topics that received a lot more 
coverage in the USSR than in the U.S.  Such was the case with Dean Reed, a uniquely 
Eastern bloc phenomenon.  Little known in the United States where he was born, Dean 
Reed was wildly popular in the Soviet bloc countries, particularly Eastern Germany.  He 
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developed an image of a country singer who protested against various injustices of the 
Western world--an image that the Soviet bloc leaders enthusiastically supported.  As a 
result, American guides were forced to field questions about Dean Reed’s recent arrest in 
Minnesota where he was involved in a protest over power lines.133  
 
Face to face with Americans: exhibit guides 
  
 Overall, American guides were the real stars of the exhibitions and as a result they 
received the most positive and energetic reactions from Soviet people almost everywhere 
they went.134  A majority of the comment books contained some praise for American 
guides, complimenting their openness, friendliness, and ability to speak Russian.135  The 
only negative comments about the guides referred to their limited knowledge of the 
exhibit’s subject matter. 
 A majority of the guides were American university students in their early 20s, 
who either had graduated or were completing their studies.  They came from all over the 
United States and a variety of academic majors, from journalism to Asian studies.  
Usually, the only thing they had in common was their interest in the Russian language.  
Most found out about the program through the State Department, others from USIA 
posters that read “Go to Russia and get paid for it too.”136  In order to qualify for the 
program applicants had to pass a language assessment exam and an interview, testing 
their knowledge of current events and ability to answer a great variety of questions. 
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 USIA chose guides based largely on their language ability.  Therefore, most had 
little idea about the subject matter, and people with no previous knowledge of the subject 
had to become relatively proficient within a short period of time.  “We were taught about 
berry production and swine herding,” recalled one guide from Agriculture: USA exhibit, 
who had no prior experience with agriculture.137  Since guides alternated among various 
sections of the exhibit, they had to know something about everything that was presented 
at the exhibit, further complicating the situation.  And frequently, the guide’s poor grasp 
of the subject matter showed and was consequently the weakest part of the exhibition 
program according to comments from Soviet visitors.138 
 Besides being interpreters, serving as citizen ambassadors, and having to learn 
about the numerous subject matters presented at the exhibit, USIA expected the guides to 
set up and take down exhibition stands.  Building the exhibit was no easy task.  It took 
around two weeks to set up and one week to take down, and required some grasp of the 
stand’s blueprints and carpentry skills. 139  Considering that some of the exhibitions 
traveled to five or more cities, this added a significant load to their already busy schedule.  
And at times these extra duties were not simply tedious but dangerous as well.  “The first 
week I was there I think I got a shock every day I was working,” remembered one guide 
who also had the job of assistant electrician.140  
 Once the exhibits opened their doors, the general reaction of Soviet people to 
American guides was friendly and warm.  Meeting a real live American was one of the 
main goals for most Soviets attending exhibitions.  USIA recognized this fact, and 
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consequently selected ordinary students, and not specialists, to serve as guides.  Because 
the guides were not official employees of the United States government, they did not 
have to adhere to any official policy of the U.S., nor were they expected to do so by the 
USIA.  USIA officials wanted the guides to know what official policies were, but they 
were free to express their own opinions on any subject.  And it was this honesty and 
openness of the American guides that impressed the Soviet citizens more than anything 
else, since they were used to censoring their own opinions if they deviated from the 
official line.141  “There was always credibility about the guides because people were 
telling their own stories,” noted a former guide.142  Another guide, in talking about some 
Soviet visitors trying to get the official stance of the American government by asking all 
of the guides the same questions, remembered that:   
they found that they would get, for the same question, 23 different answers from the 23 
various guides. Often times, [the answers] were very critical of one or another of the U.S. 
government’s official policies. To me, there was no more powerful example of American 
democracy than this sort of illustration to Soviet citizens -- that there is no government 
line and that we make up our own minds.143 
 
 In their interactions with the guides, Soviet visitors were usually courteous and 
friendly.  Most simply wanted to have a face-to-face conversation with Americans, and 
few behaved in an antagonistic manner.  When certain people did harass the guides, “the 
crowd would silence them. They would say like, ‘’oh quit bothering her,’ ‘leave her 
alone,’ ‘she’s answering the questions,’ and ‘go away.’  So there was really a lot of good 
feeling that you could evoke just by being a normal sort of human being and smiling and 
responding to the questions,” recalled an American guide.144  
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 Often, Soviet visitors invited the guides to their homes. “There was no end to the 
invitations. They didn’t have a lot of material things, but when they invited you to be 
their guest, the tables would just be laden with everything from wines to vodka to cognac, 
to all kinds of food imaginable,” noted one of the guides.145  Another remembered that 
“given Soviet hospitality at the time, which often included a lot of vodka and everything 
else – I mean people would really put on the spread. You had to be careful because you 
had to go back to work the next morning.”146    
 Such hospitality, however, came with certain risks.  For associating with 
foreigners, Soviet citizens risked questioning by the KGB.  They could be reprimanded, 
or even lose their jobs.  One guide recalled,  
certainly in the 1960s and the 1970s – that if someone was seen meeting with Americans 
at the exhibit, or it came to the attention of the authorities, especially the KGB back then, 
that they were meeting, or God help you, you were having Americans over to your home 
– they might get called in by the officials and asked why they were spending all this time 
with Americans. There was a real suspiciousness about meeting with us.147 
 
 While the Soviet government frowned upon any contact between Americans and 
Soviets during and outside exhibitions, the level of enforcement varied.  At one 
exhibition, guides reported almost no home invitations in Minsk and numerous daily 
invitations in the Ukraine.148  This difference in enforcement most likely depended on 
several factors such as the current state of U.S.-USSR relations and the attitudes of local 
party and security officials. 
 American guides were also not completely free from official oversight.  Given the 
fact that most guides were young, U.S. authorities had to set a few rules regarding 
interaction with Soviet people. And guides faced consequences if their contact with 
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Soviet people assumed a more intimate character.  In several cases, U.S. government 
removed some guides from exhibitions for “being a little too loose.”149  
 
Negative perceptions about America 
 
 As we have seen in discussion of official propaganda, Soviet authorities had 
success portraying certain areas of American life in a negative light.  As a result, Soviets 
held persistent negative opinions about the U.S. on issues of unemployment, racism, and 




 The topic of unemployment in the United States ranked the highest among all 
negative comments about America from Soviet visitors.  This was true at the 1959 
Moscow Exhibition, and again several years later at an exhibition in Kiev where it 
accounted for nineteen percent of all comments.150  The trend continued into the late 
1970s where the issue of unemployment still dominated discussions of American 
economic system among Soviet visitors.  
 Influenced by the Soviet media’s portrayal of America as a dog-eat-dog country, 
people often asked questions about social safety nets in America, with majority of the 
Soviet people having the idea that in America the unemployed were simply thrown out on 
the street and forgotten.  Some wondered why American unemployed did not come to the 
Soviet Union for work.151  Most Soviet visitors thought unemployment levels were 
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always high in the US, and when American workers lost their jobs, they sank into 
permanent poverty.152  Thus, the general opinion among the Soviet citizens attending 
American exhibitions, based mostly on reports from domestic mass media, held that 
American cities were drowning in starving unemployed workers who had little hope of 
bettering their situation.153  This conception was revealed in questions such as “Do you 
have many suicides because of unemployment?” and statements such as “Your 
unemployed workers are left to starve to death.”  Most did believe American guides 
about the wide availability of unemployment benefits, but many struggled to accept the 
size of American unemployment compensation, some asking “If you get that much, why 
do you bother to work at all?”154   
 This view of American unemployment changed little in the twenty years since the 
1959 Moscow exhibition, and most Soviet visitors in the late 1970s still saw America as a 
land of a few millionaires and millions of hungry workers out on the streets.  Much like 
other questions about America, however, Soviet visitors’ questions about American 
unemployment did not reflect simple curiosity.  The Soviet press devoted a lot of time to 
that particular subject and now the Soviet people wanted to know what Americans had to 
say about it.  In this way, some Soviets were using the vehicle of the exhibit to test the 
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 As we saw earlier the question of racial discrimination was usually the second 
most popular negative topic of discussion, behind unemployment, among Soviet visitors.  
It was the eighth most frequent topic overall, and second in the negative comment 
category, at the 1959 Moscow exhibition.156  At the Plastics U.S.A. exhibition in Kiev in 
1961, American racial issues accounted for eight percent of references to American 
domestic issues.157  The percentages were roughly the same for other cities visited by the 
same exhibition.  The same was true almost twenty years later, for the Agriculture U.S.A. 
exhibit in 1979 that toured many Soviet cities.158 
 For example, at the August, 1961, Plastics U.S.A. exhibition in Moscow, 
repeating sensational stories from the Soviet press, Muscovites asked whether blacks 
continued to be lynched in the South and why there were still separate facilities for blacks 
and whites.159  Several years later, many in the audience at the Minsk Architecture: USA 
(July-Aug. 1965) expressed strong interest in U.S. racial relations.  They wondered 
whether Negros had the same employment and education opportunities as the whites, or 
simply why Americans did not like Negros.160  Racism towards African and Native 
Americans in the U.S. came up often as a subject of conversation more than a decade 
later at the Agriculture: U.S.A exhibition in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (Dec. 1978).  Not 
realizing that this was outdated information, people often wondered why blacks were 
lynched, not allowed to eat at the same restaurants or attend the same schools as the 
whites.161  Some Soviet visitors associated American racial relations with violent conflict, 
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but most thought that Black Americans faced wide spread discrimination and lacked the 
same opportunities as White Americans.162  
 If we examine these statements in a proper context, however, we see that Soviet 
questions about racism in America were not so much an expression of anger or outrage, 
but simple curiosity—and perhaps even approval of discriminatory practices.  Indeed, 
when Soviet citizens came in contact with people with black skin color (often, students 
from Africa) they were inclined to be just as racist as they imagined Americans to be, or 
even more so.  For example, at the Plastics U.S.A. exhibition in Moscow in August, 1961, 
American guides noted that: 
Curiously, many of the Muscovites who claim that racial prejudice is a negative force in 
American society appear themselves to be afflicted with this disease.  Unlike Kievans, 
they have less frequently been willing to admit it.  Among young people, and particularly 
university students, there is without question a real current of anti-African feeling.  
During the stay of PLASTICS U.S.A. in Moscow, several visitors reported that numerous 
incidents, including fist fights, have occurred between Muscovites and Africans here, and 
that resentment against Negros who date Moscow girls is especially high.  And one 
young man announced to a guide, “Do you know why I like Americans so much? 
Americans hate Negros.”163  
 
 American guides at the 1965 Minsk exhibition noticed many openly racist 
statements coming from the visitors, although not as many as at the same exhibition in 
Leningrad.  When informed that Tbilisi was exhibit’s next destination, one elderly man 
stated that there they “will see our Negros!”  “Asked if Negros and Americans associate 
in the US, the guide replied that Negros are Americans, to which the old man replied, 
“Yes, but really, aren’t they crude…?”  Conversations with African students in Minsk 
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confirmed the presence of intense racism that made “their social and educational 
relationships…extremely difficult.”164    
 Apparently Soviet visitors feelings towards black people remained largely 
unchanged when Agriculture U.S.A. exhibit toured the Soviet Union in late 1970s. 
American guides at the Rostov-na-Donu exhibition in April, 1979 commented that:  
Although visitors were fairly cautious about making public statements critical of the 
Black African foreign students, they often confided privately, or expressed in the 
company of friends, negative attitudes toward Black people.  Under these circumstances a 
number of Rostovites unhesitatingly volunteered information that they did not like the 
Black students, or any Blacks, and thought virtually all Russians, regardless of what they 
said in public, felt the same.  They were particularly disgusted and appalled to see 
Russian girls with the African students; Russian men very often labeled these girls 
prostitutes, declaring that they went out with the Africans in order to get desirable 
Western goods from them.  Russians often characterized the Blacks as insolent, spoiled, 
and wild.165 
 
 There were also reports of violent clashes between Blacks and local Rostov youth, 
even a mention of a murder of a black student a few years before the exhibition.  But 
according to black students the violence towards them in the city was rare, although they 
did exercise certain precautions.166  The same year, visitors to the Moscow exhibition 
expressed similar sentiments, some commenting that “it was just as well the Negros were 
kept in their place in the U.S., as they were no doubt insolent and wild and uncultured,” 
others stated that “We don’t like Blacks here either.”167  “There seems to be too many 
pictures of Negroes.  Do they like to be photographed?” wrote one Muscovite in a 
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comment book, an unmistakably racist comment to anyone familiar with the Soviet 
mentality.168  
 Even simple curiosity about African Americans by Soviet visitors was at times 
expressed in a rather crude way.  One black American guide ended up quitting the 
exhibition because of the manner in which some of the Soviets approached her.  Several 
times, for example, people came up and “would sort of poke her and say, ‘Is this skin 
real?’”  Others simply refused to believe that she was “just American,” and “not African 
somehow.”169  
 The level of racism among Soviet visitors seems to have differed depending on 
the ethnicity of the individual and his/her location.  In Dushanbe, for example, Soviet 
visitors, who were mostly of Slavic origin, expressed a more pronounced dislike of 
“darker peoples,” due to their close interaction with the indigenous Tajik population.170  
Here a number of visitors combined material from Soviet press with personal feelings, 
remaining oblivious to the contradictions in their views: 
[D]irected racist remarks against Africans and American Blacks.  One moment they 
would be asking a guide in accusing tones about why there is discrimination against 
Negros in America, the next they would declare righteously that there used to be a lot of 
African and Asian students in Dushanbe, but almost all of them were sent away because 
“those people are insolent and wild, they don’t behave like human beings.”  Visitors 
would from time to time sidle up to the guide to confide that they did not like Negros 
either and we Americans were right to hate them!171  
 
 Soviet minorities attending American exhibitions appeared to have a more 
positive view of blacks in America.  Georgians at the 1961 exhibition in Tbilisi, for 
example, were more sympathetic to the American blacks than were visitors in Kiev or 
Moscow.   A USIA report stated that, “Perhaps a part of an explanation of this reaction 
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grows out of what appears to be a feeling among Georgians that they too are an oppressed 
people.  On several occasions, Tbilisians have complained privately about the arrogance 
of the Russians in Georgia.”172  A statement by a visitor in Minsk confirmed ethnic 
tensions by referring to Georgians as “our Negros!”173  The level of hostility towards 






 Along with unemployment, and racism, many Soviets brought up the problems of 
crime in America.  Specifically, many were fascinated with  
the issue of “crime in the streets.”  They asked if American carry guns, if they learn 
martial arts or other systems of self-defense, or if they just stay off the streets after dark, 
out of fear.  Many Soviets wanted to establish, to their satisfaction, just how dangerous 
American cities are.  Some people had picked up scraps of information about the Mafia 
and organized crime, and with a mixture of fascination and horror, asked if Mafia hired 
gangsters to kill people – and if the killings were done in gruesome ways.175   
 
Several others wondered whether lack of universal identity cards and internal passports 
contributed to high crime rates as criminals were free to commit crimes and then change 
their identity with ease.176  Others felt that unrestricted sale of guns, violence on TV and 
in movies, and unemployment (all information taken from official propaganda) were 
leading causes of high crime rates in America.177  As a result, the Second Amendment of 
American Constitution received the most attention from Soviet visitors at the 1976 U.S.A 
                                                        
172 NA P142/6/59 p.9. 
173 NA P142/27/144 p.7-8. 
174 NA P142/7/1 p.12. 
175 NA P142/47/33 p.24. 
176 NA P142/47/33 p.26. 
177 NA P142/42/10 p.25. 
  273 
– 200 Years exhibition in Moscow.178  “Can you really just walk into a store and buy a 
gun?” was the most common question.179  Some wanted to know “if the Mafia still shoots 
down people with machine guns from moving cars.”180  
 Visitors in Minsk thought of American cities as overrun with crime, and openly 
wondered if residents could walk the streets at night.  Others suggested that as many as 
thirty percent of Americans live in the slums.181  Muscovites also thought of America as a 
country of high crime rates, and some “imagined America as completely overridden by 
gangsters, bandits, and hoodlums, and could not imagine how any American managed to 
live to maturity.”182  
 
Reactions to American foreign policy 
 
 Normally ordinary Soviet citizens cared little about international events and their 
interest “waxed and waned in direct proportion to local media attention.” 183  This 
observation underlines the importance of domestic mass media in forming the worldview 
of the average Soviet person.  Overall, “the collective impression of the guides was that 
the […] man-in-the street was preoccupied with domestic affairs impinging directly on 
his day-to-day existence.”184  Having little say in the makeup of policies of their own 
political system, Soviet citizens thought that foreign policy was best left to the 
government.185  
                                                        
178 Ibid, p.4. 
179 Ibid, p.25. 
180 Ibid. 
181 NA P142/27/144 p.9-10. 
182 NA P142/47/7 p.24. 
183 NA P142/16/160 p.10. 
184 NA P142/16/160 p.10. 
185 NA P142/7/1 p.2. 
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 At times, however, when the Soviet mass media focused its attention on certain 
international events, Soviet citizens took an interest and expressed views at American 
exhibitions.  Soviet press coverage of the Vietnam War yielded some typical questions 
were: “What does the guide think of the war in Vietnam?  What do the American people 
think of the war? Are the American soldiers volunteers? How much do they get paid?  Do 
the American people know about the atrocities committed by the South Vietnamese 
Army?”  Few other foreign policy issues received similar level of attention, or did so only 
in connection with Vietnam.186   
 Similarly, visitors’ knowledge of the U.S. domestic affairs closely followed the 
Soviet press.  Many in the crowd espoused negative opinions about President Lyndon 
Johnson, holding him responsible for the situation in Vietnam.  There were frequent 
comparisons between John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, with the majority opinion 
that Kennedy would not have gotten involved in Vietnam in the same way as Johnson. 
Some visitors went as far as stating that Johnson “had a hand in assassination of President 
Kennedy.”187  
 Over a decade after his assassination, JFK was still greatly admired by many 
among the Soviets at the exhibit. “Why did you kill your President?” was one of the more 
frequent questions.  Admiration for JFK, however, was not based on any specific policies 
but on rather superficial assumption that he represented a “noble martyr” killed by the 
power- and money-hungry segments of American political establishment--a version of 
events perpetuated by the Soviet media.188  Many visitors asked the guides personal 
                                                        
186 NA P142/27/144 p.3. 
187 Ibid, p.5-6. 
188 NA P142/47/33 p.22-23. 
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opinions on who they thought killed JFK, and some pointed to it as proof of corruption 
and disorder in American society.189 
 In reality, the Soviet media was again the key player in shaping Soviet visitors’ 
opinion about American presidents.  While by the 1970s a majority of Soviets saw JFK as 
a positive figure killed by the reactionary and exploitative forces, this was not the case 
during his actual presidency.  At the 1961 exhibition, for example, visitors’ comments 
about Kennedy became more and more negative as tensions over Berlin mounted during 
the run of the exhibition.190   
 The same situation prevailed in the 1970s.  Initially, many Soviets saw the 
election of President Jimmy Carter as a positive step in Soviet-American relations.  At 
the simulated voting booth at one 1976 American exhibition, Soviet visitors had a chance 
to vote for American President.  Almost all voted for Carter.191  As relations between the 
two countries soured, Soviet visitors’ attitude changed.  At later 1970s exhibitions, a 
majority of the Soviets had a negative view of President Jimmy Carter, “considering him 
to blame for worsening of Soviet-American relations,” stated USIA report.192   
 Many asked whether it was true that Carter had been a farmer before becoming 
president, and were very surprised when the guides answered in the affirmative.  This 
reaction reflected assumptions Soviet visitors made about comparative access to power in 
the US and the USSR.  They did not think it strange that one of their own leaders, Nikita 
Khrushchev, could come from a peasant background.193  It is likely that election of a 
peanut farmer as American president simply did not hold up well with the popular Soviet 
                                                        
189 Ibid. 
190 NA P142/5/48 p.23-24. 
191 P142/42/10 p.5. 
192 P142/42/10 p.5. 
193 NA P142/47/33 p.21-23, P142/47/7 p.20-22. 
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belief that America was run by Wall Street interests, thus arousing much curiosity and 
doubt.  
 
East vs. West: comparisons between the two countries 
 
 Soviet citizens’ desire to understand where their country stood in the wider world 
inevitably invited frequent comparisons between America and Soviet Union.  As we saw 
earlier this usually resulted in endless questions about American standard of living – 
salaries, houses, cars…etc. at a vast majority of American exhibits.  Soviets wanted to see 
if their limited knowledge about America was true and how the American standard of 
living compared to their own.    
 Direct comparisons, voiced in public, which reflected badly on the Soviet Union, 
however, were rare.  At the agricultural exhibit, for example, Soviet people got quite 
defensive when comparisons between USSR and the U.S. pointed out deficiencies in 
Soviet agriculture.  In public, faced with negative comparisons Soviet visitors countered 
that the Soviet system was relatively young and the fact that Soviet Union suffered a lot 
of damage during World War II.  In private conversations, however, they also frankly 
admitted that Soviet agriculture had many deficiencies and had a long way to go until it 
caught up with America.194  Similar episodes occurred at other American exhibits.195 
 The issue of travel restrictions, however, was an exception.  Soviet visitors asked 
if American citizens could travel freely around the U.S., between U.S. cities, and whether 
they had internal passports.  How easy is it to get out of the U.S., they inquired; can an 
average American go to Europe if he has the money?  Such questions highlighted the 
                                                        
194 NA P142/47/33 p.10. 
195 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/110533.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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high level of frustration with numerous domestic and international travel restrictions 
placed on its citizens by the Soviet government.  This showed even among those loyal to 
the regime in most other respects, “You know, the one thing wrong with this country is 




 Starting with Moscow in 1959, American exhibitions in the Soviet Union proved 
very popular with the Soviet public. Over more than three decades close to five million 
Soviet people came from all corners of the country to get a glimpse of real America and 
Americans.  These exhibitions introduced the Soviet people to numerous aspects of 
America: books, photography, plastics, agriculture and more.  From the American side 
the goal of the exhibitions was to familiarize the Soviet public with the American way of 
life and American culture.  In other words, it sought to provide the Soviet people with an 
American point of view.  Soviet reaction to the exhibits, however, showed that in this 
respect the program fell short of its intended target. 
 The exhibition initiative did establish some formal and informal contacts between 
ordinary Americans and Soviets, but it appears that little changed in the way that Soviet 
people perceived America.  While overall reactions from Soviet visitors were mostly 
favorable and many voiced a strong desire for more Soviet-U.S. cooperation, attempts by 
American guides to convey more complex ideas about the U.S. largely failed because of 
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the “almost total inability of Soviet visitors to view American society except in the 
conventional Marxist framework,” concluded USIA report.197   
 In general, Soviet visitors had a hard time relating to aspects of American life that 
had no equivalent in the Soviet Union.  American political system for example, was 
viewed as “confusing” and “weak,” as evidenced by federal vs. state problems over 
desegregation of schools in Little Rock.  Frequently, Soviet understanding of American 
politics “represented little more than a projection of their own experience with the Soviet 
system onto the American scene.  Several visitors asked whether Americans were 
permitted to vote, and if so, who they were required to vote for.  One found it 
unbelievable that the President could not compel the people to adopt his political 
programs,” noted USIA reports.198   
  This trend is best exemplified by an incident at the 1979 Agriculture: USA 
exhibit in Rostov where one of the Soviet security guards got drunk and told American 
staff that he was instructed to report on the American guides and “I would say, frankly, 
that in my opinion, the guides don’t understand their society very well; they don’t explain 
capitalism correctly…”, meaning they did not portray it in a negative enough light.  In 
other words, when confronted with a different view of American system, instead of 
changing his opinion the guard interpreted it as a mistake on the part of American 
guides.199  
 The exhibits program did not have the desired effect of changing the Soviet 
mindset about America, or teaching Soviets about American way of life.  It did, however, 
create a more personal connection between the two people when Soviet visitors had a 
                                                        
197 P142/15/119 p.i. 
198 NA P142/15/119 p.i,5, P142/5/32 p.25. 
199 NA P142/47/13 p.4. 
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chance to meet and talk with American guides.  Thus the programs’ main effect was “in 
blunting some of the worst Soviet propaganda about what the United States was really 
about,” noted an American guide years later.200 
 Another important conclusion that can be drawn from Soviet reactions to 
American exhibitions is that lack of outside information and official propaganda played a 
major role in shaping the worldview of average Soviet citizens.   The effects of 
propaganda, however, differed depending on the topic.  Soviets tended to be more 
skeptical of official propaganda regarding matters that touched them directly: the 
availability of consumer goods, salaries, freedom of movement, and freedom of the press.  
Soviet people had first-hand knowledge of these issues and the majority was not satisfied 
with the situation.  Therefore, they were less likely to believe official propaganda and see 
America as ahead on these issues.  Matters that had little effect on Soviet peoples’ day-to-
day lives, such as Soviet and American foreign policy and U.S. domestic policies, elicited 
from exhibition visitors mostly a reiteration of the official government stance.  Moreover, 
few Soviets had access to non-official information on these topics.  Thus, more often than 
not, Soviets were more likely to side with official information sources in those matters.          
 The location of the exhibit and the status of inter-country relations also influenced 
Soviet attitudes towards America.  Major cities like Moscow and Leningrad had more 
access to outside information and generally had a higher level of education and therefore 
exhibits elicited a more nuanced approach towards America from visitors.  Visitors in 
more provincial cities on the other hand saw America more in line with official 
propaganda.201  
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 Soviet reactions to America also depended on the state of U.S.-USSR relations.  
In times of normal relations, as indicated by the official media, Soviet visitors tended to 
have more goodwill towards the U.S.  In times of heightened tensions between the two 
superpowers, most Soviets saw America as pushing the Soviet Union into an unnecessary 
arms race, fueled by the American military-industrial complex.  The Soviet Union, in 
their eyes, wanted only peace but was forced to defend itself against American 
provocations.  Despite this, many hoped for more cultural, educational, and economic 
contacts between the two countries.202  In other words, Soviets largely stuck to official 
view that American business interests wanted war with the Soviet Union while American 
















 Perhaps no segment of the Soviet population embraced America (wrapped in an 
idea of a mythical West) more than the young people in the period immediately following 
World War II up until the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s.  Officially, the 
post-World War II Soviet system offered its young people two roads in life.1  If a person 
worked hard and followed the Communist Party’s leadership, he or she would be 
rewarded with a happy and a comfortable life.  This was the path of a true Soviet person.  
The other, the anti-Soviet road, led to a life filled with debauchery, laziness, and often 
crime.  There was little doubt which road the Soviet government wanted young people to 
choose. 
 In this chapter, we will see that starting with the late 1940s, certain segments of 
Soviet youth attempted to chart a different path:  one outside official boundaries, yet still 
grounded in a socialist worldview.  And America, as Soviet youth saw and defined it, 
became a tool in the quest to first define their identities and eventually achieving much 
larger social significance in the late Soviet period.  In addition, Soviet youth’s gravitation 
towards American popular culture and consumer products highlighted the fact that in 
many ways the official Soviet definition of quality life was too narrow for a number of 
                                                        
1 Here I use the phrase “post-World War II” not to signal change over time but to establish the period that is 
covered in this chapter.    
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Soviet young people because it ran contrary to basic human qualities such as free self-
expression, sexual exploration, and desire for creature comforts.     
 In describing these phenomena, Juliane Furst correctly and persuasively argued 
that post-war Soviet youth resisted state attempts to dictate “what it meant to be young 
and Soviet,” mostly using manner of dress and music to challenge the state monopoly on 
social framework.2  In this chapter I will also argue that in the early years of the 
Khrushchev period Soviet youth used many of the same methods, although on a wider 
scale, to form a separate generational identity.  In other words, they strove to define 
themselves as independent agents capable of forming their own ideas about their own and 
their country’s future. 
 Soviet youth’s use of American and Western goods and symbols signaled their 
search for identity or in case of young adults desire for better living standards and show 
of status.  And for most, this was not a rebellion against the Soviet state on any 
ideological ground, as a majority were still patriotic Soviet citizens.  Indeed, Soviet 
adolescents and young adults desired and used Western consumer and especially cultural 
goods more than Soviet adults, yet their view of their own country did not differ 
drastically from those of adults, in that a majority did not want to switch from Soviet 
style socialism to American style capitalism.  
 By the late sixties American and other Western symbols and goods, while still 
denounced in official media, became more widespread and more accepted among the 
youth and Soviet population in general.  By then, however, as Soviet society developed 
greater appetite for consumerism, Western symbols developed new identities as status 
symbols signaling their bearers’ access to money and deficit goods.   
                                                        
2 Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 2. 
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  As other scholars previously pointed out, in the minds of Soviet youth, America 
and the West were not based on anything concrete.3  For them, Western music, fashion, 
and symbols often carried their own meanings, grounded in reality of Soviet, and 
sometimes, regional or even private life.  As Sergei Yurchak put it: “It [the idea of the 
West] was produced locally and existed only at the time when the real West could not be 
encountered.”4  Judging by a few examples from previous chapters, when the real West 
was encountered in the form of information from foreign visitors, Soviets tended to 
simply ignore it and preserve their own version.                   
 When I talk about Soviet youth I mostly refer to people who underwent a process 
of adolescent identity formation, primarily between the ages of 12 and 24.  While there 
are numerous theories of identity formation, here I will use one from the more established 
work by a noted developmental psychologist Erik Erikson who described this age period 
as one of greater independence and increased interface with the outside world.5  It is here 
that some among the Soviet youth chose to use Western clothes and music to assert their 
identity from one prescribed by the state while younger children tended to follow the 
official line.6      
  
                                                        
3 Yurchak, 158-206. 
4 Ibid, 159. 
5 Erik Erikson, Identity, youth, and crisis  (New York: Norton, 1968). 
6 Evidence is limited but Zhuk, 149-150, Raleigh, Russia’s Sputnik Generation, 35 and Shipler, 114 offer 
some examples of younger children having an almost literal interpretation of official propaganda.  Another 
telling example comes from a British lawyer who traveled to the Soviet Union in order to attend the Gary 
Powers trial in 1960.  While visiting a Soviet school, he witnessed the following conversation in a class for 
8-10 year olds.  “”Have you?” Nina [author’s friend] appealed to a small boy, “ever seen a capitalist 
before?” 
 “Only in a picture,” said the boy.  “It was a picture from a paper.  This one is different.”  He 
pointed to me as if I were an inanimate object. 
 “How different?” 
 “That one was very fat. [referring to portrayal of all capitalists as fat in Soviet propaganda]”” See 
Byford-Jones, 146. 
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Stylish Ones: some post-war trends among Soviet youth 
 
 As I already mentioned in earlier chapters, post-World War II Soviet Union saw 
an influx of Western goods brought in by soldiers returning home from Europe.  These 
included all kinds of trophy items from various parts of Europe, and especially Germany.  
They included not only furniture, cars, music, and clothing but also films that, such as the 
American Tarzan movies, became extremely popular among the Soviet population 
especially the younger generation.7   
 Besides American movies, a certain segment of Soviet youth adopted eccentric 
clothing styles and danced to American music.  Official Soviet press labeled them 
stiliagi, or style chasers.  Often these youth identified themselves as following American 
trends, yet in reality their style had little resemblance to real America.  Primarily this was 
a result of their isolation from any outside information about America.  What little they 
got was second hand and already highly mythologized.  In fact, as Mark Edele pointed 
out, stiliagi did not copy pre-existing styles from abroad, even though they called some of 
them American (shtatskie – literally meaning “from the States”), but invented their own.8  
Despite little connection to real America, position of “American” style at the top of 
stiliagi hierarchy was significant because it also showed that America was seen as the 
clear leader in an alternative, or counter-culture, universe.  In other words, those (in this 
case stiliagi) sought to establish unique identity through the use of symbols that were 
separate from, or ran counter to, those deemed acceptable by Soviet officials, America 
represented the strongest such symbol. 
                                                        
7 For example, Frederick Starr mentioned Soviet officers bringing jazz records from East Berlin in the 
immediate post-war years – Starr, 223.  For other examples, see the chapter on unofficial information. 
8 Mark Edele,  “Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow:  The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi”, Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas , Neue Folge, Bd. 50, H. 1 (2002), 50. 
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 In a similar vein, some among the stiliagi openly proclaimed their preference for 
America over the Soviet Union.9  However, since they knew little if anything at all about 
the object of their love, such statements again pointed to the fact that for these youth 
America was simply a way to stand out from the crowd.  According to Edele this was 
also a process by which the children of the Soviet elite sought to differentiate themselves 
from the lower classes of Soviet society.10  Edele also argued that, in part, stiliagi 
phenomenon arose out of the need for young Soviet males to recapture masculine identity 
denied to them because they did not serve at the front during World War II.11  This point, 
however, is more problematic because the stiliaga trend was quite diverse.    
 American/Western styles in the immediate post-war period were confined to a 
limited group of those who had money, time, and more importantly high ranking parents 
who provided a sense of protection for youth voluntarily breaking social norms.12  
Eventually, the trend spread to working class youth who, lacking material means of the 
upper classes, whom they referred to as those “from Gorky Street,”13 had to make their 
own clothes and relied on public transportation instead of driving a car.14  Moreover, at 
least some working class stiliagi had no particular allegiance to a set style or music, 
changing both frequently depending on the fashion of the moment.15 
                                                        
9 Ibid, 42. 
10 Ibid, 38. 
11 Ibid, 58-59. 
12 Shiraev and Zubok, 19-20; Edele, 58. 
13 One of the main streets in the center of Moscow, currently Tverskaia street.  At the time some stiliagi 
referred to it as “Broadway.” 
14 Recollection of one self-described working class stiliaga - http://vk.com/wall57741583_7. Accessed 
April 22, 2012.  Juliane Furst also mentioned examples of stiliaga trend among working class youth; see 
Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 283. 
15 Recollection of one self-described working class stiliaga - http://vk.com/wall57741583_7. Accessed 
April 22, 2012. 
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 As I noted in my discussion of American movies in the Soviet Union, the main 
reason for high popularity of American, and other Western movies, especially among the 
youth, was a desire to escape the grim post-war Soviet reality.16  Movie images of normal 
life, adventure, and consumer abundance offered an escape from high crime, food 
shortages, and abysmal housing conditions where a majority of the population lived in 
communal apartments with numerous families forced to share tiny decrepit living spaces, 
kitchens and bathrooms.17  In describing the period between 1948 and1953, historian 
Donald Filzer wrote that “life was still basically a struggle to survive.”18   
 Children had it especially hard.  Many had to forgo a carefree childhood by 
working at factories during the war.  After the war, millions lost track of, or were left 
without, their families.19  It is no wonder that millions of Soviet children embraced 
American Tarzan as their hero by getting Tarzan haircuts and imitating his jungle call.  
For those in the slightly older age bracket, American style fashions (how they saw them), 
but mostly American jazz music, became means to break away from their reality, and 
carve out a private space of their own, if just for a few hours. “A pack of Marlboro 
cigarettes or a jazz recording purchased on the black market brought them a little closer 
to the sounds and smells of America and helped them, if only briefly, escape the sulfuric 
odor of brown coal and the incessant drone of socialist polemic,” noted a scholar of 
Soviet rock music Timothy Ryback.20 
                                                        
16 For more on post-WWII social conditions in the Soviet Union see: Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe 
obshchestvo.  Also, Filtzer,  Soviet workers and late Stalinism.  
17 Ibid.  Filtzer, especially Chapters 3, 4. 
18 Filtzer, 115. 
19 Ibid, 151. 
20 Ryback, 10. 
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 These developments did not go unnoticed by Soviet authorities.  As part of 
general anti-foreigner (mostly aimed at the United States) campaign of the late 1940s- 
early 1950s,21  Soviet officials launched a number of propaganda campaigns specifically 
targeted at Soviet youth with foreign music and dress being the primary targets.  
Consequently, the period saw a fierce anti-jazz campaign.22  Children’s animated 
cartoons denounced American style clothes, dancing and music as foreign to Soviet 
people, and called for the public to shame and ostracize individuals following these 
trends.23  Print publications also sought to single out such young people as “strange” and 
out of step with normal Soviet behavior.24    
 Early on, the call for public shaming of those deemed too foreign had some effect, 
with those dressing in Western style colorful fashions receiving the brunt of public 
indignation.  One stiliaga recalled receiving frequent comments such as “Young man, 
aren't you ashamed of yourself, walking around looking like a parakeet?” or “Look, some 
kind of monkey,” while riding the public transport.25   
 By the early 1950s, the state turned to using youth organizations in the fight 
against stiliagi.26  However, not all stiliagi were treated this way.  Vasilii, a young 
Moscow factory worker and secretary of the factory Komsomol organization, 
remembered few if any official repercussions or negative comments from his peers about 
his self-described stiliaga lifestyle.  According to Vasilii, for him, the stylish lifestyle was 
short-term and part-time.  He mentioned dressing up only after work to go to the dances, 
                                                        
21 See the chapter on official propaganda. 
22 Ryback, 11-12.  Also see Starr, Chapter 10. 
23 For example see 1949 cartoon, Foreign Voice (Chuzhoi golos) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-
T7xwuTxgU. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
24 Edele, 39. 
25 Quoted in Ibid, 43. 
26 Ibid, 42.  Yurchak, 171-172. 
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although sporting a stiliaga haircut even during work hours.27  Therefore, it appears that 
official as well as public concern with stiliagi centered largely on the more devoted 
followers of the trend.  Although as we will see later in the chapter, anti-stiliaga 
campaigns of the Khrushchev period sometimes went too far, forcing authorities to rein 
in overzealous local officials.         
 The Soviet press frequently denounced stiliagi as anti-Soviet in their manner of 
dress, dancing, and general attitude towards life.  In large part, this tied in with intense 
anti-Western campaign of the late Stalinist period.  The sight of Soviet adolescents 
dressed in colorful clothes and dancing to Western music ran contrary to official 
portrayal of Western culture as cheap and vulgar and in direct opposition to good and 
wholesome Soviet values.  Despite official labeling of the trend as anti-Soviet and 
proclamations of love for America over their Soviet homeland by some stiliagi, we 
should not take these statements at face value.  Instead, for most Soviet youth 
participating in the stiliagi trend this was likely a search for a unique self-identity, a 
process that often involves standing out from the crowd.  In fact, differentiating 
themselves from the “gray Soviet masses” was one of the main stiliaga traits.28  For many 
others, like above-mentioned Vasilii who did not take the trend too seriously, the stylish 
lifestyle was simply a cool thing to do, something to brighten-up the otherwise hard life 
of the post-war years.   
 Therefore, stiliaga associations with the West--a West of their own imaginations--
was not an act of siding with America against the Soviet Union as a system of 
                                                        
27 http://vk.com/wall57741583_7. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
28 Edele, 40.  Also see “Dvizhenie stiliag…” at http://www.stilyagispb.ru/9-dvizhenie-stilyag.html. 
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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government.  In actuality, stiliagi stayed away from all things political.29  For them the 
West was the mythical “other,” which was better, in the vaguest sense of the term, than 
the boring Soviet life for the upper class Soviet youth30 and better than the difficult 
Soviet life for majority of the others.    
 In addition, it is here that we start to see normalization of denounced behavior, 
often tied to consumption of Western popular culture, among the Soviet youth.  In writing 
about the “last Soviet generation” Alexei Yurchak rightly noted how many among the 
Soviet youth did not see themselves as the negative and anti-Soviet characters listening to 
Western music and dressing in Western fashions, described in the Soviet press.  
Moreover, according to Yurchak, the press chose to write about the most out of the 
ordinary and extreme cases.  In turn, this led to further normalization of such practices 
because majority did not identify with these portrayals.31  “[B]y focusing its attacks on an 
isolated phenomenon, the state made the more common and less extreme manifestation of 
Western symbols and tastes appear even more natural and congruent with the identity of a 
good Soviet person,” wrote Yurchak.32   
 We can easily apply Yurchak’s analysis to earlier decades.  “In reality, his face 
was human,” remembered one former follower of the trend upon seeing a stiliaga in 
Perm’ in 1960, referring to frequent depictions of stiliagi as monkeys in official press.33  
Already mentioned Vasili is another good example because he did not see a contradiction 
                                                        
29 Ibid, 58. 
30 In one example, a young Irish woman attending 1957 Moscow Youth Festival wrote about meeting a 
young and rich Soviet man whom she described as desperately seeking excitement that is provided by 
foreign things, especially jazz; see Belfrage, 22-26.  
31 Yurchak, 170-181. 
32 Ibid, 175. 
33 “Malenkie zlye Amerikanttsy” at http://www.stilyagispb.ru/137-malenkie-zlye-amerikancy.html.  
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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between being a stiliaga and head of the factory Komsomol organization, direct opposites 
by official standards.   
  
 
Talking about my generation: West and Soviet generational conflict 
 
 The Khrushchev period, while usually associated with a loosening of official 
restrictions in most spheres of Soviet life, the so-called “Thaw” period, saw increased 
condemnation of anyone thought to be imitating a Western lifestyle.  This was especially 
true of the Soviet youth.  These condemnations in part echoed a growing concern over 
World War II’s effect on Soviet children; authorities and many ordinary Soviets made 
direct and indirect associations between one’s consumption of Western culture such as 
fashion, music, movies and criminal activity.34  In large part, the battle over the “West” 
was also a generational conflict.  Any display or suggestion at liking something Western 
by the younger generation “amounted to a betrayal of the older generation’s sacrifice and 
suffering during the war,” noted David Caute.35  While he wrote about Western art, the 
same statement could be easily applied to most Western influences of the period.    
 The general post-Stalin relaxation saw the Soviet population increasingly exposed 
to the outside world.  The 1957 Youth Festival in Moscow was one of the more important 
events where Soviet young people got a chance to personally meet and talk with a 
number of their peers from other countries.  During the festival, besides friendly chit-
chat, young Soviets managed to listen and dance to new music, see different clothing 
styles as well as purchase goods from foreign visitors.36  An American visiting the Soviet 
                                                        
34 Caute, 458-460. Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 254-257. 
35 Caute, 220. 
36 Magnusdottir, 207-217.  
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Union in 1960 reported some instances where conversations with Americans during the 
festival changed household dynamics among younger Soviets after they heard that 
American husbands helped their wives around the house.37  Furthermore, close 
interaction between Soviets, mostly women, and foreigners of the opposite sex brought 
about increased discussion of sexuality in the Soviet state.38  
 The 1957 Youth Festival did have a significant impact on Soviet youth’s 
perception of itself, at least for those who were involved in it one way or the other.  It 
was, however, a one-time event.  On the other hand, Western radio stations, Voice of 
America being the most famous, started broadcasting into the Soviet Union in the late 
1940s and continued until the break-up of the country in the early 1990s.39  These 
broadcasts had a significant impact on Soviet adolescence - “it was the young people who 
became the first regular listeners of the Voice of America or the BBC.  It was the youth 
who casually strolled the beaches of Black Sea resorts with their radios loudly 
broadcasting news from Washington and London, alarming passersby,” wrote Vladimir 
Shlapentokh.40    
 It was not the news, however, that interested them.41  A majority listened for 
entertainment purposes, specifically to American music such as jazz.42  Moreover, by this 
time Western music was no longer confined to one segment of Soviet youth.   “By the 
mid-1950s, it was not simply the iconoclastic stiliagi who were indulging in decadent 
Western music.  Loyal and industrious socialist men and women, the models of the 
                                                        
37 Fischer, 101. 
38 Kristin Roth-Ey, “Loose Girls’ on the Loose?”, 75-95. 
39 I discuss the issue of Western radio in much more detail in my chapter on unofficial information. 
40 Shlapentokh, Soviet public opinion and ideology, 138. 
41 Open and loud listening of Western broadcasts was clearly a gesture of rebellion, a wish to stand out--  
much like stiliagi wearing colorful clothes in public. 
42 See my discussion of Western radio in chapter on unofficial information. 
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socialist upbringing, not only danced to but also publicly defended the “ape culture” 
coming from the West,” stressed Timothy Ryback.43   
 Perceptions about the West became central to trans-generational debate about 
what it meant to be Soviet.  Many of those who participated in the war saw adoption of 
Western music, fashion and other symbols from the West as somehow a rejection of the 
Soviet system that they fought so hard to preserve.  “We didn’t need obscene paintings or 
boogie-woogie at Stalingrad!” wrote David Caute, capturing the sentiment of the older 
Russians.44  Interestingly, many of those who lived through and participated in the war 
had no such reservations in years immediately following World War II.  “The newspapers 
said that American people donated clothing for Red Army officers.  Where is it?” asked 
one veteran in 1946.45  “We have lots of American clothes and foodstuffs, but who 
receives it?” complained a 78-year-old woman in a letter to Kliment Voroshilov, a high-
ranking member of the Politburo.46          
 So why was it acceptable to ask openly for American clothes during and 
immediately following the war, and then look at them as an anti-Soviet phenomenon a 
few years after?  Partly this can be explained by severe goods shortages in years 
following the war, but also by the changing status of America in official propaganda.  
U.S. was a close ally during the war and some of those feelings carried over into 
immediate post-war years.  The onset of the Cold War and intense anti-American 
campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s turned America into Soviet Union’s greatest 
enemy.  Consequently, for those youth trying to separate themselves from the “grey 
                                                        
43 Ryback, 17. 
44 Caute, 220. 
45 Zubkova, Sovetskaia zhizn’, 1945-1953, 328. 
46 Ibid, 82. 
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masses,” America became the best way of accomplishing this goal.  On the other side, 
those who strongly identified with the Soviet state saw any use of American/Western 
symbols as a rejection of that system.  In other words, people with intense opinions about 
the Soviet reality, positive or negative, used America (and the West more generally) as a 
tool to showcase their beliefs. 
 Somewhere in the middle were a majority of the people who did not see things as 
black and white.  For them, listening and dancing to American music did not mean their 
disapproval of the Soviet state; neither did wearing an American style jacket or dress.   
As I mentioned in the section on Western broadcasting, most of those listening to 
Western radio did so because they were not getting enough information and 
entertainment from domestic radio, not because they wanted to overthrow the Soviet 
government.  The 1962 movie Lenin’s Outpost (Zastava Il’icha),47 not released in its full 
version until 1990s because of its frank depiction of Soviet youth, highlights this point.  
In the movie, young people from all walks of life, for the most part committed to the 
Soviet system, frequently danced to American music during street and apartment parties.  
In the movie, listening and dancing to American tunes was simply not a major issue.  Not 
once did the young characters discuss their choice of music as being an act of rebellion or 
having any political message.48 
 In fact, the only time the theme of Western influences came up was within the 
context of generational conflict.  In one scene, a female character challenges her father’s 
                                                        
47 Originally the censored version of the movie was released in 1965 under the title I Am Twenty (Mne 
dvadtsat’ let). 
48 On an interesting side-note, the movie showed young people treating their participation in May Day 
parade as a social event with little connection to the meaning of the actual holiday.  Therefore, it appears 
that the process where official rituals took on meanings other than official ones among the participants 
started earlier than suggested by Alexei Yurchak, who wrote about the Brezhnev period;seeYurchak, 121.    
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assumptions that her generation is somehow going down the wrong path by saying: “So 
sometimes they show us foreign movies and let us buy foreign clothes once in a while.”  
By this, she meant that she did not see these things as necessarily a negative 
phenomenon.  Stephen Bittner also described what he called a “fathers and sons”49 
generational split over Western music in the Thaw period.50  
 The issue made it on to the national center stage in 1960 when local authorities in 
resort town of Sochi arrested and disciplined several young people for being stiliagi.  
National leadership, wishing to tone down the anti-stiliagi campaign, directed publication 
of an article denouncing overzealousness of Sochi officials.51  The article, published in 
Izvestiia on 24 October 1960, criticized Sochi authorities for going too far by printing a 
picture of one of the offenders who simply wore a red shirt with an umbrella pattern.  
Furthermore, Izvestiia pointed out that the woman arrested over her stiliagi pants, in fact 
bought them at GUM (the central department store in Moscow).52      
 Resulting comments divided along generational lines.  Letters in support of the 
Sochi officials, written largely by older individuals, denounced the dress code of 
offending parties as anti-Soviet.  One letter stated that these fashions carried over to the 
Soviet Union by the “not so fresh winds from the West.”53  Another claimed that these 
were “American aesthetics” and when Izvestiia article talked about freedom to wear what 
                                                        
49 A reference to Ivan Turgenev’s 1862 novel dealing with generational issues of the period. 
50 Bittner, 67. 
51 The year 1960 seems to have been the pinnacle of the campaign, possibly a response to growing concern 
over juvenile hooliganism that was tied to Western influences (for more on this see Brian LaPierre, 
“Redefining Deviance: Policing and Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev’s Russia, 1953-1964” (PhD 
diss., University of Chicago, 2006)), and in order to combat Western influences from 1959 American 
exhibition in Moscow as well as to raise awareness of Western espionage shortly after the U2 incident.  In 
one extreme example, Ronald Hingley, professor of Russian studies at Oxford, reported being taken for a 
stiliaga and kicked out of a dance venue in summer of 1960 and told “We don’t allow your sort in here;” 
see Hingley, Under Soviet Skins, 51.  
52 RGANI f. 5 op. 33 d. 139 l. 62. 
53 RGANI f. 5 op. 33 d. 139 l. 65. 
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you want they must have been talking about “American freedom.”  Many others 
seconded the statement by pointing out that socialist morals regarding a dress code, as 
well as aesthetics, were different from those in the West, with one person writing: “we 
are against those who think themselves exceptional and try to prove this by wearing 
unusual clothes and thus standing out from the collective mass of good Soviet people.”  
Finally, one letter went as far as to suggest that if not opposed now, foreign influences 
will destroy the Russian spirit in the country.54   
 Obviously, many older Soviets saw any new (that is to say, different) fashion, or 
music or other manifestations of consumer culture even ones sold in Soviet stores, as pro-
American and therefore somehow dangerous to Soviet way of life.  “They believed the 
United States was an enemy that wanted to deprive them of their hard-won gains.  
Therefore, these individuals continued to respond favorably to the themes – promoted 
unflaggingly by the propaganda--that endorsed xenophobic isolationism and the Soviet 
way of life and thinking”, wrote Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok in describing what 
they called the “old middle class of Russia (bureaucrats and employees of service 
industries in particular), as well as the bulk of peasantry and blue-collar workers.”55  
 On the other side there were those who defended Izvestiia article, a majority of 
them young people.  Many reiterated Izvestiia’s point that these were perfectly acceptable 
fashions openly sold in many Soviet clothing stores.  And finally, it was nobody’s 
business what kind of clothing people wore, with a number of letters sarcastically asking 
                                                        
54 RGANI f. 5 op. 33 d. 139 l. 65 – 95. 
55 Shiraev and Zubok, 23-24. 
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whether they should send in pictures of their clothes for approval before coming to 
Sochi.56        
 Of course the main issue here was not the style of a person’s pants but perception 
of foreign things as harmful to and incompatible with the Soviet way of life among many 
members of the older generation.  At the same time, these examples saw many in the 
younger generation easily combine cultural products from the West, such as music and 
fashion, with their sense of being productive members of the Soviet system.  The West, 
American being its most obvious representative, was used by both generations to define 
their ideas about what it meant to be a Soviet person. 
 The topic of generational differences continued into the late 1960s and even 
became a centerpiece of November 1967 Life magazine.  The Life article, titled “Battle of 
Generations” featured pictures of “Westernized” Soviet youth and talked about the new 
generation’s desire to find their own way of building a socialist society, in which, 
according to the article, they still strongly believed.57 
 An increase in hooliganism, or petty crimes, in the mid-1950s, also played a 
significant role in growth of anti-Western feelings among the general population as well 
the Soviet government.  Official propaganda portrayed the hooligans as young and 
uncultured, choosing drinking, smoking and partying over useful socialist labor.58  For 
the most part, stiliagi, and others who chose to dress or wear their hair in Western fashion 
and listen to Western music were depicted in similar colors. A 1956 propaganda film 
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
57 It is possible that in talking about the Soviet youth the article was in part influenced by the growing 
American counter-culture - wearing different clothes, listening to different music, espousing different 
sexual morals.  Therefore, the article can be seen as an expression of hope that Cold War would slowly fade 
away once younger generations came to power.  
58 LaPierre, 51-60. 
  297 
showed stiliagi dress and act similar to hooligans, and at one point using the words 
interchangeably.59  Another propaganda movie from the period compared the world of 
Western fashions and rock and roll to the world of shadows and back alleys.  Participants 
in this shadowy underworld chose restaurants, drunkenness, debauchery, vulgar 
entertainment and crime instead of the normal life of worrying about exams, honest work, 
and starting a family—that is, expected Soviet behavior (see Illustration 15).60  In a 
similar fashion, an Izvestiia newspaper described a hooligan as someone who “organizes 




60 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
61 Quoted from January 1956 Izvestiia newpaper in LaPierre, 55. 
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A world of shadows vs. a world of light (Illustration 15)62 
 
 In no uncertain terms, official discourse on the subject offered Soviet youth two 
roads in life.  One, paved with Western goods, money, restaurants, alcohol, debauchery, 
and crime, led to the “dark side,” in this case literally.  If not vigilant, one could easily 
fall victim to a Western plot to corrupt the Soviet youth, something they had already done 
to their own children, claimed Soviet propaganda.   A Kiev Philharmonic soloist in an 
interview published in a Ukrainian newspaper observed:   
 
 [P]opular music in the West was an insidious weapon used by the imperialist to dull the 
senses of young people and turn them into killers …who could bloodily hurl napalm onto 
Vietnamese farms and villages.63 
 
The other path included school, honest work, consumption of appropriate cultural 
products (that is, ones approved by the state), good friends and family.  This road took 
one to the bright world of honest and rewarding socialist lifestyle.                 
 Furthermore, domestic media emasculated both male hooligans and stiliagi, 
suggesting they fell far short of Soviet masculine ideal.  The media portrayed stiliagi as 
having lost touch with their masculinity by ridiculing their haircuts that were so long that 
people could not tell whether the person was a boy or a girl.64  One film showed stiliagi 
wearing women’s scarves.65  Hooligans, according to official media, were cowards who 
picked on the weak, first ones to “shove a woman, to insult a child,”66 but quickly ran 
                                                        
62 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA 
63 Quoted in Caute, 465. 
64 See 1956 propaganda film available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTIKJ__GZgA.  Accessed 
April 22, 2012. 
65 For example see movie Foreigners (Inostrantsy) – 1961. 
66 Quoted from January 1956 Izvestiia newpaper in LaPierre, 55. 
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away when confronted by a strong male hand.67  Women associating with such characters 
were sometimes labeled as promiscuous,68 although they were much more likely to have 
been characterized as victims having been caught up with the wrong crowd.69     
 Official propaganda dehumanized both hooligans and stiliagi.  “When will you 
become human?” a mother asks her stiliaga son in 1961 movie Foreigners (Inostrantsy).  
Western music and fashions were frequently compared to that of monkeys or other 
animals (see Illustrations 16).70  And hooligans frequently compared to “predatory 
animals.”71  Films used words usually reserved for animals when describing this “dark” 
sub-culture.72   The world of shadows was in clear opposition to the world of “real [that 
is, Soviet] human values” and officials called on the rest of Soviet society to “make 
humans out of shadows.“73   
 
                                                        
67 See early 1960s propaganda movie available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA. 
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
68 For example see movie Foreigners (Inostrantsy) – 1961. 
69 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
70 In 1961 movie Foreigners (Inostrantsy), stiliagi are shown listening to animal sounds while describing it 
as American music.  Also see various caricatures of stiliagi in Krokodil magazine: 
http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/sashenka2005/post139837209/. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
71 LaPierre, 62-63. 
72 1956 official propaganda movie available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA. 
Accessed April 22, 2012.  For example, word koposhit'sia means “to putter around” or “dig through 
things”.  Judging by intonation of the narrator and context of the movie, the word is more appropriate when 




Soviet followers of Western trends on the pages of Krokodil magazine (Illustration 
16) 
  
 As a last resort, Soviet authorities tried to combat Western trends by inventing 
domestic counterparts.  For example, in order to battle the jitterbug and later the twist, 
Soviet officials tried inventing “socialist dances.”74   In another instance, the Komsomol 
tried to upgrade youth clubs and host entertainment nights to counteract Western 
influences.  However, a majority of these attempts to “domesticate” Western music did 
not achieve desired results.  For example, at one Komsomol club in 1966 “the events 
proved so boring that guards were employed to keep the young people from fleeing the 
                                                        
74 Ryback, 29, 53-55. 
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club before the events ended.”75  Not all of these efforts ended in failure.  Sergei Zhuk 
found that in the 1960s Soviet efforts to co-opt Beatlemania by sponsoring local groups 
that sounded like the Beatles, but with Russian lyrics, found some success.76  Another 
notable exception was Dean Reed, an American singer who achieved popularity in Soviet 
bloc countries in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly among the younger demographic.77   
 Heavy censorship and official criticism intensified the “forbidden fruit” factor.  
Some young people listened to Western music because it was illegal and frowned upon.78  
In most cases, foreign music was simply much “cooler” and more exciting than its 
domestic counterpart, regardless of the quality.  A group of Americans traveling through 
the Soviet Union in the 1970s reported seeing music numbers by Irish and Soviet groups 
during the same concert where the Irish group was given a much warmer reception by the 
young audience even though Americans thought the Soviet group better of the two.79  
When asked their opinion of traditional Russian music by a British journalist in 1963, a 
young man, speaking for the group, responded  
 
that traditional music was all right in its place at feast days and official celebrations but 
that he and his generation had had enough of it. "I could murder the fellow who wrote 
that song about the Ukrainian looking at the towel his mother had given him," he added. 
"It's really terrible stuff. Not contemporary”80  
  
 The Soviet state sought to define behavior and lifestyle appropriate for Soviet 
youth.  As we have seen from the examples above, many young people did not agree with 
                                                        
75 Ibid, 107. 
76 Zhuk, 84-85. 
77 I briefly mention Reed in the chapter on official propaganda. For a more detailed account of Dean Reed 
please see books by Laszewski and Nadelson. 
78 Belfrage, 76. 
79 NA P142/47/33 p.20. 
80 Van Der Post, 131. 
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official vision, not seeing Soviet values as opposed to wearing Western style clothes and 
listening to American music. 
 In this respect, despite the overall success of official propaganda in shaping public 
perception about the United States, here it clearly failed in its goal of convincing a 
majority of Soviet youth that Western cultural products such as popular music and 
fashion were anti-Soviet.  There were a number of reasons for this failure.   
 For the average Soviet person, it was nearly impossible to verify most information 
about America without actually going there.  Here, however, young Soviets could see 
their friends listening and dancing to American music.  These friends did not wish to 
overthrow the Soviet government or kill their loved ones for money.  They were not 
hooligans, criminals, anti-Soviet, or uncultured savages.  For the most part they were 
loyal Soviet citizens who just wanted to find their place in the world, or escape their 
boring and sometimes difficult lives.   Young Soviets could not check official claims on 
American unemployment or racism.  They did, however, see that official propaganda 
about the dangers of American clothes and music did not correspond to reality. 
 Furthermore, official portrayals of stiliagi as a small and marginalized group of 
criminally-inclined misfits often turned out to be quite the opposite in real life.  In fact, a 
majority of Western goods and trends came into the country via Soviet soldiers serving 
abroad or children of the Soviet elite whose parents had the opportunity to travel outside 
the country.  These Golden Youths were often at the forefront of Western trends.81  In 
                                                        
81 Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 41; Ryback, 21. Belfrage, 22-26.  I borrow the term “Golden Youth” 
(zolotaia molodezh) from Edele who mentioned that this was a “term used by contemporaries to describe 
the children of the absolute top of Stalinist society,” See Edele, 38.  
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1952, one Soviet youth witnessed how “a KGB [officer’s]82 daughter flew up and down 
in a wild boogie-woogie” at party in Moscow.83  In 1958, a jazz band led by a son of a 
police major caused a wild commotion at a Moscow concert by playing rock and roll 
music.84  Clearly, official depictions of Westernized youth as degenerate outcasts did not 
go well with images of Golden Youth participating and sometimes leading the very 
things their parents condemned. 
 We should not, however, overestimate Soviet youth’s acceptance of Western 
trends, or those who followed them, in this period.  Most did not see those engaged in 
such activity in the overly negative light of official media.  It, however, did not mean that 
young people welcomed or sympathized with this phenomenon.  A team of Soviet 
sociologists led by Boris Grushin conducted a large (about 18 thousand participants) 
public opinion study of young Soviet men and women between the ages of 15-30 in the 
early 1960s.  The study revealed that respondents saw “followers of Western trends” as 
the second-most negative trait effecting younger generation, behind alcohol abuse.85 
 The study also showed that a negative attitude towards Western trends 
corresponded to level of education.  Those who did not finish high-school saw it as a 
problem at twice the rate of people with higher education.86  Interestingly, there was little 
difference between residents of large cities, except for Moscow, and people living in rural 
                                                        
82 In his article Edele uses the phrase “KGB boss’s daughter”, perhaps unintentionally implying the girl’s 
father was the head of the KGB. In the original, Vassily Aksyonov, the author of the article, stated that the 
girl’s father was “a high-ranking KGB officer;” see Vassily Aksyonov, “Aksyonov in America: Hating 
(And Loving) the U.S.A,”  The Wilson Quarterly 11:5 (Winter 1987), 161-169. 
83 Edele, 41. 
84 Ryback, 30-31. 
85 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii, 182. 
86 Ibid.  Again, one should be careful in assuming that all of those with low levels of education condemned 
Western trends.  Along with earlier example of Vasilii, a factory worker, there were reports of Soviet port 
and other factory workers (occupations with traditionally lower levels of education) dressing up in what at 
least some people determined to be stiliagi style clothes, Ibid, 175. 
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areas in their view of stiliagi.87  In fact, rural respondents’ negative attitude towards 
stiligi was tied for the lowest with Muscovites.  This can be explained by greater 
preoccupation with alcohol abuse in rural areas (as can be seen from the survey), lower 
numbers of stiliagi in the countryside, and from rural residents’ perspective, normal 
urban styles already looked strange, and the stiliagi’s style wasn’t stranger.  
 A 24 year old carpenter from Urupinsk, town in southwestern Russia, provided an 
answer typical of those with lower level of education.  Writing about negative 
characteristics of the younger generation, he stated: 
 
[The main negative characteristics of younger generation are:] bowing before foreign 
fashions, empty music and dances.  I know a few young people in my town who are 
happy not to study or work, instead living off their parents.  Their manner of dress is 
laughable.  They grow out long hair, muttonchops and beards, as if they just came from 
an uninhabited island.  They are nowhere to be seen during the day, hiding like moles.  At 
night you can find them at the movies, drama theater, or youth dances.  In the Soviet 
Union their numbers are very small and I think in the near future we will teach them how 
to have respect for society and to work and live like the rest of their contemporaries.88      
 
A more moderate view came from a 22-year-old member of the Soviet military who 
stressed that he also liked to dress fashionably but some of his peers took it too far, 
making themselves look ridiculous by wearing “Texas pants” and outrageous ties.89      
 Grushin team’s findings closely parallel popular responses to official propaganda 
about the West among general population.  As I mentioned in the chapter on official 
propaganda, one’s educational level and access to outside information strongly 
corresponded to the level of trust they put in official media.  We can clearly see this when 
Urupinsk carpenter’s comments closely resembled denunciations of stiliagi in official 
media. 
                                                        
87 Ibid.  
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 For-Sale Men: Soviet black-market and the West 
  
 Fast growing demand for all things Western among the younger generation, and 
the deficit of quality consumer good in general, created an extensive black market for 
such products.  At the center of this underground economy stood a character called a 
fartsovshik.90  The fartsovshchik was most likely young and male, although women 
participated as well.91  He dressed in Western style clothes, frequently hung out at 
restaurants, and had money to spend.92  One Soviet writer described his fartsovshchik 
friend in this way: “He was elegantly dressed.  He did not look like a Soviet person, more 
like an American or a European – fancy tie, coat, pants, and a suit that he made himself 
from American blueprints.”93   
 Furthermore, fartsovshchiki had their own language, one heavily permeated with 
English words because among fartsovshchiki America and American things were 
synonymous with good and quality.  For example, in fartsovshchik argot, to treat 
someone in “an American way” meant to treat someone well.  To have “an American 
supper” meant to have a good supper as opposed to having a Slavic, or bad, supper.94  
                                                        
90 The term appears to be a variation of the word forsel’shik, Russian version of English phrase “for sale,” 
often used by fartsovshiki when trying to buy goods from foreigners, see B. N. Timofeev  Pravel’no my 
govorim? (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1961).   
91 Lee, 23-26. 
92 For example see an interview with former fartsovshik in Sovetskaia Belorussiia 7/16/2010.  Available at 
http://pda.sb.by/post/102736/.  Accessed April 22, 2012. Also, Pavel Romanov and Elena Iarskaia-
Smirnova, “Fartsa: Podpol’e Sovetskogo obshestva potrebleniia,” Neprikosnovennyi Zapas.  5(43) 2005.  
Available at http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2005/43/ro12.html.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
93 Quoted in Ibid. 
94 Michael Korovkin, “An Account of Social Usages of Americanized Argot in Modern Russia” Language 
in Society 16:4 (1987), 515.  
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These meanings had little to do with the actual way Americans treated each other and 
others, or the quality of American meals.             
 Frequently, fartsovshchiki came from privileged backgrounds; their parents 
occupied high-level positions within the Soviet hierarchy.95  This was especially true of 
the decades immediately following World War II, the late 1940s-early 1960s, when few 
outside the elite circle had access to foreign goods, or a sense of invincibility due to 
official status of their parents.  By the late 1960s, with the increase of foreigners coming 
to the Soviet Union and Soviets traveling abroad, the black market for foreign goods 
expanded, involving people from all walks of life.96 
 Officially, the fartsovshchik occupied a space somewhere between stiliaga and 
hooligan, more stylish than a hooligan and more criminal than a stiliaga.  One Soviet 
movie showed fartsovshchiki as almost comical figures, willing to adopt any style and 
listen to any music only because those things came from America.  At the same time they 
were literally willing to tear clothes off the backs of foreign tourists.97 
 In real life, the Soviet government did not see fartsovshchiki as a laughing matter.  
In anti-speculator campaign in 1961, Soviet court sentenced four currency speculators, 
activity often associated with fartsovshchiki, to death.98  Others received a lesser sentence 
of twelve years in prison.99  Extreme severity of punishment, however, was simply due to 
the show nature of the campaign.100  In later years, fartsovshchiki acted quite openly,101 
                                                        
95 Interview with former fartsovshik at http://pda.sb.by/post/102736/.  Accessed April 22, 2012.  Lee, 23-
26. 
96 Romanov and Iarskaia-Smirnova. 
97 Foreigners (Inostrantsy) – 1961. 
98 Interview with former Moscow fartsovshik Yuri Zakhar at 
http://www.masterstudio.narod.ru/bucher/bucher6/farzovshik.htm. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Apparently KGB began building a case against currency speculators as a response to complaints by 
several prominent foreign visitors that people wanting to exchange foreign currency pestered them during 
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and while still persecuted by authorities, they could often escape legal problems by 
bribing officials.102       
 The vast majority of foreign tourists to the Soviet Union remembered having been 
approached by one of these characters.  Ronald Hingley, visiting the Soviet Union from 
England in 1960, recalled: 
 
It is rare to meet a tourist returning from Russia who has not been pestered in the streets 
to sell the clothes off his back, flog pound notes for six times their official value or buy 
ikons which, if not fakes, will probably be taken off him by a Soviet customs official at 
the border.”103    
 
Others reported being hassled for gum and ball-point pens.104   
 Strong demand and limited availability of Western goods meant handsome profits 
for those who managed to engage in this trade without getting caught.  American 
journalist Harrison Salisbury, working in the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, reported 
that “old, secondhand American records which wouldn’t bring a nickel at a Goodwill 
store in the U.S.A. can be sold in Moscow for twenty-five rubles [a large sum at the time] 
apiece.”105  One Belorussian for-sale-man reported earning enough for a brand new car in 
two weeks in the early 1970s, as well as having enough money that his wife never wore a 
dress more than once.106   
                                                                                                                                                                     
their stay in the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev himself weighted in on the sentence, seeing it as just - 
http://fisechko.ru/100vel/kaznei/99.htm#n_43. 
101 Lee, 23-26. Bernard Newman, Visa to Russia (London: H. Jenkins, 1959), 95; Ray Pierre Corsini, 
Caviar for Breakfast (London: Harvill, 1967), 20. 
102 Interview with former fartsovshik at http://pda.sb.by/post/102736/. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
103 Hingley, Under Soviet Skins, 53. 
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105 Salisbury, American in Moscow, 112. 
106 Interview with former fartsovshik at http://pda.sb.by/post/102736/. Accessed April 22, 2012.  While 
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 What motivated people to become fartsovshchiki?  Soviet media suggested they 
did it out of sheer stupidity and blind admiration of the West.107  In reality, money 
appears to have been the primary motivation for a majority of fartsovshchiki.  “I wanted 
to live a normal [that is, comfortable] life,” stated one former fartsovshchik when asked 
about the reasons for choosing such a profession.108  Others reported similar 
motivations.109  Some fartsovshchiki claimed their lifestyle was a way of helping people 
obtain necessary goods, stand out from the crowd or experience the thrill of doing 
something illegal.110  While probably true in some cases, it is easy to imagine other ways 
for people to achieve similar results, if they were truly altruistic, they could have charged 
a lesser markup; or to gain visibility through legal means; or engaged in petty, but equally 
thrilling, violations of the law.    
 How did average people view these blackmarketeers?  It is not hard to imagine 
that a number of young Soviets looked at them with admiration and jealousy, as they 
stood out from the crowd and lived a life of luxury.  For many others, the “seller of 
deficit goods became class enemies, soulless and spiritless shysters,” wrote sociologists 
Pavel Romanov and Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova.111  The resentment is not surprising, given 
that the vast majority of Soviet people could only dream of the fartsovshchik lifestyle.  
While working full-time jobs and taking care of their families, few Soviets had access to 
quality foreign goods, and even fewer had enough money to buy a car or eat out at 
restaurants.  Consequently, the word speculator (spekuliant), usually associated with 
                                                        
107 1960s propaganda movie available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W4mDYumxSA. 
Movie Foreigners (Inostrantsy) – 1961. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
108 Interview with former fartsovshik at http://pda.sb.by/post/102736/. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
109 Interview with former Moscow fartsovshik Yuri Zakhar at 
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fartsovshchiki and the black market in general, became a common derogatory label for 
anyone perceived to have more money than the average person.    
 
Times they are a changin’: Soviet youth in late socialism 
 
 In 1968, in an unsolicited report to authorities, a Soviet university student 
described some aspects of the student life in Odessa in the following way: 
 
- A majority of students prefer foreign radio.  [Because it has] more detailed news 
and more interesting programs.  Almost every room has a radio.  A frequent 
expression among students is “But the “Voice” [VOA] said that…” 
- Since Odessa is a big port, students see lots of foreigners and often admire 
anything Western.  Phrases “from the States” are synonymous with the highest 
class. 
- Common phrases heard among students – “Americans are smart people because 
they don’t have a communist party” and “Their unemployed live better than our 
engineers.” 
- Students are eager to “fight for something”, so they fight for Western fashion and 
dances. 
- Western movies such as the “Magnificent Seven” have a strong impact on Soviet 
youth, who often imitate them, because they have a strong hero characters. 
-  Student phrase “I don’t care if its socialism or capitalism as long as I am paid 
well.” 
- Interest in sexuality is an area where Western influence is the strongest. 
- Western women are considered prettier and better taken care of as opposed to our 
“cows.”  The expression “free love” is popular.112 
 
The information in the report is telling not just in frequent mention of Soviet students’ 
seeming admiration of the West, but also in highlighting the growth of consumerism and 
desire for a more comfortable and freer life among the younger generation.  In talking 
about high salaries in America, desire for a large paycheck regardless of which economic 
system provided it, sexuality, and Western entertainment, a growing number of Soviet 
youth voiced their appetite for a life free of deficits in consumer goods, better and more 
                                                        
112 RGANI f. 5 op. 60 d. 48  l. 133-152. 
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diverse entertainment, as well as more life-affirming goals.113  In other words, these 
students wanted a life that had a meaning, more choices, and to enjoy life, not struggle 
through it.     
 Already in the early 1960s, some among the younger generation began to notice 
greater preoccupation with material wellbeing among their contemporaries. “You only 
live once so take everything you can from life,” wrote a 21-year-old female student from 
Penza describing a certain attitude among some of her peers (especially women) in an 
early 1960s sociological survey.114  Others noted consumerism and lack of enthusiasm in 
Party activities and work.115  Issues directly related to consumerism, and preoccupation 
with material wellbeing and material things, made up five out of top ten negative traits of 
the younger generation, as seen by their peers in the above-mentioned survey.116        
 Adolescents were not the only segment of Soviet society increasingly preoccupied 
with material quality of life.  A number of scholars identified similar trends in various 
other parts of Soviet society from 1960s to break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s.117  For example, writing about 1960s Soviet generation’s infatuation with Ernest 
Hemingway, Vail’ and Genis noticed that Soviets liked what they perceived to be 
Hemingway’s attitude toward life rather than the insights from his writing.  People copied 
his clothing style, abandoning the suit for the sweater in a rebellion of materialism over 
the world of only ideas because in Hemingway’s books people enjoyed life: food, fun, 
                                                        
113 For example, a 1976 KGB report on school age youth and university students pointed out that a number 
of Soviet youth thought social work in the country was too traditional and primitive, not allowing for full 
individual development; see “Analiticheskaia spravka KGB SSSR o kharaktere i prichinakh negativnykh 
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116 Ibid, 180. 
117 Millar, 53.  Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People, 76-79, Smith, 178. 
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and drink.118  New York Times correspondent David Shipler wrote of Soviet society in the 
late 1970s: 
 
the qualities in America that the Russians came to admire were not those that many 
Americans hoped to export.  A powerful lust developed for the material goods and 
popular styles of American society, a craving for the exotic artifacts of the consumer 
culture.  In Moscow and other major cities a lucrative black market flourished in jeans, 
rock records, chewing gum, and American cigarettes.  Faddish teenagers slapped English 
words into Russian slang and sported dungaree jackets with American flags sewn on the 
sleeves.119 
 
 The lives of Soviets in the Brezhnev period no longer revolved around the 
hardships of World War II and post-war reconstruction.  If the previous generation could 
blame the war for their present day struggles and hope for a brighter future, by 1960s, the 
government was running out of excuses.  As we have seen in the chapter on official 
propaganda, the authorities tried to divert attention away from consumer goods by 
promoting Soviet achievements in space, but it was a short-term solution. 
 Much like the post-war youth, however, the Brezhnev youth did not reject the 
Soviet system outright.  Instead, they chose to simply graft desire for material comforts, 
self-expression, and a particular type (one outside the system) of entertainment and 
relaxation onto it. 120  “Just because we dig Jimi Hendrix doesn’t mean we are any less 
ready to fight for our country,” stated a Russian fan of rock music.121   A majority of 
Soviet youth were comfortable with the social benefits of free education and healthcare 
provided to them by the Soviet system, but wanted to dress better, live in their own 
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120  As if often the case, adolescents seek to find their identity outside the system, or at least what they 
perceive to be outside the system--in other words, a youthful rebellion.  As far as general entertainment we 
must note that by the late 1960s, Soviet entertainment industry, particularly TV, did adjust to the needs of 
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apartments, have meaningful goals, and carve out their own space outside the one 
prescribed by the state. 
 Let us consider two examples of Soviet young people mentioned by Andrea Lee, 
an American graduate student who lived in Moscow for ten months in the late 1970s.  
Grigorii, our first example, was a journalism student who genuinely believed in 
superiority of Soviet system over the West.  At the same time, he decorated his office 
space with Western advertisements, and listened to Western music - constantly playing 
Donna Summer’s “Love to Love You, Baby” “to the delighted horror of his friends.”122  
Tolia, our second illustration, was a “Komsomol member so highly respected that he 
heads his own study group.”123  Being an active Komsomol member, however, did not 
prevent Tolia from being an avid consumer of things American, which except in some 
rare cases could only be obtained on the black market.  He owned many pairs of 
American jeans and other clothing items, and in his apartment “bottles of American after-
shave and mouthwash and can of American air freshener are artistically set out, like so 
many bibelots.”124  Both Grigorii and Tolia created a hybrid version of the Soviet Union 
that combined socialist principles with Western, primarily American, popular culture.  In 
their version of the Soviet Union, one could listen to Donna Summer and wear Wrangler 
jeans while believing in eventual downfall of the corrupt and unjust system that produced 
them.   
 In the 1970s and 1980s, American things became status symbols, especially 
among the younger Soviets.  If early stiliagi used brands to separate themselves within 
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the group from those in other socio-economic classes,125 by the 1970s, brands became a 
way for people to advertise their position within a wider society.  Wearing stylish and 
difficult-to-obtain American clothes signaled that the wearer had money and/or 
connections.   This was especially important for younger Soviets, who also used Western 
symbols to stand out.  Noting a sociological study from the 1970s, Vladimir Shlapentokh 
wrote:  
 
female teenagers in Moscow were asked whether they would date young men who did 
not wear jeans.  To the great surprise of the Soviet sociologist who cites the data, the 
majority said “nyet.”126 
 
 Young people, however, were not exclusive in using Western products as status 
symbols.  For example, in 1982 movie Private Life (Chastnaia Zhizn’), the director of a 
large automobile factory smokes Marlboro cigarettes to underscore his high-level 
position.  This example also showed that Soviets were developing a nascent recognition 
of Western brands.  Already in the 1950s, stiliagi put Soviet cigarettes in Pall Mall and 
Camel packs for prestige.127   In the late 1970s, some children of the Soviet elite defined 
themselves based on whether they preferred Levi’s or Wrangler denim.128  
 Imitation of Western trends and use of Western symbols was especially important 
among Soviet subculture groups such as hippies, rock and soccer fans, and fartsovshchiki 
whom we already mentioned.  They frequently dressed, acted and listened to music just 
like they thought people did in the West.  And when a rare opportunity presented itself, 
they tried to see if their mimicry was up-to-par.  American tourists in the Soviet Union 
                                                        
125 Edele, 38. 
126 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People, 151.  American journalist David 
Shiplet recorded an incident where  “One Russian cleaning lady was shocked when American woman 
threw away a Lee label of her jeans.  The Russian took it home and attached it to her son’s jeans.”  See 
Shipler, 352. 
127 Edele, 42. 
128 Lee, 54. 
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often faced questions about current trends among American hippies and the latest gossip 
about the Beatles and the Rolling Stones.129  Sometimes, without a proper context, Soviet 
followers of Western trends were either years behind the West or focused their energy on 
trends relatively unknown even in their country of origin.130   Facing questions about 
contemporary American hippy culture from a group of Soviet hippies in the late 1970s, 
Andrea Lee recalled the following scene: 
 
The faces of the group bent in toward me, their eyes searching mine ravenously.  I felt a 
curious embarrassment as I tried to describe to them the changed temper of the seventies.  
It was a near-sad feeling, as if I were a bearer of tidings to an isolated group of believers 
that their leaders had lost the faith.131  
  
 Furthermore, possessing little concrete information about the things they imitated, 
young Soviets often created their own meanings.  Fartsovshchiki and soccer gangs used 
English words and phrases that had little significance to people outside their groups, 
English or Russian.132   At times, local interpretations of the same thing differed 
depending on the city, and sometimes became the exact opposites of those popular in the 
West.  For example, the heavy metal band Black Sabbath, whose members wore crosses, 
inspired religious revival among certain segments of Soviet youth in Dnepropetrovsk 
(Ukraine).133   In the West, Black Sabbath was frequently associated with black magic 
and Satanism.  In Moscow youth liked Black Sabbath because of its message of “defiance 
and aggression,” a meaning closer to one found in the West.134 
                                                        
129 Kuhn, 98; Lee, 90-91;  Smith, 469.  
130 Veil’ and Genis, 216. 
131 Lee, 90-91. 
132 For examples of fartsovshik argot see Korovkin, 515.  For soccer gang argot see John Bushnell,  
Moscow Graffiti: Language and Subculture  (Boston : Unwin Hyman, 1990), 29-66. 
133 Zhuk, 204-206. 
134 Bushnell, 81-89. 
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 Raised in the Soviet Union, young people naturally adopted a lot of Soviet 
characteristics into their subcultures.  In their groups, hippies in L’viv (Ukraine) 
incorporated elements from Communist Youth organizations.135  Others, including 
political opposition groups, also borrowed organizational structures from official 
institutions.136   
 Here we come to a rather obvious question:  Why copy the West, especially 
America?  Why not imitate India, or Cuba?  In part, the answer lies in simple matter of 
availability.  Western, largely American, content was most readily available for 
consumption by Soviet youth.  VOA and RL broadcasted non-stop day and night to the 
Soviet Union, when young people tuned in to hear the latest jazz and pop music.  
Moreover, American music already had deep roots in Soviet youth culture, going back as 
far as the 1920s,137 and jazz was one of the first popular music genres in post-war Soviet 
Union.   American and British musical groups were the most popular and best marketed 
in the world, therefore when illegal music made it over Soviet borders it was likely to be 
from the U.S. or U.K.  Another reason was that for Soviet youth, the West, especially 
America, lingered as the pinnacle of the dynamic, fun, dangerous, and trend setting 
“other”, the forbidden fruit that young often seek out.  
 How did Soviet authorities react to greater encroachment of American popular 
culture into the lives of Soviet youth?   Soviet media showed Westernized youth of the 
period as lazy, materialistic, and their music and fashions as better suited for a crazy 
                                                        
135 William Jay Risch, “Soviet 'Flower Children. Hippies and the Youth Counter-culture in 1970s L'viv” 
Journal of Contemporary History 40 (2005), 579.   
136 For more detailed discussion on the topic see Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 363. 
137 For more on this see Anne Gorsuch, Flappers and foxtrotters : Soviet youth in the “roaring twenties” 
(Pittsburgh : Center for Russian & East European studies, 1994). 
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house or carnival.138  Unlike official treatment of stiliagi, however, these depictions 
rarely suggested criminal associations, and definitely had a more comical character than 
similar propaganda in the 1950s and early 1960s.        
 Soviet security institutions focused on different aspects of Western influences on 
Soviet youth.  A secret KGB report from 1976 attributed Western influences to targeted 
propaganda campaign instigated by Western intelligence agencies, with the CIA leading 
the way.  The report stated that by using radio, cultural exchanges, and other propaganda 
mediums, Western intelligence services sought to propagate disapproval of the Soviet 
government among youth.   Young people were particularly vulnerable to Western 
propaganda because of their as yet unstable and rapidly changing worldview, added the 
report.139  
 The KGB report also noted that a large number of these negative manifestations 
contained political overtones.  In its conclusion it again underlined that the primary 
objective should be the prevention of “politically harmful” influences.  Therefore, KGB 
saw proliferation of Western music, dances, and fashion as undesirable and harmful in 
general, but seriously harmful only when it inculcated political dissent. 
 On a local level, concerns over negative influences of Western pop culture 
sometimes lost out to temptations of personal enrichment.  I already mentioned largely 
futile attempts to co-opt Western music by promoting Soviet bands with similar sound by 
authorities in the 1950s and 1960s.  These failures, however, also showed that when 
Western music played during official youth functions it could bring in a hefty profit for 
                                                        
138 http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/sashenka2005/post139837209/.  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
139 “Analiticheskaia spravka KGB SSSR o kharaktere i prichinakh negativnykh proiavlenii sredi 
uchaisheisia i studen’cheskoi molodezhi,” Istoricheskii Arkhiv, No. 1, 1994, 195-207. 
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organizers and officials alike.  In his study of rock music in Dnepropetrovsk, Sergei Zhuk 
noted  
 
Thus the first wave of cultural consumption in the 1960s, that involving jazz, 
demonstrated the ability of both Soviet officials and common consumers to make money 
on new music and build new entrepreneurial connections, which would become the 
foundation for a lucrative music business in the closed city of the 1970s.140   
 
In another example, in his work on Soviet hippies in 1970s L’viv, William Risch pointed 
out that “local party authorities in L’viv did not perceive hippies as a serious ideological 
adversary, even allowing them to gather literally on their doorstep.”141   
 Therefore, it appears that despite authorities’ view of American music and hippie 
lifestyle as undesirable, they did not come down too hard as long as they did not 
challenge the government’s monopoly on shaping political discourse.  Consequently, any 
expression with political overtones, even those that paralleled official statements, was 
quickly shut down.  In 1971, for instance, a number of Soviet hippies planned a march 
from Moscow State University (MGU) to the American embassy in order to protest the 
Vietnam War.  As soon as they unwrapped their banners denouncing American 




 For a large number of young people, the Soviet system simply did not offer 
enough choices that fit their particular quest for self-identity.  As a result, they looked to 
places outside the Soviet borders, turning to Western dress, music, literature, and popular 
                                                        
140 Zhuk, 78. 
141 Risch, “Soviet 'Flower Children“, 579. 
142 Bushnell, 115. 
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culture in general.  Juliane Furst attributed this phenomenon to static nature of post-war 
Soviet system and ideology.  She wrote:   
 
Instead of contributing to the process of socialism through a continuous process of self-
transformation and self-improvement, the later Soviet self had to wrap itself around static 
messages and petrified rituals.  It had to fit, rather than to develop; it was expected to 
support rather than create.  Of course, the occasional ideological campaign such as the 
Virgin Lands provided a valve for ideological romanticism and revolutionary-type self-
fashioning.143 
 
 In many ways this assessment is correct.  We, however, cannot attribute it 
wholesale to the nature of the Soviet system.  Certainly, Soviet society had fewer avenues 
for youthful self-expression than many of the Western countries, but as we have seen that 
did not prevent Soviet youth from carving out their own niches.  Therefore, we should 
also view agency on the part of Soviet youth as part of a broader human condition, or as 
sociologist Thomas Cushman put it in his study of Soviet rock music: 
 
expressions of Russian culture take on new meanings if we view them as instances which 
illustrate the more general, universal capacity of individuals to exert agency and control 
over structural conditions which limit and constrain them.144 
 
 
 As I have shown in this chapter, the vast majority of the time Soviet youth’s 
adoption of Western popular culture was not a struggle against the Soviet system.  It was, 
however, a message that the system failed to address more existential needs of its 
younger members.   Of course we might ask whether any system is equipped for such a 
task, considering rebellion against the system is often a major part in a search for self-
identity.    
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 Events such as the 1957 Youth Festival, the 1959 (and subsequent) American 
exhibitions in Moscow, American radio broadcasts, music, movies, and consumer 
products undoubtedly had an impact on Soviet people’s view of America.   
 But what kind of an impact?  In other words, we must answer the question: Do 
people’s use of, or preference for, foreign cultural or consumer products signal a rejection 
of the political or social system under which they are living?  As I have shown, despite 
the significant presence of Americana in Soviet society and its apparently wide 
acceptance, American influences did not alter the core beliefs about America among a 
majority of the Soviet population in the post-World War II years (1945-1985).   
 Almost until the end of the Soviet Union, Soviet people saw America as a country 
with a high level of material wealth and Americans as having superb business acumen.  
Most also saw America as having achieved high standards in technological and consumer 
product spheres.  The limited amount of information, however, often inflated these 
perceptions far beyond reality.  Consequently, as we have seen in examples from 
American exhibitions, Soviets were frequently disappointed to find American products 
residing firmly in the realm of non-fiction.  In the eyes of the Soviets, American wealth 
came at a price.  They saw Americans as having chaotic and high paced lifestyles, high 
crime and lack of stability, as well as the absence of a social safety net and benefits such 
as free health care and education, all as a result of economic inequality.  Soviet people 
knew that America provided better living conditions for its citizens, but few saw it as an 
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improvement over their safe and stable existence.  However, people began to demand 
more from the government once the devastation and sacrifice of the World War II and 
post-war reconstruction began to fade in the 1970s.  The work of David Ruffley, for 
example, has shown the greater focus on material wellbeing and demands for higher 
personal realization among young Soviet specialists in the 1970s and 1980s.  Even so, 
these aspirations still remained within the confines of the Soviet system, and few called 
out for capitalism.  Therefore, while acknowledging that America achieved better results 
in certain fields, particularly consumer technology and goods, most Soviets did not see 
the American system as inherently better than their own.  To put it another way, despite 
attempts by the American government to promote American way of life through 
exhibitions, radio broadcasts, and cultural exchanges, Soviet people did not see the 
connection between high living standards in the United States and its social and political 
system.   
 It is here that we see why Soviet people managed to combine their loyalty to the 
Soviet system with their use and even admiration for American products.  These things 
remained on the outer level of Soviet perceptions about the United States and never 
permeated core Soviet beliefs about unjust nature of American system.  It was partly a 
matter of (perceived) quality—the US specialized in producing consumer goods, unlike 
the Soviet Union—and more attention was paid to ease of use and aesthetics.  It was 
partly exoticism—these goods were distinctive, clearly different from Soviet-produced 
products.  It was partly a safe challenge to the stultifyingly rigid Soviet official 
propriety—nobody could get into a lot of trouble for listening to Western music or 
wearing jeans.  In this way, an affinity for American popular culture was rather like 
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making jokes about the Soviet system: diverting, a bit risqué, a safe way to comment on 
the inadequacies of Soviet officialdom, but without intending a serious challenge.  And 
most of all, Western products and the model of America provided a way for Soviets to 
measure their own society against an international standard, and against its own promises, 
and to challenge their country to do better.  Rarely did one’s preference for American 
consumer or cultural products turn into a call for the overthrow of the Soviet government 
or radical changes to the values of social justice claimed by the Soviet system.         
 In his study of Soviet youth in the closed city of Dnepropetrovsk, Sergei Zhuk 
convincingly demonstrated that Western influences did indeed play a role in the 
emergence of anti-Soviet (as defined by Soviet officials) phenomena such as religiosity 
and nationalism.  Yet, as we have seen, even while challenging aspects of the Soviet 
system by comparing them to the United States, Soviet citizens often reaffirmed Soviet 
patriotism and condemnation of the American socio-politico-economic system.   
 Therefore, the problem rests in the question of how do we characterize the term 
anti-Soviet?  I and several other scholars of the Soviet Union, notably Furst and Yurchak, 
found that most Soviet users of Western cultural and consumer products did not see 
themselves as anti-Soviet.  At the same time, many others, officials as well as ordinary 
citizens, had the opposite view.   
 From the official perspective, anti-American/anti-West campaigns in the early 
post-World War II period sought to solidify public support for the government’s foreign 
and domestic policies that were being challenged by greater exposure to the West during 
the war.  With tensions undoubtedly heightened by the onset of the Cold War, officials 
depicted American influences as seriously damaging to the Soviet state and Soviet way of 
  322 
life.  Eventually, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, officials characterized their citizens’ 
use of American products (consumer and cultural) in softer colors.  Officially, such 
practices no longer posed direct threats but still signaled lack of vigilance to harmful 
influences to the Soviet way of life.   
 “I behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond 
reproach. I am obedient and therefore I have the right to be left in peace,” was the 
message communicated to his superiors by the Czech greengrocer who put up official 
posters in his window, according to Vaclav Havel.1  As far as authorities were concerned, 
a Soviet person wearing American jeans and listening to the Rolling Stones (American 
products not sanctioned by officials) sent the opposite message by not behaving in a 
manner expected of him.  In the later Soviet period, such a person was not necessarily a 
threat but certainly suspect in his allegiance to the Soviet way of life, as defined by 
authorities.  Moreover, authorities also worried about Soviet people yearning for material 
things that the system could not provide.  
 Following the official lead, many average Soviet people saw the use of American 
products not approved by the state as somehow anti-Soviet behavior.  In other words, 
their view of what it meant to be Soviet resided in the confines of the official framework.  
Deviations from this framework were considered as corroding to Soviet way of life.                         
 Therefore, my study of Soviet attitudes and reactions to the United States has 
value in our continued attempt to understand Soviet people’s debates about the nature of 
the Soviet state, its image, and its future, among themselves and with their government.   
America often served as a symbol in a variety of more personal issues ranging from self-
                                                        
1 Vaclav Havel, “Power of the Powerless.” Available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/700.  
Accessed May 17, 2012. 
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expression to grievances over compensation for work.  It is clear that America, as 
representative of the greater West, figured prominently in these debates. 
 Despite their propensity to invoke “America” as a rhetorical device to challenge 
Soviet authorities, most average Soviets continued to view America within the 
framework of official propaganda, despite the availability and widespread use (especially 
in post-Stalin years) of unofficial information such as Western radio broadcasts.  These 
findings suggest that the Soviet state managed to control the prism through which the 
people viewed America.  Moreover, it raises questions about the extent and mechanisms 
in which radio broadcasts and cultural exchanges influenced Soviet public opinion.               
 For example, millions of Soviet people listened to Western radio broadcasts such 
as VOA and RL.  My analysis, however, showed that high listenership did not imply that 
American propaganda to the Soviet Union achieved its goals of becoming a trusted news 
source and presenting American system as a better alternative to the Soviet Union.  
Indeed, many Soviets received information from American radio, yet without the ability 
to independently verify this information, most were just as skeptical of the American 
version as they were of the Soviet one.  The same was true of American exhibitions.  The 
focus of American propaganda on material prosperity in the United States simply 
reaffirmed something the Soviets knew from the days predating the 1917 October 
Revolution.  At the same time, it did little to dispel the widely held view of America as a 
land of vast social inequality and American foreign policy as based on the need for war to 
maximize Wall Street profits.  The cultural exchange showed Soviet people that America 
was not a devoid of high culture, yet it did not change the perception of American culture 
as largely lowbrow, based on glorifying sex and violence.    
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 Within these overall conclusions, the opportunity for further refinement remains.  
This dissertation touched briefly on issues of gender, profession, nationality, and 
geographical location in regard to reactions to America, but further research would 
permit refinements of my initial conclusions.  These include findings suggesting that 
Soviet women, as mothers, were more receptive than men to official propaganda 
regarding peace initiatives which portrayed America as a warmonger and the Soviet 
Union as protector of peace.   
 In other examples, peasants appeared more willing than urban workers to accept 
the government’s assertions regarding the United States, mostly due to lower education 
levels and limited availability of outside information in the countryside.  At the same 
time, lack of information caused greater exaggerations of both official and unofficial 
statements about the United States.  In addition, Soviet minority nationalities, especially 
those who are racially different from the Russian majority, readily incorporated the 
American racism narrative in discussing relations among ethnic groups in the Soviet 
Union. 
 This dissertation enables further comparative analysis, comparing and contrasting 
popular responses to the Cold War in the Soviet Union and the United States.  Clearly, 
public responses reflect the context of the political and social systems in each country.  
For example, in both countries, people idealized in the “other” in regard to situations that 
were problematical at “home.”  So while Americans who struggled with problems of 
unemployment idealized Soviet full employment, Soviets who struggled with the 
availability of consumer goods idealized American comfort.  In both countries, people 
imaged that women had superior rights.  In both countries, the “other” was used less as a 
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model for future development than as a rhetorical device to challenge weaknesses in the 
current system.  However, unlike American pop-culture in the Soviet Union, Soviet 
culture never became desirable or exotic among Americans, even among American youth 
who rejected the cultural norms of their elders.  Further study will help to answer the 
question of why the cultural exoticism was unidirectional. 
 This project has significant implications for the receptivity of Russians today to 
American political, social, economic and cultural values.  To what extent have the 
patterns and perceptions of the Cold War era persisted in contemporary Russia and other 
states of the former Soviet Union?  How do they influence the current Russian 
government’s interactions with the United States?  In his statements, Vladimir Putin 
frequently has blamed the United States for inciting instability during 2012 parliamentary 
and presidential elections in Russia.  This is evidence that in official statements America 
continues to play a role of chief adversary, although with more old-fashioned geopolitical 
terms replacing ideology. 
 In some ways, the Russian official rhetoric regarding the United States has been 
strikingly similar to those of the Soviet era.  For example, Russian official statements on 
European based missile defense shield seek to portray Russia as a peaceful victim and the 
U.S. as a senseless aggressor.  This is a tactic quite similar to Soviet Cold War 
propaganda that sought to convince the Soviet population that the Soviet Union fought 
only for peace while the United States thrived on its profits from war.      
 In other aspects, present day Russian attempts to influence public opinion differ 
from those of its Soviet past.  Soviet era efforts to shape public opinion in regard to the 
U.S were based largely on rather unsophisticated depictions of America as a country 
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high-jacked by a small clique of profit-motivated “warmongers.”  Such propaganda 
techniques required almost complete government control of all the media and restrictions 
on foreign travel--something the current Russian government is unwilling and unable to 
do considering the prevalent use of internet and satellite dishes.2  The current Russian 
approach is undoubtedly taking lessons from the largely unsuccessful attempts by the 
Soviet government to prevent the population from listening to Western radio broadcasts 
during the Cold War. Therefore, the Russian government is intent on presenting its case 
for opposition to the American missile defense shield as having a scientific, rather than 
ideological, basis.  For example, in laying out the scientific case for Russian 
apprehensions about the missile shield, Putin repeatedly pointed to the low level of rocket 
technology of North Korea and Iran--the two countries cited by the U.S. as possible 
nuclear threats.3  This approach is far more effective at influencing the views of the 
general public, as arguments based on science, despite their truth or falsity, are far more 
resilient under basic scrutiny. 
 Interestingly, Russian public reactions to the U.S. changed little from those in the 
Soviet days where people viewed the U.S. in contradictory terms, essentially blaming the 
U.S. for fomenting the Cold War, while simultaneously envying American living 
standards and holding generally positive feelings towards Americans as people.  
Similarly, current Russian public opinion polls define the United States primarily as a 
                                                        
2 There is little doubt that the Russian government under Putin succeeded in pushing much of the official 
media towards the government line.  Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the average Russian today has 
numerous alternative sources of information.  Russians can readily access American news sources, such as 
CNN and see what American life is like through YouTube, commercial and educational websites, and 
entertainment media, via satellite television, the internet, and travel. 
3 Putin stated that both North Korea and Iran basically possessed upgraded versions of the World War II 
German technology. 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2001/06/18/0002_type63376type63380_28569.shtml  Accessed April 22, 
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wealthy country, but one that imposes its worldview on the rest of the globe, and seeing 
the U.S. as the primary threat to global security.4  
 The Russian government’s vocal concern over the proposed American missile 
shield and NATO expansion in early 2001 had a significant effect on public opinion.  
According to surveys conducted by the All Russian Research Center of Public Opinion 
(WCIOM), between July 2000 and February 2001, the number of Russians who saw 
American-Russian relations in a positive light declined by 11% to 59% of those 
interviewed.   However, the survey indicates that this trend did not last, as by May 2001, 
69% of respondents once again saw U.S.-Russia relations as “generally good.”5  The 
instability of the negative feelings towards the U.S. is a possible indicator that the “base” 
feelings of the Russian public towards the U.S. are generally positive, being affected by 
certain statements from the Russian government, but only for a short period of time.  The 
contradictory feelings are in line with previous largely positive views of Americans as 
people and negative attitude towards the American government.  
 May 2002 surveys found similar attitudes, where about 62% saw U.S.-Russian 
relations in a positive light.6  At the end of 2005, public opinion surveys showed that 
while the majority of those polled had a favorable opinion of the U.S., regardless of their 
party affiliation, most still saw the United States as a primary threat, both in military and 
                                                        
4 http://www.levada.ru/om2008.html  Accessed April 22, 2012. 
5 http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/601.html?no_cache=1&cHash=6c64426fcc   
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
6 http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/247.html?no_cache=1&cHash=64413e326f. 
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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economic spheres.7  Moreover, there had been a decline in the number of people who 
viewed U.S.-Russia relations with optimism: 64% in 2003 to 54% in 2008. 8 
 According to one public opinion expert, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russians developed what was referred to as an “inferiority complex,” and now 
“viewed most world events through the prism of this complex.”9  For example, one 
commentator noted that Russians envied early American military successes in 
Afghanistan: “How is it possible that Americans accomplished in a few months what we 
could not accomplish in 11 years.”10  Russian attitudes toward the East European missile 
shield, therefore, should be viewed through the same prism.  For the average Russian, the 
shield and the Russian government’s inability to do anything about it, conjures up painful 
memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia, a historical Russian ally, in 1999. 
 In short, most Russians resent the loss of superpower status and tend to see 
American foreign policy as heavy-handed and arrogant.  This was an opinion expressed 
by several experts during a 2007 discussion of American-Russian relations on Ekho-
Moskvy radio station.  One participant attributed the American stance concerning the 
European missile shield to periodic instances when America was “drunk with power.”  
Another expert noted that American proposals regarding the missile shield showed that 
Americans intended to dominate any discussion on the issue. 11        
                                                        
7 http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/2180.html?no_cache=1&cHash=040effddb0. 
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
8 http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10432.html?no_cache=1&cHash=88db311008. 
Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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 Polls by other institutions studying Russian public opinion tend to support the 
general trends noted in the WCIOM surveys.  For example, public opinion research by 
the Levada Center showed that the largest percentage of Russians viewed the U.S.-
Russian relations as stable, yet more on the negative side, with some rather dramatic 
changes during open disagreements between the two countries (ex. EE missile shield, 
Georgian conflict).12  At the same time, since 2000, the overwhelming majority of 
Russians see the American people in a positive light, suggesting that Russians view the 
American government and the American people as separate entities.13  This is a trend 
similar to popular opinion in post-WWII Soviet Union, where the Soviets saw average 
American people as being exploited by the ruthless alliance of Wall Street and 
Washington.  
More recent events suggest that Russians see certain areas of possible cooperation 
with the United States.  For example, much like Americans, Russians viewed “Islamic 
terrorism” as the primary threat to national and international security, but are sharply 
critical of the U.S. methods in the “war on terror,” suspecting the U.S. of using the war as 
a cover for global domination and undermining Russian security.  For example, a 2008 
Russian survey found that the largest percentage (40%) of Russians viewed the American 
cancelation of the East European missile shield as only temporary, and saw the original 
intent for the shield as an American desire for military supremacy over Russia.14  
Moreover, another poll showed that a majority of the Russian population fully supported 
the government’s proposed military response in form of placing Iskander missiles in the 
                                                        
12 http://www.levada.ru/om2008.html. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
13 Ibid. 
14 http://www.levada.ru/press/2009100901.html. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
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Kaliningrad region.15  Significantly, these views correspond to the Russian government’s 
rhetoric on the subject, demonstrating that the population remains willing to accept the 
government’s depiction of US goals rather than believing the US government’s 
statements. 
Polls show that Russian public opinion is strongly influenced by the official 
government position, conveyed through the mass media that is largely controlled by the 
government.  These fluctuations in public opinion, however, are short lived and do not 
appear to have a significant permanent effect on the Russians view of the United States as 
a business and technological leader as well as generally positive attitude towards 
Americans as people.  As a result, it is safe to speculate that while the Russian 
government significantly influences public opinion, significant deviations from “core” 
beliefs about America, both positive and negative, will remain short-lived and difficult to 
sustain.    
Certain actions by the United States (for example, the East European missile 
shield), however, viewed as hostile by average Russians, will have long-term effects on 
public perceptions of the United States.   In a brief survey16 of comments in articles 
regarding U.S.-Russian relations, I found that many Russians still view the U.S. as an 
adversary that does not have Russia’s best interests in mind.  For example, an article on 
the cancelation of the missile shield by President Barak Obama drew the common 
response that America is doing this out of their own interest by switching to more 
effective and cheaper alternatives. “USA never does anything against its interests.  If they 
                                                        
15 http://www.levada.ru/om2008.html. Accessed April 22, 2012. 
16 The survey, done in 2010 by the author, included around twenty articles from the Russian website 
mail.ru.  A majority of the articles focused on the issue of U.S.-Russia relations.  Specifically, issues 
surrounding the U.S. missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. 
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removed [missiles] from the Czech Republic, then they will put them in more 
advantageous spots – the sea, islands, etc.  We need to follow their example and surround 
Europe and the U.S. with missiles,” wrote one reader.17  Most Russians consider their 
country the dominant player in the surrounding region, and view American military 
presence (such as the missile defense shield) as provocation that has to be forcefully 
countered.  In other words, a significant part of Russians reactions to America is rooted in 
nationalism.  Further studies will need to determine with more precision the extent to 
which nationalism contributed to Russians view of America, past and present. 
 As we saw, besides being a Cold War adversary and an inspiration for popular 
culture trends, America has also been a “mirror” for Russians to see themselves and their 
place in the world.  Therefore, attitudes about the United States were ultimately attitudes 
about the Soviet Union itself.  Limited access to outside information played a major role 
in this use of America as a measuring stick.  The next question, then, is how has this 
sentiment changed now that Russia is firmly entrenched in worldwide information 
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